Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Motion to Dismiss Void Judgment CCP 473 (d)

Sharon Stephens
Pro per
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO                                                               
8303 North Haven Avenue
Rancho Cucamonga, CA  91730
CASE NO.:  MWV 903720


 CCP 473(d)
 TIME:    8:30  AM
 DATE:  September 23, 2011
 DEPT   7

                              TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 23, 2011, at 8:30 a.m. in the department 7, in the above Court located at 8303 North Haven Avenue, Rancho Cucamonga, California, 91730, Sharon Stephens (hereinafter “Stephens”) Petitioner and Defendant in this case will move and hereby moves for an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments, including any contempt charges.
    Stephens has already argued that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter any order or judgment in this case including the contempt proceedings therefore making them void. Judge Sabet ignored that, and all arguments of Stephens, therefore Stephens does not now waive anyclaim that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction but adds Judge Sabet committed fraud on the court by sitting on the case at all.
    San Bernardino County and its attorneys committed the first fraud upon the court by not disclosing that San Bernardino County was making payments payment to Judge Sabet. Judge Sabet joined in this fraud upon
the court by not disclosing such in violation of Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2). She further violated Canon 3E(1) and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A) (iii) by not disqualifying herself. She also violated Canon 4D(1) by accepting San Bernardino County payments.
   During her tenure as a San Bernardino judge from January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011it is estimated that Judge Sabet received approximately $300,000 in payments from San Bernardino County.(EXHIBIT A)
    The San Bernardino County payments to judges were held to violate Article VI, section 19, of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08. They were recognized as criminal in California Senate Bill SBx2-11, which gave retroactive immunity to “governmental entity and officers and employees of a governmental entity” including  judges from criminal prosecution, civil liability, and disciplinary action for receiving “judicial benefits” effective 5/21/09.
    The retroactive immunity did not extend to “fraud on the court” or the obstruction of justice of not disclosing the payments. Nor does it extend to judges presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party before the judges. After 5/21/09, no immunity existed for the payments.
   The second fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet, and the San Bernardino County Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu conspired with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, ignored the law of CCP 527.8 and unlawfully incarcerated Stephens in West Valley Detention Center on a void on the face Temporary Restraining Order, and ignored mandated Criminal Charging Affidavits against Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck leaving them free of any charge of misconduct.
   The third fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet and San Bernardino County District Attorney, in conspiracy with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck prosecuted Stephens on a void on the face contempt order, and unlawfully incarcerated her in West Valley Detention Center.
   U.S. Supreme Court precedents hold that fraud upon the court vitiates the case; that all orders and judgments are regarded as nullities and void. SEE: U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61,64,66(1878); Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. (1920))
                             MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES


    Moving Party Stephens Petitioner and former Defendant in this case seeks an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments in this case, and all contempt proceedings.
     As stated in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08, Counties began making payments to State Superior Court judges in the late 1980s. The Sturgeon case held that these payments violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution.
     A letter from Roger M. Whitby written November 10, 1988 was produced in the appellate phase of the Sturgeon case.
    Such letter showed that (1) only the State Legislature could “prescribe” the “compensation” of judges, under Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution; (2) “compensation” encompassed fringe benefits, according to two California Attorney General opinions; (3) the Legislature’s duty was not delegable to any other body, according to California case law; (4) Superior Court judges are State Constitutional Officers; and (5) The Board of Supervisors has claimed to have found that in order to attract and retain qualified judges to serve in this County it is necessary
and appropriate to provide them with benefits and a flexible benefit plan contribution – in addition to their State salary, State benefits, and State retirement. It appears the sole purpose of these payments was only  be to influence the judges to rule in favor of San Bernardino County, which was often a party before the judges accepting
the money.

    Code of Ethics Canon 4(D)(1) prohibits judges from entering into
financial dealings that:
                 (a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the
judge’s judicial position, or
                 (b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or
continuing business relationships with…persons likely to appear
before the court in
 which the judge serves.

     CCP 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) mandated such judges disqualification.

      Such Section states:

                     A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:
                     [ ] A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that
                     the judge would be able to be impartial.

                     Canon 3E(2) requires a judge to: disclose on the record information that
 reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under
                     Code of
 Civil Procedure section 170.1, even if the judge believes there
                     is no
 actual basis for disqualification.

                      Canon 3E(1) requires the judge to “disqualify”
                      himself or herself in any
                      proceeding in which disqualification is required by law.

    Any judge who received any San Bernardino County benefits was bound to disclose such and disqualify him or her self.
    If the judge does not disclose and disqualify themselves they can be facing bribery charges.
    After the Sturgeon decision, the legislature enacted Senate BillSBx2-11which recognized that the County payments to judges were criminal. Senate Bill SBx2-11 gave retroactive immunity, effective 5/21/09, from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to a “governmental entity, officer, or employee of a governmental entity.” The retroactive immunity did not extend to the judge’s actions presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party. Nor, did it extend to county payments received after 5/21/09.
     At all times, judges who accepted “bribes” from an interested party were biased. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the  appearance of justice,” Levine v. United States 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960) citing Offutt v.  United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).
Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party
 over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.
    Further, the judge receiving the payment may be prosecuted for violating the intangible right to honest services under Federal Law 18 U.S.C. section 1346. The U.S. Supreme Court held under Skilling v.United States 561 (Decided 6/24/2010), Slip Options pages 48-49, that section 1346, encompasses bribery and kickbacks.
      A.   For more than a year the San Bernardino County Office of
District Attorney and the court, particularly Judge Sabet has
persecuted Stephens on a void on the face restraining order. Stephens
has been in and out of false arrests and unlawful incarcerations, and
has been drug back and forth to court like a rag doll, all the while
being homeless and living in her car because of a retaliatory eviction
by Logan Property Management Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck, essentially
for complaining about lack of fire safety and criminal behavior on her
senior apartment complex.
      When Stephens fought the bogus eviction, Attorney Hollenbeck
filed two sham Workplace Violence Restraining Orders, CCP 527.8. One
was promptly and properly dismissed for not meeting the required
statutory or case law to issue the order. The second slipped by and
went into court where it was challenged as void in a 402 Hearing.
         Judge Sabet sat through the entire 402 Hearing brought to
challenge this void on the face.
Workplace Violence Restraining Order under CCP 527.8, after admitting,
at the start to “not
knowing the law of void judgments.” There were “complex legal issues;”
she ought to have
recused herself right there, or, taken the time to research the law.
Instead she went on to retry
the case which openly violated legal procedure of deciding a void
judgment challenge. From the
beginning the TRO was void on the face for not meeting the criteria
for violence. A TRO is also
void after 14 days.

                 "It is well settled that a judgment or order which
is void on its face, and which
                   requires only an  inspection of the judgment-roll
or record to show its invalidity,
                   may be set aside on motion, at any time after its
entry, by the court which
                   rendered the judgment or made the order. Other
Courts my also may do the
                   same. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord
Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983)
                   140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761
      Judge Sabet exceeded her jurisdiction, and therefore committed
fraud upon the court. At the

 end of several hours of false, subrogated perjured testimony she then
asked the attorneys to

present points and authorities so she could decide the case. They had none!

                  Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals
                   to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or
attempts to, defile the court
                   itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of
the court [Judges are officers of
                   the court] so that the judicial machinery can not
perform in the usual manner
                   its impartial task of adjudging cases that are
presented for adjudication."
                   Kennerv. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's
Federal Practice,2d ed.,
                   p. 512, 60.23.

                The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced
by fraud upon the court
                  is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final."
                  The judgment is void.

       On May 26, 2010 Judge Sabet had to dismiss this void on the
face restraining order because someone informed her case was void.
Then, in what can only be called a mean-spirited, retaliatory move she
ignored the law of CCP 527,8, and at the insistence of Deputy District
Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, and with a sneer on
her lips,  gave an order to incarcerate Stephens, on the antecedent,
void on the face temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in the case, and
set Bail at $150,000 (Excessive Bail: Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. (1951)
the U.S. Supreme Court: A judge or justice may be censured for
"setting 'grossly excessive' bail and [thus] showing a 'severe
attitude' toward witnesses and litigants," as the Michigan Supreme
Court did to a trial judge recently: Debra Cassens Weiss, writes,
"Judge Censured for Excessive Bail, Severe Attitude", (ABA Journal,
February 8, 2008).

                Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
[subject matter] jurisdiction to
                act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of
treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
                216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 );
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
                (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

                Any judge or attorney who does not report a judge for
treason as required
                by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of
treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.

     On January 11, 2011 Judge Sabet again unlawfully incarcerates
(“Stephens” ) for 50

 days in West Valley Detention for having Attorney Linda Hollenbeck
served with a

 Notice of Intent to sue, claiming it is a violation of the void on
the face probation that she

had set.

               Such void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and
can legally be ignored
               as they neither bind, nor bar anyone. "Obviously a
judgment, though final
               and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject
to collateral attack
               if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter or person,
               and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is
obtained by extrinsic
               fraud. [Citations.]" 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,
Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).

      B. San Bernardino County and Its Attorneys’ Fraud Upon The Court

      San Bernardino County nor its attorneys have never disclosed to
this day that San Bernardino County has made payments to Judge Sabet.
     Judge Sabet is a native born Iranian who came to the United
States in 1970 because there was no room for her in the university
there. Judge Sabet feels becoming a judge may be related to genetic
predisposition. Her grandfather was a justice of the Iran Supreme
Court and two cousins also served as judges at a time when a codified
system of justice, was based on code rather than case law, [stare
decisis], an inquisitorial system, such as exists in France. The
judge serves not only as judge but as prosecutor, jury, and arbiter.
The Islamic legal system of Sharia (Islamic law) and Fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence) has always been an influence in the Iranian law system,
where the  judge holds absolute power, there is no stare decisis, and
laws allow circumstantial evidence to be used in deciding a case
"under the rubric of `the judge's reasoning."
     Stephens has been witness to Judge Sabet practicing this sort of
“law” in the court room.
     In Judge Sabet’s biography, written in February 2006 she had
served on the county bench for 12 years, and prior to that served in
the San Bernardino County District Attorneys’ Office. From
    January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011 it is estimated that Judge
Sabet received approximately more than $300,000 in payments from San
Bernardino County.
     Judge Sabat has never disclosed any of these county payments to
those appearing before her. Stephens  is putting her on official
notice that she is reporting Judge Sabet to The Fair Political
Practices Commission for violating the Political Reform Act's
requirement that she disclose this County income on her Form 700, Her
actions were improper. There is a criminal doctrine of law that if you
receive money you are not entitled to, and you keep it -- that is
considered theft.
   We have Judge Sabet along with a group of members of the judiciary
that have effectively engaged in what is called a RICO scheme which is
a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act scheme. And the basis of
the scheme is that you have the illegal payments. You have them taking
place time and time again. You have the judges obstructing justice.
That is a RICO scheme.
   The entire judiciary system in California is susceptible to this
scheme and the 38 million people of California are victims of this
    Ninety percent of the judges in California received illegal
payments and that goes all the way up to five out of the seven
California Supreme Court justices received those illegal payments. So
the system is rife with obstruction.
     When a judge is receiving payments from the county and one of
the parties appearing before him is represented by the county the
judge MUST disclose these payments to everybody in the courtroom.
     It became an extrinsic fraud when Judge Sabet did not disclose
the payments she received
 from the county and it prevented Stephens from getting due process
and a fair trial and that’s
extrinsic fraud and actually deprives the court of jurisdiction. And
when there is no jurisdiction
anything that Judge Sabet did in this case is void.
    Judge Sabet, and all judges has a responsibility under the Code
of Judicial Ethics Rule 3E, 3E 1 and 2. to disclose these payments.
The responsibility existed to not even accept the payments under the
Code of Judicial Ethics 4D 1. And the responsibility exists for the
judges to tell other judges about these illegal payments and that is
under the federal statute the misprision of felony, 18 U.S.C. Section
4 which makes it a federal crime for someone who knows of a crime
being committed to not tell a judge about such crime; that is a
federal crime.
    And state court judges are bound to follow federal law and that’s
under Article 6 Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
   The United States – U.S. Attorney or Attorney General, Eric
Himpton Holder can prosecute

 these people;

    Judge Sabet ought to be in jail.


    The U.S. Supreme Court, which the Superior Court is bound to
follow, stated in U.S. v.

Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878):

                 “There is no question of the general doctrine that
fraud vitiates
                    the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.”

       The Court continued at page 66:
                   “Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally
with a contract . . .”
                   (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499).

     The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in  Vallely v. Northern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
      254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920):

                    “Courts are constituted by authority, and they
cannot [act] beyond the
                     power delegated to them.  If they act beyond
that authority, and
                     certainly in contravention of it, their
judgments and orders are
                     regarded as nullities.  They are not voidable,
but simply void, and this
                     even prior to reversal.”  Elliott v. Lessee of
Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
                     328, 340; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236

    The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Austin v. Smith,
312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962), in

    light of F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5), held:
                    “…if the underlying judgment is void, the
judgment based upon it is also
                       void. “

                    “When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they
are a trespasser of the law,
                    the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and
the judges orders are void,
                    of no legal force or effect.” The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,
                    416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated
that, "when a state officer
                    acts under a state law in a manner violative of
the Federal Constitution, he
                    comes into conflict with the superior authority
of that Constitution, and he
                    is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is
                    subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct.
                    The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility
                    to the supreme authority of the United States."
[Emphasis supplied in original].

      Judge Shaela S. Sabet no longer has immunity from a lawsuit against her.

      There is undeniable proof that Judge Sabet violated her
responsibility to give  due process and a fair trial to Stephens, and
in  making judgments she had no authority to make the judgments and
orders that caused Stephens a great deal of hurt and harm. Stephens
has standing to disqualify her, and to have all of her judgments
dismissed as void.
       This obstruction of justice must not be allowed to continue.
It has already destroyed
 the integrity of the California judicial system.  Unless it is
stopped now, it will destroy what little
 remains of the California judicial system.  A report from the
Administrative Office of the Courts
 shows that 90% of the judges receive County payments. Unlawfully
incarcerating people such as Stephens and others  has resulted in
arousing the anger of many. Calls for prosecution of the judges and
the supervisors have begun and will not stop until this problem is
resolved and the judicial system is reformed.
       It is time for the Superior Court to obey the law and void and
annul all the orders and

 judgments in the case and in all contempt proceeding.         

Friday, September 2, 2011



August 10, 2011


City of Cathedral City
Council Chambers in City Hall

68-700 Avenida Lalo Guerrero
Cathedral City, CA   92234  
On January 29, 2005 I attend a meeting in the Cathedral City Police Department with Captain Kevin Connor and Sgt. Charles Robinson to discuss a false arrest, abuse of process and abuse while in the custody of Sgt. Hatfield.  I explained I was also was going to a pre-arraigned  meeting down the hall that morning with Mary Brhel, ( her husband Martin Brhel, an ex-deputy district attorney), an aide to Assemblywoman Bonnie Garcia, and therefore could only spend a short amount of time on the Hatfield matter. I did not explain my business regarding Garcia.

I met with Mary Brhel to talk about the ongoing problems with homeowner associations in the 
Coachella Valley.   (On December 7, 2004 we had held a press conference in my home with Pat Cooper, aide to Senator Duchency to discuss these problems.) Mary Brhel and I had a good talk and she promised to call me back the following day.  She didn’t.

On February 2, 2005 I called Mary Brhel who told me two Cathedral City Police Officers had come into the Garcia office as soon as I left and had told her I had “made all kinds of problems for the Cathedral City police and other government agencies, and was a ‘threat.’ “ She said she was putting me on a threat list in 
Sacramento, and then hung up on me. She refused to tell me the names of these two men, however it is not hard to guess… I complained to Chief Henry, and asked for an investigation. It never happened and not one person in the police department, nor the City Manager or the mayor, or City Council  would talk with me.

And so on February 3, 2005 began provable conspiracy between the Garcia Office, the Cathedral City Police Department, Shadow Crest Homeowner Association, and stretched all the way to the Riverside County District Attorney. Cindy Uken of the Desert Sun was convinced to write a article filled with lies.

The well documented facts of this are in Kendall Berkey’s  65 page Memo of Costs in Case No, 0424575 Robinson v. Stephens, Riverside County Superior Court, Indio – a void on the face restraining order:

Government agencies may not have a TRO or Retraining Order against a citizen: Under Civil Code of Procedure 527.6, “ government agencies are not individuals, and cannot bring a TRO against a citizen, and police officers in particular cannot object to a person wanting them to do their job.” Diamond View, Ltd v. Herz (1986)180,Cal App 3d 612, 618 – 619, 225 Cal. Rptr. 651,655/;    (Civil Code of Procedure 533)   Civil Code of Procedure 537.6 “ …was enacted to supplement the tort of Invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, therefore a person must prove these two elements.” Grant v. Clampett (1997) 2nd District) 56 Cal App 4th 586, 65 Cal Rptr 2d 727.  “There must be clear and convincing evidence of suffering great medical or psychological distress.”  Sheild v. Rubin (1991, 2nd Dis) 232 Cal App 3d 755, 283 Cal Rptr 533     

The court had no jurisdiction to issue an order under CCP 527,6 and under all stated law and facts the Robinson case is void.

Under Federal Law, which is applicable in all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated “…if a court is without authority, its judgment sand orders are regarded as nullities They are not voidable, but simply void … They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers.”  Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

 Void on the face judgments “never die” in the State of California and CCP  473, and 473(a) has not direct reference to void orders, i.e., the time limitation is not applicable. Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal App 4th 1186,1194   

An Appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree – a void order. Svistunoff v. Svistunoff (1952) 108 
Cal App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P2d 650], and see: 6 WitkenCal Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal Sec. 7, pp. 4024-4025

On February  3, 2005 Chief Stan HenryJudy WilliamsCaptain Kevin Connor, and Sgt. Charles Robinson, with the help of Assistant City Manager, Kendall Berkey  began a totally unmerited “investigation” against me that never produced anything  but “legal expenses” which were added and added to the point of $68,000  which were awarded to them by the court in this case --  a case that was brought only to protect Captain Kevin Connor and Sgt. Charles Robinson, and other officers in the department from an investigation for abuse and slander, and to keep me from making valid complaints.  

Judy Williams would appear in court for the police department and claim I violated the restraining order, and I would be sentenced to over a year in the 
County Jail - in solitary confinement. ($100.00 a day compensation is not fair to me, but lawful.)

I never violated anything in asking the police to protect me from provable crimes in Shadowcrest Homeowners Association.

Void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and can legally be ignored as they neither bind nor bar anyone. “Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction or the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations}”  WitkinCal. Procedure,  Judgment, Section 286, p. 828.

While I was unlawfully incarcerated, 
City Attorney, Charles Green approached my daughter to sell my home to Cathedral City to pay for the legal expenses awarded after the case. She gave in to their demands, and I could do nothing in jail but agree to the sale.  There was approximately $380,000 in equity in the home. Not only did the equity go to Cathedral City, but they never paid their agreed upon expenses in the sale of approximately $5,000.

The sale of the home was based on fraud, and therefore void. This is a case in-itself.

City Attorney, Charles Green and his assistant, Kendall Berkey did no due diligence to discover and abide by the law as mentioned above, and in this did they commit fraud on the court.  I shall take this to the Cal State Bar as a formal complaint against both.

As a direct result of the void on the face restraining orderthe conspiracyfraud, elder abuse, and more than one unlawful arrests and unlawful incarcerations I lost not only my home, but about  $500.000. I will settle for $450,000

Kindly send me a check or money order for the amount of $450,000 on or before 
August 23, 2011 or I shall promptly file in Superior Court.

You may reach me at any time at, 760.835.8210

Most sincerely,

Sharon Stephens



Void on the face judgments “never die” in the State of California
CCP  473, and 473(a) has no direct reference to void orders, i.e.,
 the time limitations is not applicable.
Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal App 4th 1186,1194

     Motions to vacate void judgments may be made at any time after judgment. County of Ventura v. Tillett, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110.).

     A judgment is void on its face if the trial court exceeded its subject matter or personal jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant.
   Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties. (Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408].) Thus, the fact that a judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation does not insulate the judgment from attack on the ground that it is void. In People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan (1947) 81 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21-22 [183 P.2d 368], the court explained: "[P]rior to 1933 the provisions of section 473 and of section 473a were contained in one section, so that there was both a six-month and a one-year limitation found in the section, applicable, of course, to different situations. In that year the original section 473 was split into two parts. Old paragraph 3 of section 473 remained in that section. That paragraph refers to judgments taken against a party through his 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,' and requires the motion to be made within six months. The paragraph has no direct reference to void judgments. Section 473a (formerly and until 1933 a part of section 473) provides for a particular situation -- where summons has not been personally served (even though constructive service is permitted) the court may allow the aggrieved party within one year to answer on the merits. Both the third paragraph of section 473 and section 473a are primarily directed to setting aside valid judgments. Prior to 1933, section 473 contained no express provision relating to the power of courts to set aside void judgments.
     Prior to that time the law was settled that courts of record possessed inherent power to set aside a void judgment, whether or not it was void on its face, provided that, as to a void judgment not void on its face, the motion was made within a reasonable time. If the motion was not made within a reasonable time the party was relegated to an action in equity. In determining whether the motion was made within a reasonable time the courts applied by analogy the one-year provision of old section 473, now section 473a. Thus, when these old cases referred to the time limits of section 473 they were referring to the one-year limitation, not the six-month limitation. When the Legislature revamped section 473 in 1933, and broke it down into two sections, they added to section 473 paragraph 4. This paragraph was formerly section 900a of the Code of Civil Procedure, applying to courts not of record. So far as pertinent here that paragraph now reads: 'The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.' (For a discussion of the 1933 amendments to section 473 see Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal. 2d 563, 572 [107]. It is well settled that erroneous final judgments serve as a bar to further litigation on the action, whereas in general void judgments may be collaterally attacked.

     A void judgment or order may properly may be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to void judgments or orders.

     "Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.)

     California Civil Procedure 437(d), provides that a court, on noticed motion, may set aside void judgments and orders. Courts also have inherent power to set aside a void judgment.
 Courts also possess inherent power to grant such relief.(Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.)  `It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761"...a default that is void on the face of the record when entered is subject to challenge at any time irrespective of lack of diligence in seeking to set it aside within the six-month period of section 473."].). 

     The normal rule that "the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order" ( § 916, subd. (a)) does not apply. "[A] court may set aside a void order at any time."

    An appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree -- a void order." (MacMillan Petroleum Corp. v. Griffin (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 523, 533 [222 P.2d 69]; accord: People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467 [89 Cal. Rptr. 290]; Svistunoff v. Svistunoff (1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P.2d 650]; and SEE: 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 7, pp. 4024-4025.) EXAMPLE:Consequently, notwithstanding the pending appeal from the earlier order of November 25, 1969, which necessarily carried with it a consideration of the validity of the judgment entered October 31, 1967, the order of August 14, 1970, limited to those aspects which trim off the void judgment and orders, should be affirmed. 

     The courts' power to control their own judgments is statutory. 19 Cal. 2d at p. 573. Apart from statutory authority, the courts have the inherent power to correct clerical errors in their judgments or to vacate void judgments.

     Although it has been held, by analogy to section 473a, that such motions should be made within one year from the date the judgment sought to be set aside was rendered (Washko v. Stewart, 44 Cal. App. 2d 311, 317 [112 P.2d 306]; Richert v. Benson Lbr. Co., 139 Cal. App. 671, 674-676 [34 P.2d 840]) this time limitation does not apply where the judgment is based on a fraudulent return. (Washko v. Stewart, supra, p. 318; Richert v. Benson Lbr. Co., supra, p. 677.).

It is true that the statute of limitations does not apply to an archaic suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, supra, p. 569; Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648].) However,  this rule holds as to all void judgments. In the two cases cited, People v. Massengale and In re Sandel, the courts hearing the respective appeals confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct void judgments (in excess of jurisdiction), therefore, the rule holds up to dismissal of void judgment in all cases.