tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29431963343804519742024-03-13T03:50:20.702-07:00Ain't It BeautifulSharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comBlogger81125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-4327632781637541152013-06-19T00:07:00.000-07:002013-06-19T00:07:04.868-07:00<a href="http://www.uglyjudge.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/bonnie-garcia-cathedral-city-california-incarcerated-sharon-stephens-abuse-of-power.gif"><img alt="bonnie garcia cathedral city california incarcerated sharon stephens abuse of power" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-951" height="400" src="http://www.uglyjudge.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/bonnie-garcia-cathedral-city-california-incarcerated-sharon-stephens-abuse-of-power.gif" width="400" /></a>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-9864142348797834482013-06-18T11:14:00.001-07:002013-06-18T11:16:10.717-07:00RETIRED JUDGE TELLS HER STORY OF CORRUPTION IN JUDICAIL SYSTEM<br />
THIS ALONG WITH INDIO'S (Riverside County) CORRUPT JUDGES TO APPEAR In
<b>LAWLESS AMERICA DOCUMENTARY.</b><br />
<br />
<span class="userContent"><span class="text_exposed_show"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Please view the video and SHARE this post and images</span></b></span><br /> <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58XuDxUN-EQ" rel="nofollow nofollow" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58XuDxUN-EQ</a></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;"><b><span style="font-size: large;">A Retired Judge Tells Her Story</span></b><br />
<br />
I have a book titled <b>"Judging Me." </b>This book is written for the<br />
disenfranchised, dispossessed and disillusioned. I grew up poor and<br />
was violently sexually abused for more than ten years, only to become<br />
a well known litigator for civil rights and eventually a federal civil<br />
rights judge.<br />
<br />
I am hard-wired for justice and fair play. Unfortunately, I was asked<br />
to change a decision for political reasons, but I refused to do so. I<br />
exposed the corruption within the government and, the United States<br />
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).<br />
<br />
It was a very traumatic event to have the people who are responsible<br />
for your care and well-being betray you at the most basic level.<br />
<br />
As an adult with multiple sclerosis and lupus, the EEOC tried to<br />
destroy me. The EEOC wrote the law on disability, enforces the law and<br />
acts as judge, jury and executioner. The second worst betrayal in my<br />
life.<br />
<br />
Working through these issues was a full time project. "If I can take<br />
the debris of my life and help just one other person, then what<br />
happened to me was worthwhile" is a quote from my book "Judging Me."<br />
This is my journey.<br />
<br />
Thank you, and Best Wishes!<br />
<b>Honorable Mary Elizabeth Bullock (Retired)</b></span>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-56719172830623070412013-05-30T12:10:00.000-07:002013-05-30T12:10:14.427-07:00EX-ASSEMBLYWOMAN BONNIE GARCIA and HER FALSE INCARCERATION OF ME AND MORE<br />Hi Bill Windsor/ LAWLESS AMERICA<br /><a href="http://www.facebook.com/billwindsor1?fref=ts" target="_blank">http://www.facebook.com/<wbr></wbr>billwindsor1?fref=ts</a><br /><br /><br /> Well, got some info to Marshall Gilbert a local radio announcer on the documentary Lawless America this morning. He had guest Ex-Assembly-woman Bonnie Garcia who is running now for California State Senate in 2014.<br /><a href="http://blog.pe.com/political-empire/2013/04/08/election-2014-bonnie-garcia-will-run-for-state-senate-in-2014/" target="_blank">http://blog.pe.com/<wbr></wbr>political-empire/2013/04/08/<wbr></wbr>election-2014-bonnie-garcia-<wbr></wbr>will-run-for-state-senate-in-<wbr></wbr>2014/</a><br /><br /><strong>BONNIE GARCIA,</strong> along with <strong>Cathedral City government</strong> members are very much responsible for my unlawful yearlong incarceration; <strong><u>a void case</u></strong>, the illegal taking of my home;<span style="color: black;"><strong><u> a void case</u></strong></span> and the loss of my life-savings as a result.<br /><br /> I sent the following message to Marshall Gilbert and placed this on<br /> Bonnie's web site: "Bonnie, I have been trying to reach you, I am sure<br /> you remember me -it has been awhile. I am writing a book and I want to<br /> send you what I have written about you so it will give up a heads up.<br /> You can find a good part of it on me blog:<br /><br /> Ain't It Beautiful, <a href="http://sharonstephens.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://sharonstephens.<wbr></wbr>blogspot.com/</a><br /><br /> ...just look up "Golf Cart Parade" and "Bonnie Garcia." I can send it to<strong> Marshall Gilbert at Money Radio 1200/Palm Springs</strong> <<span email="marshalltalk@aol.com"><em>marshalltalk@aol.com</em>> </span>and he can pass it on to you, or you can email me <<em>sharonstephens.1@gmail.com</em>> and I will send it to you directly.<br /><br /> I am still working on Judicial Corruption issues and of course that deals with illegal incarcerations that you say so concerned about?"<br /><br /> Bonnie has never talked to me about her unethical and unlawful behavior even though she has been told how to contact me.<br /><br /> Looking forward to you soon to be visit to California Bill.<br /><br /> Sincerely,<br /><br /> Sharon StephensSharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-43766654994274884832012-02-08T12:04:00.000-08:002012-02-08T12:04:21.166-08:00Urge Your Legislators to Hold Prosecutors Accountable<br />
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<b>We have 1 out of 100 Americans incarcerated at least 10% innocent!</b><br /><span style="color: #444444;"><span style="font-size: 12px; line-height: 15px;"><br /></span></span></div>
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By its controversial 5-4 decision in <u><em>Connick v. Thompson</em>, the U.S. Supreme Court </u>took away one of the only remaining means for the wrongfully convicted to hold prosecutors accountable for willful misconduct. Although all other professionals, from doctors to airline pilots to clergy, can be held liable for their negligence, the Supreme Court has effectively given district attorney offices complete legal immunity for the actions of their assistants, even when an office knowingly abandonsits responsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence in its zeal to win convictions.</div>
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Groups representing prosecutors have argued that there are already mechanisms that effectively address misconduct, yet studies have revealed that these systems hold prosecutors accountable <strong>less than one percent of the time.</strong><br /><br />Recent reports have shown that when prosecutors abuse or misuse the power invested in them by the state they face virtually no consequences for their actions. According to <em>Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997-2009</em>, prosecutors were found by appellate courts to have committed misconduct 707 times from 1997 to 2009, yet were disciplined only 6 times. A <em>USA Today</em> investigation by Brad Heath and Kevin McCoy that was published on Sept. 23, 2010, documented 201 instances where federal prosecutors violated laws or ethics rules since 1997 and noted that only one of those prosecutors was suspended from practicing law - and that was only for one year. While it may be that each of these violations did not merit a severe sanction, each incident required a review anda transparent response. The public has a right to know what happens and whether they can have confidence that errors and misconduct are being addressed and prevented.<br /><br />
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It is now up to our elected officials to strengthen our existing systems and create new ones if necessary to ensure that prosecutor’s offices are accountable and transparent.<br /><br /><br /></div>
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<strong>Contact your elected officials and demand that they strengthen safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct and protections for the wrongfully convicted in your state.<br /><br /></strong></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-77347083063854226282012-01-27T12:48:00.000-08:002012-01-27T12:48:17.464-08:00DOMESTIC SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2003Interested Persons Memo: Section-by-Section Analysis of Justice Department draft "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003," also known as "PATRIOT Act II" (2/14/2003) <br />
<br />
<br />
To: Interested Persons <br />
From: Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel <br />
Date: February 14, 2003 <br />
Re: Section-by-Section Analysis of Justice Department draft ""Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,"" also known as ""Patriot Act II"" <br />
<br />
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has been drafting comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation for the past several months. The draft legislation, dated January 9, 2003, grants sweeping powers to the government, eliminating or weakening many of the checks and balances that remained on government surveillance, wiretapping, detention and criminal prosecution even after passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, in 2001. <br />
<br />
Among its most severe problems, the bill <br />
<br />
Diminishes personal privacy by removing checks on government power, specifically by <br />
<br />
Making it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping of U.S. citizens under the authority of the shadowy, top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (Sections 101, 102 and 107) <br />
Permitting the government, under certain circumstances, to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court altogether and conduct warrantless wiretaps and searches. (Sections 103 and 104) <br />
Sheltering federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive Branch officials. (Section 106) <br />
Creating a new category of ""domestic security surveillance"" that permits electronic eavesdropping of entirely domestic activity under looser standards than are provided for ordinary criminal surveillance under Title III. (Section 122) <br />
Using an overbroad definition of terrorism that could cover some protest tactics such as those used by Operation Rescue or protesters at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico as a new predicate for criminal wiretapping and other electronic surveillance. (Sections 120 and 121) <br />
Providing for general surveillance orders covering multiple functions of high tech devices, and by further expanding pen register and trap and trace authority for intelligence surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. (Sections 107 and 124) <br />
Creating a new, separate crime of using encryption technology that could add five years to any sentence for crimes committed with a computer. (Section 404) <br />
Expanding nationwide search warrants so they do not have to meet even the broad definition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act. (Section 125) <br />
Giving the government secret access to credit reports without consent and without judicial process. (Section 126) <br />
Enhancing the government's ability to obtain sensitive information without prior judicial approval by creating administrative subpoenas and providing new penalties for failure to comply with written demands for records. (Sections 128 and 129) <br />
Allowing for the sampling and cataloguing of innocent Americans' genetic information without court order and without consent. (Sections 301-306) <br />
Permitting, without any connection to anti-terrorism efforts, sensitive personal information about U.S. citizens to be shared with local and state law enforcement. (Section 311) <br />
Terminating court-approved limits on police spying, which were initially put in place to prevent McCarthy-style law enforcement persecution based on political or religious affiliation. (Section 312) <br />
Permitting searches, wiretaps and surveillance of United States citizens on behalf of foreign governments - including dictatorships and human rights abusers - in the absence of Senate-approved treaties. (Sections 321-22) <br />
Diminishes public accountability by increasing government secrecy; specifically, by <br />
<br />
Authorizing secret arrests in immigration and other cases, such as material witness warrants, where the detained person is not criminally charged. (Section 201) <br />
Threatening public health by severely restricting access to crucial information about environmental health risks posed by facilities that use dangerous chemicals. (Section 202) <br />
Harming fair trial rights for American citizens and other defendants by limiting defense attorneys from challenging the use of secret evidence in criminal cases. (Section 204) <br />
Gagging grand jury witnesses in terrorism cases to bar them from discussing their testimony with the media or the general public, thus preventing them from defending themselves against rumor-mongering and denying the public information it has a right to receive under the First Amendment. (Section 206) <br />
Diminishes corporate accountability under the pretext of fighting terrorism; specifically, by <br />
<br />
Granting immunity to businesses that provide information to the government in terrorism investigations, even if their actions are taken with disregard for their customers' privacy or other rights and show reckless disregard for the truth. Such immunity could provide an incentive for neighbor to spy on neighbor and pose problems similar to those inherent in Attorney General Ashcroft's ""Operation TIPS."" (Section 313) <br />
Undermines fundamental constitutional rights of Americans under overbroad definitions of ""terrorism"" and ""terrorist organization"" or under a terrorism pretext; specifically by <br />
<br />
Stripping even native-born Americans of all of the rights of United States citizenship if they provide support to unpopular organizations labeled as terrorist by our government, even if they support only the lawful activities of such organizations, allowing them to be indefinitely imprisoned in their own country as undocumented aliens. (Section 501) <br />
Creating 15 new death penalties, including a new death penalty for ""terrorism"" under a definition which could cover acts of protest such as those used by Operation Rescue or protesters at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, if death results. (Section 411) <br />
Further criminalizing association - without any intent to commit specific terrorism crimes - by broadening the crime of providing material support to terrorism, even if support is not given to any organization listed as a terrorist organization by the government. (Section 402) <br />
Permitting arrests and extraditions of Americans to any foreign country - including those whose governments do not respect the rule of law or human rights - in the absence of a Senate-approved treaty and without allowing an American judge to consider the extraditing country's legal system or human rights record. (Section 322) <br />
Unfairly targets immigrants under the pretext of fighting terrorism; specifically by <br />
<br />
Undercutting trust between police departments and immigrant communities by opening sensitive visa files to local police for the enforcement of complex immigration laws. (Section 311) <br />
Targeting undocumented workers with extended jail terms for common immigration offenses. (Section 502) <br />
Providing for summary deportations without evidence of crime, criminal intent or terrorism, even of lawful permanent residents, whom the Attorney General says are a threat to national security. (Section 503) <br />
Completely abolishing fair hearings for lawful permanent residents convicted of even minor criminal offenses through a retroactive ""expedited removal"" procedure, and preventing any court from questioning the government's unlawful actions by explicitly exempting these cases from habeas corpus review. Congress has not exempted any person from habeas corpus -- a protection guaranteed by the Constitution -- since the Civil War. (Section 504) <br />
Allowing the Attorney General to deport an immigrant to any country in the world, even if there is no effective government in such a country. (Section 506) <br />
Given the bipartisan controversy that has arisen in the past from DOJ's attempts to weaken basic checks and balances that protect personal privacy and liberty, the DOJ's reluctance to share the draft legislation is perhaps understandable. The DOJ's highly one-sided section-by-section analysis reveals the Administration's strategy is to minimize far-reaching changes in basic powers, as it did in seeking passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, by characterizing them as minor tinkering with statutory language designed to bring government surveillance authorities, detention and deportation powers, and criminal penalties ""up to date."" <br />
<br />
This ACLU section-by-section analysis of the text of the legislation, however, reveals that the DOJ's modest descriptions of the powers it is seeking, and the actual scope of the authorities it seeks, are miles apart. The USA PATRIOT Act undercut many of the traditional checks and balances on government power. The new draft legislation threatens to fundamentally alter the constitutional protections that allow us as Americans to be both safe and free. If adopted, the bill would diminish personal privacy by removing important checks on government surveillance authority, reduce the accountability of government to the public by increasing government secrecy, further undermine fundamental constitutional rights of Americans under an already overbroad definition of ""terrorism,"" and seriously erode the right of all persons to due process of law. <br />
<br />
Our detailed section-by-section analysis follows. <br />
<br />
Title I - Diminishing Personal Privacy by Removing Checks on Government Intelligence and Criminal Surveillance Powers <br />
<br />
Title I amends critical statutes that govern intelligence surveillance and criminal surveillance. Both forms of surveillance are subject to Fourth Amendment limitations. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (criminal surveillance); United States v. United States District Court (""Keith""), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (intelligence surveillance). Yet while traditional searches are governed by warrant procedures largely drawn from the common law, wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance are governed by standards and procedures embodied in two federal statutes that respond to Katz and Keith - Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, which governs surveillance of criminal suspects, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 which governs surveillance of foreign powers and agents of a foreign power for intelligence purposes. <br />
<br />
Making it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping, including of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, through the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Sections 101-111). The draft bill's proposed amendments to FISA attack key statutory concepts that are critical to providing appropriate limits and meaningful judicial supervision over wiretapping and other intrusive electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. These limits were approved by Congress in 1978 because of a history of abuse by government agents who placed wiretaps and other listening devices on political activists, journalists, rival political parties and candidates, and other innocent targets. These so-called ""national security wiretaps"" and other covert surveillance were undertaken without any court supervision and without even the slightest suspicion that the targets of such surveillance were involved in criminal activities or were acting on behalf of any foreign government or political organization. This pattern of abuse culminated in the crimes of Watergate, which led to substantial reforms and limits on spying for intelligence purposes. <br />
<br />
FISA represented a compromise between civil libertarians, who wanted to ban ""national security wiretaps"" altogether, and apologists for Presidential authority, who claimed such unchecked intelligence surveillance authority was inherent in the President's Article II power over foreign relations. The Congress chose to authorize intelligence wiretaps without evidence of crime, subject to a number of key restraints. One of these restraints, separating intelligence gathering from criminal investigations, has been significantly weakened by the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act abolished the ""primary purpose"" test - the requirement that FISA surveillance could only be used if the primary purpose of surveillance was gathering of foreign intelligence, and not criminal prosecution or some other purpose. <br />
<br />
The draft bill eliminates or substantially weakens a number of the remaining constraints on intelligence surveillance approved by Congress. Taken as a whole, these changes go a long way to undermine limits on intelligence surveillance essential to preserving civil liberties and to preventing a repeat of the wiretapping abuses of the J. Edgar Hoover and Watergate eras. <br />
<br />
Authorizing the government to initiate wiretaps and other electronic surveillance on Americans who have no ties to foreign governments or powers (sec. 101). This section would permit the government to obtain a wiretap, search warrant or electronic surveillance orders targeting American citizens and lawful permanent residents even if they have no ties to a foreign government or other foreign power. Under FISA, the government need not show, in many circumstances, probable cause that the target of a wiretap is involved in any criminal activity. FISA requires an alternate showing - probable cause that the target is acting on behalf of a foreign government or organization, i.e., a ""foreign power."" Section 101 of the draft bill eliminates this requirement for individuals, including United States citizens, suspected of engaging in ""international terrorism."" It does so by redefining individuals, including United States citizens or lawful residents, as ""foreign powers"" even if they are not acting on behalf of any foreign government or organization. The ""foreign power"" requirement was a key reason FISA was upheld in a recent constitutional challenge. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, slip op. at 42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. Nov. 18, 2002) (while FISA requires no showing of probable cause of crime, it is constitutional in part because it provides ""another safeguard . . . that is, the requirement that there be probable cause to believe the target is acting 'for or on behalf of a foreign power.'"")[1] <br />
<br />
Permitting surveillance of the lawful activities of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents if they are suspected of gathering information for a foreign power (sec. 102). United States citizens and lawful permanent residents who are not violating any law should not be subject to wiretapping or other intrusive electronic surveillance. The FISA contains dual standards for non-U.S. persons and for U.S. persons with respect to surveillance of ""intelligence gathering activities,"" i.e., the gathering of information for a foreign government or organization. These standards reflect the judgment of Congress that U.S. persons should not face electronic surveillance unless their activities ""involve or may involve"" some violation of law (as, for example, would certainly be the case with respect to any activity in furtherance of terrorism or other crime). For non-U.S. persons, this showing does not have to be made, i.e., the gathering of information by foreign persons for foreign powers is enough to trigger FISA. The draft bill (at section 102) applies the lower standard to U.S. persons. <br />
<br />
Lawful gathering of information for a foreign organization does not necessarily pose any threat to national security. This amendment would permit electronic surveillance of a local activist who was preparing a report on human rights for London-based Amnesty International, a ""foreign political organization,"" even if the activist was not engaged in any violation of law. By eliminating this need to show some violation of law may be involved before authorizing surveillance of U.S. persons, Congress could well succeed in rendering FISA unconstitutional, by eliminating another key reason FISA was upheld in a recent court challenge. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, slip op. at 42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. Nov. 18, 2002) (holding that FISA surveillance of U.S. persons meets Fourth Amendment standards in part because a surveillance order may not be granted unless there is probable cause to believe the target is involved in activity that may involve a violation of law). <br />
<br />
Permitting the government, under some circumstances, to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court altogether (Sections 103, 104). Section 103 gives the Attorney General the power to authorize intelligence wiretaps and other electronic surveillance without permission from any court, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, for fifteen days, after an attack on the United States or force authorization resolution from the Congress. Under existing federal statutes, a formal declaration of war by the Congress triggers a host of civil liberties consequences, including authorization by the Attorney General to engage in intrusive electronic surveillance for up to fifteen days without any court order at all. The draft bill expands this power dramatically by eliminating judicial review for any surveillance under FISA for a period up to fifteen days pursuant to (1) an authorization of force resolution by the Congress or (2) a ""national emergency"" created by an attack on the United States. For surveillance under the latter circumstance, no action by Congress would be required. Once the President has unilaterally decided such an attack has occurred, the Attorney General could unilaterally decide what constitutes an ""attack"" on the United States, creating an emergency that justifies what would otherwise be plainly illegal wiretaps. <br />
<br />
DOJ's rationale for this change is that declarations of war are rare and the statute should be updated to reflect this. This argument fundamentally misconstrues the purpose of this provision. The normal FISA process, including review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, was Congress's attempt to impose meaningful limits over national security surveillance conducted without a formal declaration of war and for continuing threats that cannot easily by defined by reference to traditional war powers. To use Congress' grant of surveillance authority following a declaration of war as an argument to permit surveillance even in the absence of such action by Congress is a fundamental intrusion on Congress's war powers. <br />
<br />
The draft bill (at section 104) also expands special surveillance authority, available for up to a year with no court order at all, for property ""under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power"" by permitting eavesdropping on ""spoken communications."" This expansion of authority leaves intact the current requirement that such surveillance can go forward only if the Attorney General certifies under oath that ""there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party."" Still, the new authority would plainly involve eavesdropping on communications protected by the Fourth Amendment, as it would inevitably result in listening - without any court order - to the conversations in the United States of anyone who might be using telephones, computers, or other devices owned by a foreign government, political organization, or company owned by a foreign government. <br />
<br />
There are serious questions about whether the secret review of surveillance orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which by its nature can only hear the government's side of the case, is effective in protecting Americans' civil liberties. These amendments would bypass judicial review under FISA altogether. <br />
<br />
Sheltering federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive Branch officials (Section 106). This section would encourage unlawful intelligence wiretaps and secret searches by immunizing agents from criminal sanctions if they conduct such surveillance, even if a reasonable official would know it is illegal, by claiming they were acting in ""good faith"" based on the orders of the President or the Attorney General. In order to ensure that FISA was successful in bringing national security surveillance under the rule of law, Congress not only provided a process for legal intelligence surveillance, but also imposed criminal penalties on any government agent who engages in electronic surveillance outside that process. Congress also provided a ""safe harbor"" for agents who engaged in surveillance that was approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, even if such surveillance was not in fact authorized by FISA. The draft bill (at section 106) substantially undercuts the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions for illegal wiretaps or electronic surveillance by expanding the ""safe harbor"" to include surveillance not approved by any court, but simply on the authorization of the Attorney General or the President. <br />
<br />
Of course, the very spying abuses FISA was designed to prevent were undertaken with the authorization of high-ranking government officials, including the President. For example, President Nixon authorized just such a covert search of the Brookings Institution, whom he and his staff suspected of possessing classified information that had been leaked to the press. As described by Nixon biographer Richard Reeves: <br />
<br />
Nixon sat up. ""Now if you remember Huston's plan [to engage in covert surveillance] . . ."" <br />
<br />
""Yeah, why?"" Haldeman said. <br />
<br />
Kissinger said: ""But couldn't we go over? Now, Brookings has no right to classified-"" <br />
<br />
The President cut him off, saying, ""I want it implemented. . . . Goddamit get in there and get those files. Blow the safe and get them.""[2] <br />
<br />
Any government official acting within the scope of his employment already enjoys ""qualified immunity"" from charges of violating Fourth Amendment or other constitutional rights - i.e., an official cannot be punished or held civilly liable if a reasonable government official would not have known his or her conduct was illegal. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Providing additional protection to government officials who engage in wiretaps or searches without a court order, where a reasonable official would know those wiretaps or searches were clearly illegal, would take away any incentive for such officials to question an illegal authorization by the President, Attorney General or other high official. <br />
<br />
Further expanding pen register and trap and trace authority for intelligence surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents beyond terrorism investigations (Section 107). This section allows the government to use intelligence pen registers and trap and trace surveillance devices to obtain detailed information on American citizens and lawful permanent residents, including telephone numbers dialed, Internet addresses to which e-mail is sent or received, and the web addresses a person enters into a web browser, even in an investigation that is entirely unrelated to terrorism or counterintelligence. In so doing, it erodes a limitation on this authority that was part of the USA PATRIOT Act. <br />
<br />
The standard for obtaining a pen register or trap and trace order is very low, requiring merely that a government official certify that the information it would reveal is ""relevant"" to an investigation. Under section 216 the USA PATRIOT Act, the government was given new power to obtain this sensitive information for Internet communications merely by making this certification. This expansion was a serious erosion of meaningful judicial oversight of government surveillance because it expanded the authority to get court orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices in a way that permitted the government to access far more detailed content than was available before such authority was extended to the Internet. <br />
<br />
For United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, Congress limited the new authority to terrorism and counterintelligence investigations. This section would remove that limitation, opening the door to expanded government surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents under controversial government law enforcement technologies like CARNIVORE and the Total Information Awareness Pentagon ""super-snoop"" program whose development Congress just voted to limit. <br />
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Providing cleared, appointed counsel for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Section 108). While we welcome the provision providing for an appointed, cleared counsel to argue in favor of a ruling of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when the government appeals its decisions, it should not substitute for participation, in appropriate cases, by interested civil liberties organizations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approves government orders for electronic surveillance and physical searches under FISA. It meets in secret and never hears from anyone other than the government officials seeking its approval. If an order is denied, the government has the right to seek review of that denial in a special three-judge court of appeals, called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. No one can appeal the approval of a surveillance order, as the target of the surveillance is not notified. Instead, the only challenge to an approved order would occur later, if the information obtained is to be used in a criminal prosecution, in a suppression motion before the district court. If the information is used only for intelligence purposes, there is never an opportunity t <br />
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<br />Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-28042058228875343242011-09-07T09:20:00.000-07:002011-09-07T09:20:05.905-07:00Motion to Dismiss Void Judgment CCP 473 (d)<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Sharon Stephens<br />XXXXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><a avglsprocessed="1" href="tel:760.835.8210" value="+17608358210"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: black;">760.835.8210</span></a><br />Pro per</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <br />SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <br />8303 North Haven Avenue</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span></span><br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b><br /></b></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b>CASE NO.: MWV 903720<br /></b></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <b>NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION TO VOID</b></span><b><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> and ANNUL ALL ORDERS and JUDGMENTS</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> INCLUDING ANY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">MADE BY JUDGE SHELA S. SABET;</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> DECLARATION OF SHARON STEPHENS</span></b><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b> CCP 473(d)</b></span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> TIME: 8:30 AM</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> DATE: September 23, 2011</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> DEPT 7</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">_____________________</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">__________/</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <b> TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD</b></span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 23, 2011, at 8:30 a.m. in the</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">department 7, in the above Court located at 8303 North Haven Avenue,</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Rancho Cucamonga, California, 91730, Sharon Stephens (hereinafter</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">“Stephens”) Petitioner and Defendant in this case will move and hereby</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">moves for an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments,</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">including any contempt charges.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Stephens has already argued that Judge Sabet did not have subject </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">matter jurisdiction to enter any order or judgment in this case</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">including the contempt proceedings therefore making them void. Judge</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Sabet ignored that, and all arguments of Stephens, therefore Stephens does not now waive any</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">claim that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction but</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">adds Judge Sabet committed fraud on the court by sitting on the case</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">at all.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> San Bernardino County and its attorneys committed the first fraud</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">upon the court by not disclosing that San Bernardino County was making</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">payments payment to Judge Sabet. Judge Sabet joined in this fraud upon</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the court by not disclosing such in violation of Code of Judicial</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Ethics Canon 3E(2). She further violated Canon 3E(1) and CCP Section </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">170.1(a)(6)(A) (iii) by not disqualifying herself. She also violated</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Canon 4D(1) by accepting San Bernardino County payments.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> During her tenure as a San Bernardino judge from January 11,1999</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">through April 11, 2011</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">it is estimated that Judge Sabet received approximately $300,000 in</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">payments from San Bernardino County.(EXHIBIT A)</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The San Bernardino County payments to judges were held to violate</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Article VI, section 19, of the California Constitution in the case of</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev.</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">denied 12/23/08. They were recognized as criminal in California Senate</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Bill SBx2-11,</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">which gave retroactive immunity to “governmental entity and officers </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">and employees of a governmental entity” including judges from</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">criminal prosecution, civil liability, and disciplinary action for</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">receiving “judicial benefits” effective 5/21/09.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The retroactive immunity did not extend to “fraud on the court” </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">or the obstruction of justice of not disclosing the payments. Nor does</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">it extend to judges presiding over cases in which the county who paid</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">them was a party before the judges. After 5/21/09, no immunity existed</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">for the payments.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The second fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet, and the</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">San Bernardino County Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu conspired </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, ignored the law of CCP 527.8 and </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">unlawfully incarcerated Stephens in West Valley Detention Center on a </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">void on the face Temporary Restraining Order, and ignored mandated </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Criminal Charging Affidavits against Deputy District Attorney, Jack </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Liu and Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck leaving them free of any charge of</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">misconduct.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The third fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet and San </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Bernardino County District Attorney, in conspiracy with Attorney Linda</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Hollenbeck prosecuted Stephens on a void on the face contempt order,</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">and unlawfully incarcerated her in West Valley Detention Center.</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> U.S. Supreme Court precedents hold that fraud upon the court </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">vitiates the case; that all orders and judgments are regarded as </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">nullities and void. SEE: <i><u>U.S. v. Throckmorton</u></i><u>, 98 U.S. 61,64,66</u></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><u>(1878)</u>; <u><i>Valley v. Northern Fire </i>& <i>Marine Ins. Co</i>., 254 U.S. (1920))</u></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><b><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <u> MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES</u></span></b><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <br /><b> I. PREFATORY STATEMENT</b></span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Moving Party Stephens Petitioner and former Defendant in this</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">case seeks an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments in</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">this case, and all contempt proceedings.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <b> II. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY PAYMENTS TO STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN SAN</b></span><b><br /></b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b>BERNARDINO COUNTY</b></span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> As stated in the case of<u> <i>Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles </i>167</u></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><u>Cal.App.4th 630 (2008)</u>, rev. denied 12/23/08, Counties began making</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">payments to State Superior Court judges in the late 1980s. The</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Sturgeon case held that these payments violated Article VI, Section</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">19, of the California Constitution.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> A letter from Roger M. Whitby written November 10, 1988 was </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">produced in the appellate phase of the Sturgeon case.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Such letter showed that (1) only the State Legislature could</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">“prescribe” the “compensation” of judges, under Article VI, Section </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">19, of the California Constitution; (2) “compensation” encompassed</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">fringe benefits, according to two California Attorney General </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">opinions; (3) the Legislature’s duty was not delegable to any other</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">body, according to California case law;</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">(4) Superior Court judges are State Constitutional Officers; and (5)</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">The Board of Supervisors has claimed to have found that in order to attract</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">and retain qualified judges to serve in this County it is necessary</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">and appropriate to provide them with benefits and a flexible benefit</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">plan contribution – in addition to their State salary, State benefits,</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">and State retirement. It appears the sole purpose of these payments</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">was only be to influence the judges to rule in favor of San </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Bernardino County, which was often a party before the judges accepting</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the money.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Code of Ethics Canon 4(D)(1) prohibits judges from entering into</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">financial dealings that:</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> (a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judge’s judicial position, or</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> (b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">continuing business relationships with</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">…persons likely to appear <br />before the court in</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">which the judge serves.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> CCP 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) mandated such judges disqualification.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Such Section states:</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">of the following is true:</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> [ ] A person aware of the facts might reasonably</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">entertain a doubt that</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> the judge would be able to be impartial.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Canon 3E(2) requires a judge to: </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">disclose on the record information that<br /> is</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">reasonably relevant to the</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> question of disqualification under<br /> Code of</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Civil Procedure section</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 170.1, even if the judge believes there <br /> is no</span> <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">actual basis for</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> disqualification.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Canon 3E(1) requires the judge to “disqualify”</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> himself or herself in any</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> proceeding in which disqualification is required by law.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Any judge who received any San Bernardino County benefits was</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">bound to disclose such and disqualify him or her self.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> If the judge does not disclose and disqualify themselves they can</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">be facing bribery charges.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> After the Sturgeon decision, the legislature enacted Senate Bill</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">SBx2-11which recognized that the County payments to judges were</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">criminal. Senate Bill SBx2-11 gave retroactive immunity, effective</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">5/21/09, from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">action to a “governmental entity, officer, or employee of a</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">governmental entity.” The retroactive immunity did not extend to the</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judge’s actions presiding over cases in which the county who paid them</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">was a party. Nor, did it extend to county payments received after</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">5/21/09.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> At all times, judges who accepted “bribes” from an interested</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">party were biased. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the principle that “justice must satisfy the </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> appearance of justice,” Levine v. United States 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">S.Ct. 1038 (1960) citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <br />Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Further, the judge receiving the payment may be prosecuted for</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">violating the intangible right to honest services under Federal Law 18 </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">U.S.C. section 1346. The U.S. Supreme Court held under Skilling v.</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">United States 561 (Decided 6/24/2010), Slip Options pages 48-49, that</span><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">section 1346, encompasses bribery and kickbacks.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> III. THE FRAUDS UPON THE COURT</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> A. For more than a year the San Bernardino County Office of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">District Attorney and the court, particularly Judge Sabet has</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">persecuted Stephens on a void on the face restraining order. Stephens</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">has been in and out of false arrests and unlawful incarcerations, and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">has been drug back and forth to court like a rag doll, all the while</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">being homeless and living in her car because of a retaliatory eviction</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">by Logan Property Management Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck, essentially</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">for complaining about lack of fire safety and criminal behavior on her</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">senior apartment complex.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> When Stephens fought the bogus eviction, Attorney Hollenbeck</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">filed two sham Workplace Violence Restraining Orders, CCP 527.8. One</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">was promptly and properly dismissed for not meeting the required</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">statutory or case law to issue the order. The second slipped by and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">went into court where it was challenged as void in a 402 Hearing.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Sabet sat through the entire 402 Hearing brought to</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">challenge this void on the face.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Workplace Violence Restraining Order under CCP 527.8, after admitting,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">at the start to “not</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">knowing the law of void judgments.” There were “complex legal issues;”</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">she ought to have</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">recused herself right there, or, taken the time to research the law.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Instead she went on to retry</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the case which openly violated legal procedure of deciding a void</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judgment challenge. From the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">beginning the TRO was void on the face for not meeting the criteria</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">for violence. A TRO is also</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">void after 14 days.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> "It is well settled that a judgment or order which</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">is void on its face, and which</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">or record to show its invalidity,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> may be set aside on motion, at any time after its</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">entry, by the court which</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> rendered the judgment or made the order. Other</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Courts my also may do the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> same. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983)</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Sabet exceeded her jurisdiction, and therefore committed</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">fraud upon the court. At the</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> end of several hours of false, subrogated perjured testimony she then</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">asked the attorneys to</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">present points and authorities so she could decide the case. They had none!</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Circuit Court of Appeals</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">attempts to, defile the court</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the court [Judges are officers of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> the court] so that the judicial machinery can not</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">perform in the usual manner</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> its impartial task of adjudging cases that are</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">presented for adjudication."</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Kennerv. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Federal Practice,2d ed.,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> p. 512, 60.23.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">by fraud upon the court</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> is not in essence a decision at all, and never</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">becomes final."</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The judgment is void.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> On May 26, 2010 Judge Sabet had to dismiss this void on the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">face restraining order because someone informed her case was void.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Then, in what can only be called a mean-spirited, retaliatory move she</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">ignored the law of CCP 527,8, and at the insistence of Deputy District</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, and with a sneer on</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">her lips, gave an order to incarcerate Stephens, on the antecedent,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">void on the face temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in the case, and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">set Bail at $150,000 (Excessive Bail: Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. (1951)</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the U.S. Supreme Court: A judge or justice may be censured for</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"setting 'grossly excessive' bail and [thus] showing a 'severe</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">attitude' toward witnesses and litigants," as the Michigan Supreme</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Court did to a trial judge recently: Debra Cassens Weiss, writes,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"Judge Censured for Excessive Bail, Severe Attitude", (ABA Journal,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">February 8, 2008).</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">[subject matter] jurisdiction to</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 );</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Any judge or attorney who does not report a judge for</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">treason as required</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> On January 11, 2011 Judge Sabet again unlawfully incarcerates</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">(“Stephens” ) for 50</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> days in West Valley Detention for having Attorney Linda Hollenbeck</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">served with a</span><br /><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Notice of Intent to sue, claiming it is a violation of the void on</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the face probation that she</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">had set.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Such void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">can legally be ignored</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> as they neither bind, nor bar anyone. "Obviously a</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judgment, though final</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">to collateral attack</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">subject matter or person,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">obtained by extrinsic</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> fraud. [Citations.]" 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> B. San Bernardino County and Its Attorneys’ Fraud Upon The Court</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> San Bernardino County nor its attorneys have never disclosed to</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">this day that San Bernardino County has made payments to Judge Sabet.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Sabet is a native born Iranian who came to the United</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">States in 1970 because there was no room for her in the university</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">there. Judge Sabet feels becoming a judge may be related to genetic</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">predisposition. Her grandfather was a justice of the Iran Supreme</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Court and two cousins also served as judges at a time when a codified</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">system of justice, was based on code rather than case law, [stare</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">decisis], an inquisitorial system, such as exists in France. The</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judge serves not only as judge but as prosecutor, jury, and arbiter.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">The Islamic legal system of Sharia (Islamic law) and Fiqh (Islamic</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">jurisprudence) has always been an influence in the Iranian law system,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">where the judge holds absolute power, there is no stare decisis, and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">laws allow circumstantial evidence to be used in deciding a case</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"under the rubric of `the judge's reasoning."</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Stephens has been witness to Judge Sabet practicing this sort of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">“law” in the court room.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> In Judge Sabet’s biography, written in February 2006 she had</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">served on the county bench for 12 years, and prior to that served in</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the San Bernardino County District Attorneys’ Office. From</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011 it is estimated that Judge</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Sabet received approximately more than $300,000 in payments from San</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Bernardino County.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Sabat has never disclosed any of these county payments to</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">those appearing before her. Stephens is putting her on official</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">notice that she is reporting Judge Sabet to The Fair Political</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Practices Commission for violating the Political Reform Act's</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">requirement that she disclose this County income on her Form 700, Her</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">actions were improper. There is a criminal doctrine of law that if you</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">receive money you are not entitled to, and you keep it -- that is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">considered theft.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> C. JUDICIAL RACETEERING</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> We have Judge Sabet along with a group of members of the judiciary</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">that have effectively engaged in what is called a RICO scheme which is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act scheme. And the basis of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the scheme is that you have the illegal payments. You have them taking</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">place time and time again. You have the judges obstructing justice.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">That is a RICO scheme.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The entire judiciary system in California is susceptible to this</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">scheme and the 38 million people of California are victims of this</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">scheme.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Ninety percent of the judges in California received illegal</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">payments and that goes all the way up to five out of the seven</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">California Supreme Court justices received those illegal payments. So</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the system is rife with obstruction.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> When a judge is receiving payments from the county and one of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the parties appearing before him is represented by the county the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judge MUST disclose these payments to everybody in the courtroom.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> It became an extrinsic fraud when Judge Sabet did not disclose</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the payments she received</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> from the county and it prevented Stephens from getting due process</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">and a fair trial and that’s</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">extrinsic fraud and actually deprives the court of jurisdiction. And</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">when there is no jurisdiction</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">anything that Judge Sabet did in this case is void.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Sabet, and all judges has a responsibility under the Code</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">of Judicial Ethics Rule 3E, 3E 1 and 2. to disclose these payments.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">The responsibility existed to not even accept the payments under the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Code of Judicial Ethics 4D 1. And the responsibility exists for the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judges to tell other judges about these illegal payments and that is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">under the federal statute the misprision of felony, 18 U.S.C. Section</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">4 which makes it a federal crime for someone who knows of a crime</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">being committed to not tell a judge about such crime; that is a</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">federal crime.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> And state court judges are bound to follow federal law and that’s</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">under Article 6 Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The United States – U.S. Attorney or Attorney General, Eric</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Himpton Holder can prosecute</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> these people;</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Sabet ought to be in jail.</span><br /><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> D. U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES MANDATE THAT THE ORDER VOIDING</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> AND ANULLING ALL ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BE ENTERED BASED</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> ON FRAUD UPON THE COURT.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The U.S. Supreme Court, which the Superior Court is bound to</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">follow, stated in U.S. v.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878):</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> “There is no question of the general doctrine that</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">fraud vitiates</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.”</span><br /><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The Court continued at page 66:</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> “Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">with a contract . . .”</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499).</span><br /><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920):</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> “Courts are constituted by authority, and they</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">cannot [act] beyond the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> power delegated to them. If they act beyond</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">that authority, and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> certainly in contravention of it, their</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judgments and orders are</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> regarded as nullities. They are not voidable,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">but simply void, and this</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> even prior to reversal.” Elliott v. Lessee of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 328, 340; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236</span><br /><br /><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Austin v. Smith,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962), in</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> light of F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5), held:</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> “…if the underlying judgment is void, the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">judgment based upon it is also</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> void. “</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> “When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">are a trespasser of the law,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the judges orders are void,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> of no legal force or effect.” The U.S. Supreme</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">that, "when a state officer</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> acts under a state law in a manner violative of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the Federal Constitution, he</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> comes into conflict with the superior authority</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">of that Constitution, and he</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> is in that case stripped of his official or</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">representative character and is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> subjected in his person to the consequences of</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">his individual conduct.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> The State has no power to impart to him any</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">immunity from responsibility</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> to the supreme authority of the United States."</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">[Emphasis supplied in original].</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> Judge Shaela S. Sabet no longer has immunity from a lawsuit against her.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> IV. CONCLUSION</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> There is undeniable proof that Judge Sabet violated her</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">responsibility to give due process and a fair trial to Stephens, and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">in making judgments she had no authority to make the judgments and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">orders that caused Stephens a great deal of hurt and harm. Stephens</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">has standing to disqualify her, and to have all of her judgments</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">dismissed as void.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> This obstruction of justice must not be allowed to continue.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">It has already destroyed</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> the integrity of the California judicial system. Unless it is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">stopped now, it will destroy what little</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> remains of the California judicial system. A report from the</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Administrative Office of the Courts</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> shows that 90% of the judges receive County payments. Unlawfully</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">incarcerating people such as Stephens and others has resulted in</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">arousing the anger of many. Calls for prosecution of the judges and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">the supervisors have begun and will not stop until this problem is</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">resolved and the judicial system is reformed.</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> It is time for the Superior Court to obey the law and void and</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">annul all the orders and</span></span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> judgments in the case and in all contempt proceeding.</span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> </span></b></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-63766405014499315102011-09-02T08:42:00.000-07:002011-09-02T08:42:28.480-07:00TO CATHEDRAL CITY FOR MONETARY SETTLEMENT<br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13px;"><span><b>DEMAND LETTER FOR MONETARY SETTLEMENT<br /><br />August 10, 2011<br /><br />TO<br /><br />City of Cathedral City<br />Council Chambers in City Hall</b></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13px;"><b><span><br />68-700 Avenida Lalo Guerrero<br />Cathedral City, CA 92234 </span></b></span></div>
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</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13px;"><b> </b></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span><br /></span></span></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-size: 13px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;">On </span><b style="font-family: Arial;">January 29, 2005</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;"> I attend a meeting in the</span><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;">Cathedral City Police Department with </span><b style="font-family: Arial;">Captain Kevin Connor</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;"> and </span><b style="font-family: Arial;">Sgt. Charles Robinson</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;"> to discuss a </span><i style="font-family: Arial;">false arrest, abuse of process</i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;"> and </span><i style="font-family: Arial;">abuse while in the custody</i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;"> of </span><b style="font-family: Arial;">Sgt. Hatfield.<span> </span></b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;">I explained I was also was going to a pre-arraigned</span><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;">meeting down the hall that morning with </span><b style="font-family: Arial;">Mary Brhel,</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;"> ( her husband Martin Brhel, an ex-deputy district attorney),</span><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;">an aide to Assemblywoman Bonnie Garcia, and therefore could only spend a short amount of time on the Hatfield matter. I did not explain my business regarding Garcia.</span><div class="gmail_quote">
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<span style="color: black;"><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial;">I met with Mary Brhel to talk about the ongoing problems with homeowner associations in the </span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Coachella</span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Valley</span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">.<span> </span>(On </span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">De<wbr></wbr>cember 7, 2004</span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> we had held a press conference in my home with Pat Cooper, aide to Senator Duchency to discuss these problems.) Mary Brhel and I had a good talk and she promised to call me back the following day. <span> </span>She didn’t.<br /><br />On <b>February 2, 2005</b> I called Mary Brhel who told me two Cathedral City Police Officers had come into the Garcia office as soon as I left and had told her I had “made all kinds of problems for the Cathedral City police and other government agencies, and was a ‘threat.’ “ She said she was putting me on a threat list in </span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Sacramento</span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">, and then hung up on me. She refused to tell me the names of these two men, however it is not hard to guess… <b>I complained to Chief Henry, and asked for an investigation. It never happened and not one person in the police department, nor the City Manager or the mayor, or City Council <span> </span>would talk with me.</b></span></span></span></div>
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<span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">And so on </span></span></span><span><b><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">February 3, 2005</span></span></b></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> began <u>a <i>provable</i> <i>conspiracy</i></u> between the Garcia Office, the Cathedral City Police Department, Shadow Crest Homeowner Association, and stretched all the way to the Riverside County District Attorney. Cindy Uken of the Desert Sun was convinced to write a article filled with lies.<br /><br />The well documented facts of this are in <b>Kendall Berkey’s</b><span> </span>65 page <u>Memo of Costs</u> in <u>Case No,</u> <u>0424575 <i>Robinson v.</i> <i>Stephens, Riverside County Superior Court, Indio </i></u>– a <i>void on the face </i>restraining order:<b></b></span></span></span></div>
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<span><span><b><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Government agencies may not have a </span></b></span></span><span><span><b><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">TRO</span></b></span></span><span><span><b><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> or Retraining Order against a citizen: </span></b></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Under <b>Civil Code of Procedure 527.6,</b> “ government agencies are not individuals, and cannot bring a </span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">TRO</span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> against a citizen, and police officers in particular cannot object to a person wanting them to do their job.” <i><u>Diamond View, Ltd v. Herz</u></i><u> (1986)180,Cal App 3d 612, 618 – 619, 225 </u></span></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cal.</span></u></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Rptr. 651,655/; </span></u></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"><span> </span><span> </span>(Civil Code of Procedure 533) <span> </span><b>Civil Code of Procedure 537.6</b> “ …was enacted to supplement the tort of Invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, therefore a person must prove these two elements.” <i><u>Grant v. Clampett </u></i><u>(1997) 2<sup>nd</sup> District) 56 Cal App 4<sup>th</sup> 586, 65 </u></span></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cal</span></u></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Rptr 2d 727</span></u></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">.<span> </span>“There must be clear and convincing evidence of suffering great medical or psychological distress.”<span> </span><i><u>Sheild v. Rubin</u></i><u> (1991, 2<sup>nd</sup> Dis) 232 Cal App 3d 755, 283 </u></span></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cal</span></u></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Rptr 533 <span> </span></span></u></span></span></div>
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<span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">The court had no jurisdiction to issue an order under CCP 527,6 and under all stated law and facts the Robinson case is void.<br /><br />Under Federal Law, which is applicable in all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated “…if a court is without authority, its judgment sand orders are regarded as nullities They are not voidable, but simply void … They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers<u>.”<span> </span><i>Elliot v. Piersol</i>, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)</u><br /><br /><span> </span>Void on the face judgments “<u>never die</u>” in the State of California and CCP <span> </span>473, and 473(a) has not direct reference to void orders, i.e., the time limitation is not applicable. <i><u>Reid v. Balter</u></i><u> (1993) 14 Cal App 4<sup>th</sup> 1186,1194<span> </span></u><br /><br />An<u> </u>Appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree – a void order.<u> Svistunoff v. Svistunoff (1952) 108 </u></span></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cal</span></u></span></span><span><span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P2d 650</span></u></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">], and see: 6 </span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Witken</span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">, </span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cal</span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal Sec. 7, pp. 4024-4025<br /><u><br /></u>On <b>February<span> </span>3, 2005 Chief Stan Henry</b>, <b>Judy Williams</b>, <b>Captain Kevin Connor</b>, and <b>Sgt. Charles</b> <b>Robinson</b>, with the help of Assistant City Manager, <b>Kendall Berkey</b> <span> </span>began a totally unmerited “investigation” against me that never produced anything<span> </span>but “legal expenses” which were added and added to the point of $68,000 <span> </span>which were awarded to them by the court in this case -- <span> a case </span>that was brought only to protect Captain Kevin Connor and Sgt. Charles Robinson, and other officers in the department from an investigation for abuse and slander, and to keep me from making valid complaints.<span> </span><br /><br /><b>Judy Williams</b> would appear in court for the police department and claim I <i>violated the restraining order</i>, and I would be sentenced to over a year in the </span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">County</span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Jail</span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> - in solitary confinement. ($100.00 a day compensation is not fair to me, but lawful.)<br /><br />I never violated anything in asking the police to protect me from provable crimes in <b>Shadowcrest Homeowners Association</b>.</span></span></span></div>
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<span><span><b><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and can legally be ignored as they neither bind nor bar anyo</span></b></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">ne. “Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction or the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations}”<span> <b><u> </u></b></span><b><u>7 </u></b></span></span></span><b><u><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Witkin</span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">, </span></span></span><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cal.</span></span></span></u></b><span><span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b><u> <wbr></wbr>Procedure, Judgment, Section 286, p. 828.</u></b></span></span></span><span><span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /><br />While I was <i>unlawfully incarcerated,</i> </span></span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">City Attorney, <b>Charles Green </b></span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">approached my daughter to sell my home to </span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">Cathedral</span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">City</span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;"> to pay for the legal expenses awarded after the case. She gave in to their demands, and I could do nothing in jail but agree to the sale.<span> </span>There was approximately $380,000 in equity in the home. Not only did the equity go to </span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">Cathedral</span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">City</span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">, but they never paid their agreed upon expenses in the sale of approximately $5,000.<br /><br /><b>The sale of the home was based on fraud, and therefore void. This is a case in-itself.</b><br /><br />City Attorney, Charles Green and his assistant, Kendall Berkey did no <i>due diligence</i> to discover and abide by the law as mentioned above, and in this did they commit <i>fraud on the court</i>. I shall take this to the Cal State Bar as a formal complaint against both.<br /><br />As a direct result of the <i>void on the face restraining order</i>, <i>the conspiracy</i>. <i>fraud,</i> <i>elder abuse</i>, and more than one <i>unlawful arrests</i> and <i>unlawful incarcerations</i> I lost not only my home, but about $500.000. I will settle for $450,000<br /><br />Kindly send me a check or money order for the amount of $450,000 on or before </span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;">August 23, 2011</span></span><span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial;"> or I shall promptly file in Superior Court.<br /><br />You may reach me at any time at, <a avglsprocessed="1" href="tel:760.835.8210" style="color: #0000cc;" target="_blank" value="+17608358210">760.835.8210</a><br /><br />Most sincerely,<span style="color: #888888;"><br /><br />Sharon Stephens<b></b></span></span></span></div>
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</span>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-82058096400076327902011-09-02T08:20:00.000-07:002011-09-02T08:20:23.439-07:00CALIFORNIA VOID CASES<br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: large;"> </span></b> </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: normal;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="color: black;">SHORT SUMMARY OF THE BASIC LAW OF VOIDS IN </span></b><st1:state style="line-height: 150%;"><st1:place><b><span style="color: black;">CALIFORNIA</span></b></st1:place></st1:state><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold; line-height: 150%;"> </span></span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: black;"><b>Void on the face judgments “<u>never die</u>” in the State of California</b><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;"> </span></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;">CCP 473, and 473(a) has no direct reference to void orders, i.e.,<br /> the time limitations is not applicable.<br /><i><u>Reid v. Balter</u></i><u> (1993) 14 Cal App 4<sup>th</sup> 1186,1194</u></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"><u> </u></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> Motions to vacate <b><i>void</i></b> <b><i>judgments</i></b>
may be made at any time after judgment. </span><st1:place style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><st1:placetype><span class="grame"><i><u><span style="color: black;">County</span></u></i></span></st1:placetype><span class="grame"><i><u><span style="color: black;"> of </span></u></i></span><st1:placename><span class="grame"><i><u><span style="color: black;">Ventura</span></u></i></span></st1:placename></st1:place><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><u><span style="color: black;"> v. </span></u></i></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><u><span style="color: black;">Tillett</span></u></i></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u><span style="color: black;">, 133 </span></u></span><st1:state style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><st1:place><span class="grame"><u><span style="color: black;">Cal.</span></u></span></st1:place></st1:state><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u><span style="color: black;"> App. 3d 105, 110</span></u></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="color: black;">.).</span></span><span style="color: black;"> <br /><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A judgment is </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">void on its face</i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> if
the trial court exceeded its subject matter or personal jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no
power to grant. </span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the
consent of the parties. </span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(<i><u>Summers v. Superior Court</u></i><u>
(1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. </u></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u>Rptr</u></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u>. 324, 347 P.2d 668]; <i>Roberts v. Roberts</i> (1966) 241 Cal.
App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. </u></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u>Rptr</u></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u>. 408]</u>.)</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> Thus, the fact that a judgment is entered
pursuant to stipulation does not insulate the judgment from attack on the
ground that it is void. </span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><u>In People v.</u></i></span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u>
One 1941 Chrysler Sedan</u></i><u style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> (1947) 81 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21-22 [183 P.2d
368</u><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">], the court explained: "</span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">[P]<span class="spelle">rior</span> to 1933
the provisions of section 473 and of section 473a were contained in one
section, so that there was both a six-month and a one-year limitation found in
the section, applicable, of course, to different situations. In that year the
original section 473 was split into two parts. <u>Old paragraph 3</u> of section 473
remained in that section. That paragraph refers to judgments taken against a
party through his 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,' and
requires the motion to be made within six months. The paragraph has no direct
reference to <b>void</b> <b>judgments</b>. Section 473a (formerly
and until 1933 a part of section 473) provides for a particular situation --
where summons has not been personally served (even though constructive service
is permitted) the court may allow the aggrieved party within one year to answer
on the merits. Both the third paragraph of section 473 and section 473a are
primarily directed to setting aside valid judgments. Prior to 1933, section 473
contained no express provision relating to the power of courts to set aside <b>void</b>
<b>judgments</b>. </span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; line-height: 150%;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><i>Prior to that time the law was settled
that courts of record possessed inherent power to set aside a void judgment,
whether or not it was void on its face, provided that, as to a void judgment
not void on its face, the motion was made within a reasonable time. If the
motion was not made within a reasonable time the party was relegated to an
action in equity. In determining whether the motion was made within a
reasonable time the courts applied by analogy the one-year provision of old
section 473, now section 473a. Thus, when these old cases referred to the time
limits of section 473 they were referring to the one-year limitation, not the
six-month limitation. When the Legislature revamped section 473 in 1933, and
broke it down into two sections, they added to section 473 paragraph 4. This
paragraph was formerly section 900a of the Code of Civil Procedure, applying to
courts not of record. So far as pertinent here that paragraph now reads: '<span class="grame">The</span> court may . . . on motion of either party after notice
to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.' (For a discussion of
the 1933 amendments to section 473 see <u>Estate of <span class="spelle">Estrem</span>,
16 Cal. 2d 563, 572 [107].</u> It is well settled that erroneous final judgments
serve as a bar to further litigation on the action, whereas in general <b>void</b>
<b>judgments</b> may be collaterally attacked.<br /><br /> </i></span></span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><span style="color: black;"><i style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"> </i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 150%;">A void judgment or order
may properly may be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally. The </span><span style="line-height: 150%;">doctrine of <i>res judicata</i></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 150%;"> does not apply to </span><b style="line-height: 150%;">void</b>
<b style="line-height: 150%;">judgments</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 150%;"> or orders. </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 150%;"><br /><i style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"> </i></span></span><span style="color: black;"><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 150%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><span style="color: black; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><i> "Obviously a
judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject
to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it
is obtained by extrinsic fraud</i></span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. <span class="grame">[Citations.]"</span> <span class="grame">(<u><b>7</b> </u></span></span><st1:place style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><u><st1:city><i><span class="grame"><span style="color: black;">Witkin</span></span></i></st1:city><span class="grame"><span style="color: black;">, </span></span><st1:state><span class="grame"><span style="color: black;">Cal.</span></span></st1:state></u></b></st1:place><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="color: black;"><b><u> Procedure, supra,
Judgment, § 286, p. 828</u></b>.)<br /></span></span><span style="color: black;"> <br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">California Civil Procedure 437(d)</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">, provides that a court, on noticed
motion, may set aside </span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>void</i></b> <b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>judgments</i></b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> and orders.
Courts also have inherent power to set aside a void judgment.</span></span><span style="color: black;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Courts also possess inherent power to grant such relief.</span><span style="color: black;"><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(<i><u>Reid v. </u></i></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><u>Balter</u></i></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u> (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.</u>)</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><i>`It is well
settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires
only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may
be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which
rendered the judgment or made the order.</i></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">[Citations.]'</span>
<span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">[Citations.]"</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> (Ibid; accord </span><u style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="spelle"><i>Plotitsa</i></span><i>
v. Superior Court</i> (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761</u><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> [ </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">"...<i>a default that is
void on the face of the record when entered is subject to challenge at any time
irrespective of lack of diligence in seeking to set it aside within the
six-month period of section 473</i></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">."].). </span></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> T</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">he normal rule that </span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">"the perfecting of an appeal stays
proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon
the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the
judgment or order" ( § 916, <span class="spelle">subd</span>. (<span class="grame">a</span></span></i><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">)) does not apply</span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. <b>"[A] court may set aside a void
order at any time."</b><br /><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> <b>An appeal will not prevent the court from at any time
lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree -- a void
order</b>." </span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(</span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><u>MacMillan</u></i></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u><i> Petroleum Corp. v. Griffin</i> (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 523, 533
[222 P.2d 69</u>]; accord: <u><i>People v. West Coast Shows, Inc.</i> (1970) 10 Cal.
App. 3d 462, 467 [89 Cal. </u></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; text-decoration: underline;">Rptr</span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; text-decoration: underline;">. 290]; </span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; text-decoration: underline;"><i>Svistunoff</i></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; text-decoration: underline;"><i> v. </i></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; text-decoration: underline;"><i>Svistunoff</i></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u> (1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P.2d 650]; </u>and SEE: <b><u>6 </u></b></span><span class="spelle" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><u>Witkin</u></b></span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><u>, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971)
Appeal, § 7, pp. 4024-4025.</u></b>)</span> EXAMPLE:<i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;">Consequently, notwithstanding the pending
appeal from the earlier order of </span></i></span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif;"><st1:date day="25" month="11" year="1969"><span style="color: black;">November 25, 1969</span></st1:date><span style="color: black;">, which necessarily carried with it a
consideration of the validity of the judgment entered </span><st1:date day="31" month="10" year="1967"><span style="color: black;">October
31, 1967</span></st1:date><span style="color: black;">, the
order of </span><st1:date day="14" month="8" year="1970"><span style="color: black;">August 14, 1970</span></st1:date><span style="color: black;">, limited to those aspects which trim off
the void judgment and <span class="grame">orders,</span> should be affirmed. </span></span></i></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="color: black;"> The
courts' power to control their own judgments is statutory. <b>19 </b></span><st1:state><st1:place><span style="color: black;"><b>Cal.</b></span></st1:place></st1:state><span style="color: black;"><b> 2d at p. 573. </b>Apart from statutory
authority, the courts have the inherent power to correct clerical errors in
their judgments or to vacate <b><i>void</i></b> <b><i>judgments</i></b>.
<br /><br /> <b><i> </i></b>Although it has been held, by analogy to section 473a,
that such motions should be made within one year from the date the judgment
sought to be set aside was rendered (<u><span class="spelle"><i>Washko</i></span><i>
v. Stewart</i>, 44 Cal. App. 2d 311, 317 [112 P.2d 306]; <span class="spelle"><i>Richert</i></span><i>
v. Benson <span class="spelle">Lbr</span>. Co</i>., 139 Cal. App. 671, 674-676
[34 P.2d 840]</u>) this time limitation does not apply where the judgment is based
on a fraudulent return. <span class="grame">(</span><i><u><span class="spelle">Washko</span><span class="grame"> v. Stewart, supra, p. 318; </span><span class="spelle">Richert</span><span class="grame"> v. Benson </span><span class="spelle">Lbr</span></u></i><span class="grame"><u><i>. Co., supra, p. 677</i>.)</u>.<br /><br /></span></span></span><span style="color: black;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It is true that the statute of
limitations does not apply to an archaic <i>suit in equity</i> to vacate a void judgment. </span><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(</span><u style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="spelle"><i>Cadenasso</i></span><span class="grame"><i> v. Bank of Italy</i>, supra, p. 569; <i>Estate of </i></span><span class="spelle"><i>Pusey</i></span></u><span class="grame" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><u>, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P.
648</u>].)</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> However, this rule holds as to <u>all </u></span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>void</i></b> <b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>judgments</i></b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">.
In the two cases cited, </span><u style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>People v. <span class="spelle">Massengale</span></i>
</u><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">and </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">In re <span class="spelle"><u>Sandel</u></span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">, the courts hearing the
respective appeals confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct </span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>void</i></b>
<b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>judgments</i></b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> (in excess of jurisdiction), therefore, the rule holds up to dismissal of void judgment in all cases.</span></span> </div>
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Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-92010453413004895412011-08-29T19:21:00.000-07:002011-08-29T19:30:35.634-07:00Judicial Racketeering Prompts Call For RICO ACT Prosecutions<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white;"></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><b>08/26/2011</b></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-large;">JUDICIAL RACKETEERING</span></b></div>
<b><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> <a avglsprocessed="1" href="http://www.fulldisclosure.net/Blogs/102.php" style="color: #0000cc;" target="_blank">http://www.fulldisclosure.net/<wbr></wbr>Blogs/102.php</a></span></b></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">DUTTON:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Dr. Fine is turning up the heat. He’s
declaring that the judges of Los Angeles Superior Court are part
of organized crime and should be prosecuted under the RICO
statute. </span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>FINE:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b> </b>No question about it. It’s a federal
violation and essentially if the </span><st1:country-region><st1:place><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">United
States</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> – U.S. Attorney or if Attorney
General Holder has the guts to prosecute these people, these
people will be in jail in what we call a New York minute.<br />
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>DUTTON:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> This is an extraordinary accusation. We
asked Dr. Fine to explain this serious charge.<br />
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>FINE:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b> </b>You have a judicial, a group of member of
the judiciary that have effectively engaged in what we call a RICO scheme
which is a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act scheme.
And the basis of the scheme is that you have the illegal payments.
You have them taking place time and time again. You have the <i>judges obstructing justice.</i> That is a RICO scheme.<br />
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>DUTTON:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> And so according to Dr. Fine this
corruption of racketeering isn't just isolated only to the Los Angeles
Superior Court.</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">FINE: The entire judiciary
system in </span><st1:state><st1:place><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">California</span></st1:place></st1:state><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> is
susceptible to this scheme and the 38 million people of </span><st1:state><st1:place><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">California</span></st1:place></st1:state><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> are
victims of this scheme.<br />
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</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>DUTTON:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Dr. Fine has the evidence to back up his
claim of judicial corruption.<br />
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>FINE:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b> </b>Ninety percent of the judges in </span><st1:state><st1:place><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">California</span></st1:place></st1:state><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">
received illegal payments and that goes all the way up to five out of
the seven California Supreme Court justices received those illegal
payments.So the system is rife with obstruction.<br />
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</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>DUTTON:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> If the judges receiving payments from the
county and one of the parties appearing before him is represented by the
county aren’t the judges supposed to disclose this fact to everybody
in the courtroom?<br />
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</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>FINE:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Oh there’s no question. The responsibility
existed under the Code of Judicial Ethics Rule 3E, 3E 1 and
2. The responsibility existed to not even accept the payments
under the Code of Judicial Ethics 4D 1. The
responsibility existed for the judges to tell other judges about
these illegal payments and that is under the federal statute the <i>misprision
of felony</i> and that is 18 U.S.C. Section 4 which makes
it a federal crime. It’s a federal crime for someone who knows of a
crime being committed to not tell a judge about such crime. And
that’s a federal crime. And state court judges are bound to
follow federal law and that’s under Article 6 Clause 2 of the </span><st1:country-region><st1:place><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;">United
States</span></st1:place></st1:country-region><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Constitution.<br />
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>DUTTON</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>: </b>Perhaps we’re being optimistic to hope
that some judges somewhere in the entire state recognizes this obvious
conflict of interest and is refusing these illegal
and unconstitutional payments. Isn't there at least one judge
with integrity in the state?</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>FINE:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> To my knowledge I don’t know of any judge
that has turned down any payments.<br />
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</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>DUTTON:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b> </b>So if they’re all taking
the payments shouldn't they at least inform the parties
they’re judging? We asked Dr. Fine, “Who’s responsible for making
sure everybody knows there are illegal payments being paid to
the judges?”<br />
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</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"><b>FINE:</b></span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black; font-family: Arial;"> Well, the responsibility is going to fall
on two people. One is going to be the judge. The second place is
going to be the County Council if the County’s in there because
the <i>County Council would then be misleading and deceiving the
court and actually committing obstruction of justice.</i><br />
So if the County Council does
not come in and disclose that the County is paying or has paid
illegal payments to the judges, the County has committed obstruction
of justice. Now when the County knows that they made the
illegal payments and the judge knows that they've made illegal
payments, the two of them together have committed <i>obstruction of justice</i> and they
have precluded the other person from the, in the lawsuit, from
obtaining a fair trial. <br />
Now that results in two things. One
that results in the <i>denial of due
process</i>, in addition to that such action is going to be an
obstruction of justice because what has happened is that [the]
County has <i>bought</i> the judiciary
and by doing that they have obstructed justice by also denying people
a fair trial. <br />
Now a third thing takes place
and this is that they've committed an extrinsic fraud upon
the court because what they've done by having bought the
court, they've stopped the other side from obtaining a fair trial. <br />
And when you do what is known
as an outside action of stopping the other side from obtaining a fair
trial you've committed an extrinsic fraud because that’s
something that the other side really can’t find out about and it has
nothing whatsoever to do with what the case is about. If it had something
to do with – would be the proof of the case it would be considered an
intrinsic fraud and it would be something that the other side could
prove within the confines of the case, but this is something totally
outside of the case, what we call <i>collateral to the case</i>. <br />
So it becomes an extrinsic fraud and the cases hold
that when one party does something or something happens that is outside
of the case and it prevents through any means whatsoever someone
getting a fair trial, that’s extrinsic fraud and that
actually deprives the court of jurisdiction. And when there is no
jurisdiction anything that the court does is void. So that gives you sort
of a picture of what is happening here.</span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-62178719243348153892011-07-21T15:47:00.000-07:002011-07-21T15:47:47.243-07:00Request For Judicial Benefits<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><br />From: Sharon Stephens<br />Sent: Monday, July 11, 2012<br />Subject: <b>Public Records Act<br /> <span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span></b></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 16px;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">GOVT. CODE §§ 6250 - 6276.48.</span></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><span style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b><br /></b><br /><span style="background-color: white;">Pursuant to the provisions of the California Public Records Act, request is hereby made for documents showing all payments from Riverside County commonly known as "local <span style="color: #222222;">Judicial</span> <span style="color: #222222;">Benefits</span>" to Riverside County Judges <b>THOMAS N. DOUGLASS </b>and <b>B. J. BJORK</b>from the commencement of such payments believed to be in the 1980's through the present. A yearly summary of "Megaflex cafeteria plan <span style="color: #222222;">benefits</span>' </span>401(k), 457 or other retirement contributions, "professional allowances" and any other retirement contributions, "professional development allowances" and any other Riverside County compensations for each year that the "Local <span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #222222;">Judicial</span> <span style="color: #222222;">Benefits</span>"</span> were paid will be sufficient.<br /><br />Time is of the essence. An e-mail response to <a href="mailto:sharonstephens.1@gmail.com" style="color: #0000cc;" target="_blank">sharonstephens.1@gmail.com</a> <wbr></wbr>containing all available records or a summary thereof will be sufficient to this most urgent matter.<br /><br />Thank you for your attention to this <b>most urgent matter.</b><br /><br />Sincerely,<br /><span style="color: #888888;"><span style="color: #888888;"><span style="color: #888888;"><br />Sharon Stephens</span></span></span></span></span>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-23674120751182219572011-07-21T14:17:00.000-07:002011-07-21T14:17:14.034-07:00Dear California Attorney General, Kamala Harris<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b><br />WHAT ABOUT JUDICIAL BENEFITS<br /> </b></span></div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">In the State of California we have judges breaking the law every day by sitting on </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">cases where they have lost their right to do so due to taking "bribes" in the form </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">of local judicial benefits from their counties. YES! Those are bribes according to </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Federal Law and are void</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b style="font-size: 11pt;"> </b></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b>CCP Sec. 473(d), a violation of CCP Sec. 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii), and Code of Judicial Ethics, Cannons 2A, #E (1) and (2), and 4D(1), and an Obstruction of Justice.</b></span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">As stated in the case of<i> <u>Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, </u></i><u>167 Cal.App.4 </u><u>630 (2008)</u>, rev. denied 12/23/08, [counties] began making payments to State Superior Court judges in the late 1980s. The Sturgeon case held that these payments violated <b>Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution.</b></span></div>
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If the judge did not reveal such payments and recuse themselves, the judge could be facing a bribery charge. After the Sturgeon decision, the legislature enacted<b> Senate Bill SBx2-11</b>, which recognized that the County payments to judges were criminal. Senate Bill SBx2-11 gave retroactive immunity, effective 5/21/09, from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to a “governmental entity, officer, or employee of a governmental entity,”including judges who were paid or received “judicial benefits.” The retroactive immunity did not extend to the judge’s actions of presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party. Nor, did it extend to county payments received after 5/21/09. </div>
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<br />At all times, judges who accepted “bribes” from an interested party were biased. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” <u><i>Levine v. United States</i>, 362 U.S. </u><u>610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), </u>citing <u><i>Offutt v. United States</i>, 348 U.S. 11, 14, </u><u>75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).</u> Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice. </div>
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Further, the judge receiving the payment may be prosecuted for violating the intangible right to honest services under <b>Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1346. </b> <b>The U.S. Supreme Court</b> held in <u> </u><i><u>Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. </u></i>(decided 6/24/2010), Slip Opinion pages 48-49, that § 1346 encompasses bribery and </div>
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kickbacks.</div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;">The judges and the county and its attorneys have never disclosed to this day that the countys have made payments to judges. This is fraud on the court.</span><br /><br /><div style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="font-family: 'arial black', sans-serif;">U.S. Supreme Court Cases Mandate That the Order Voiding and </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'arial black', sans-serif;">Annulling All Orders and Judgments be Entered Based Upon Fraud </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'arial black', sans-serif;">Upon the Court .</span></div>
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The U.S. Supreme Court, which the Superior Court is bound to follow, stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878): </div>
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There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. </div>
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The Court continued at page 66: Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract . . .(citing <b>Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499</b>). </div>
<br /><span style="font-family: Arial; line-height: 24px;">"<b><i>Fraud upon the court</i></b><i>" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court</i> [<u>JUDGES AREOFFICERS OF THE COURT</u>)]<i> so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication</i>." <i><u>Kenner</u></i><i><u>v. C.I.R.,</u></i><u> 387 F.3d 689 (1968);</u> <b>7 Moore's Federal Practice</b>,<b>2d ed., p. 512, 60.23</b>.<br /><br />The 7th Circuit further stated "<i>a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final</i>." <b>THE JUDGMENT IS VOID!</b></span><br /><br /><div style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in <u><i>Vallely v. Northern Fire & </i></u><u><i>Marine Ins. Co</i>., 254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920</u>): Courts are constituted by authority, and they cannot [act] beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply<b> void!</b> </div>
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<br /><b>I am filing motions against such judges next week:</b><br /><br /><i>People v. Stephens</i> <span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 10pt;"><b>CASE NO.:</b><span style="font-weight: bold;"> </span><b>MWV 903720 </b>San Bernardino County<br /> (Judge S. Sabet has received over $300,000 in judicial benefits.)<br /><br /><i>People v. Stephens</i> <b>CASE NO</b>.: </span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; color: #29303b; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <b>INF054715</b> Riverside County<br /> (There are several cases I shall be challenging including one<br /> involving Cathedral City, and ALL home owner board members.)<br /><br />There are several more cases I shall be filling motions against as well.<br /><br />~Sharon Stephens</span></div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif;"> </span></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-28440427014152720722011-06-16T16:28:00.000-07:002011-06-16T16:28:19.160-07:00Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-89591315821283753862011-04-27T17:38:00.000-07:002011-04-27T17:41:19.281-07:00Attorney Richard Fine's Model for Void Judgment<a href="http://www.fulldisclosure.net/Blogs/96.php">http://www.fulldisclosure.net/Blogs/96.php</a><br />
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<strong>Los Angeles, CA</strong> Former U S Prosecutor <strong>Dr. Richard I Fine</strong> explains how citizens can disqualify a State judge who is "on the take". All 430 California Superior Court Judges in L A County can be disqualified by citizens who have been involved in litigation against the County of Los Angeles in the last two decades. If you lost your case and did not know your judge was getting money from the County, Richard Fine says you can "Null & Void" the Judge's Order and get a new trial.<br />
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<strong>GET YOUR MONEY BACK?</strong><br />
If you paid money to the County, you now have a chance to recover that money, according to Dr. Fine's experience, he has already disqualified five judges who have been "On the Take" in his cases involving the County of L.A. That is why he was locked up in L A County jail for 18 months without being charged or convicted of a crime. Now he can show you the way to get JUSTICE. Featured here are Dr. Fine's Motions to "Null & Void" that were used by him to disqualify the five Judges so far in his case.<br />
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<strong>DO IT YOURSELF OR HAVE YOUR ATTORNEY FILE?</strong><br />
Richard Fine suggests that you can file "In Pro-Per" or better yet ask your attorney to use Dr. Fine's Motions To Null & Void the Decision made by your Judge. The templates he used are shown below.<br />
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<tr><td valign="top" width="10%">Step 1</td><td width="90%">Contact L A County Auditor-Controller: Greg Iverson<a href="mailto:GIVERSON@auditor.lacounty.gov" style="text-decoration: none;">GIVERSON@auditor.lacounty.gov</a> to request amount County paid to your judge since 1987 (link to Richard Fine's example below). Use the Template with name & E-mail address where to send: (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LACountyAuditorJudicialBenefits.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">download & print here</a>) (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/Kuhl-HighberbergAuditor-ControllerReport.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">and here</a>)</td></tr>
<tr><td valign="top" width="10%">Step 2</td><td>Download Richard Fine's TEMPLATE Motions to Disqualify & Null & Void Judge's Orders:<br />
Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Judge David Yaffe (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LASCNoticeVoid-Null-8-6-10.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">Aug. 6, 2010</a>) (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LASCMotionNull8-27-10.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">Aug. 27, 2010</a>)<br />
Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Judge Robert O'Brien (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LASCFineMotionNullDec2010.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">Dec. 2010</a>) (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LASCRenewalMotion1-31-11.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">Jan. 27, 2011</a>)<br />
Reply Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Elihu Berle (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LASCReplyNull-Void3-2-11.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;"> Mar 2, 2011</a>)<br />
Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Judge Carolyn B. Kuhl (<a href="http://fulldisclosure.net/Documents/LASC-RemoveJudgeKuhl3-8-11.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;">RemoveJudgeKuhl</a>)</td></tr>
<tr><td valign="top" width="10%">Step 3</td><td>Send a copy of your Motion with Case number to Full Disclosure Network, 333 Washington Blvd. Suite #24, Marina del Rey, CA 90402 or E-mail it to<a href="mailto:feedback@fulldisclosure.net" style="text-decoration: none;">feedback@fulldisclosure.net</a> so Full Disclosure Network can follow and report on YOUR case.</td></tr>
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<strong>NOTE</strong>: Please send Full Disclosure a copy of the L A Auditor-Controller's response to you with the amount of money your Judge received. We will post a chart with the totals to inform the public on how much the Judges are receiving in this illegal Double Benefits.</div>
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<br /></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-76428572692042707342011-03-03T17:00:00.000-08:002011-03-04T10:29:49.074-08:00SHAELA S. SABET<div style="text-align: center;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b>AN UNJUST JUDGE</b><br /><i>Writ Of Habeas Corpus</i></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY</span><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">RANCHO CUCAMONGA DIVISION</span><br /><b style="font-size: small;">CASE NO. MWV903720</b></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">COMES NOW SHARON STEPHENS to submit a petition for a PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS on a sentence imposed by JUDGE SHAELA S. SABET on January 11, 2011 on a <i>void on the face j</i>udgment. Judge Sabet had admitted, on the record she "does not know void judgment law," but refused to let me recuse her on a CCP 170.1 so that another judge might hear the case.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Judge Shaela Sabet imposed on me an unlawful incarceration that began with a <i>void on the face </i>temporary restraining order [TRO] and then became a<i> void on the face </i>Restraining Order.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">For more than a year the San Bernardino Office of District Attorney and this court, particularly Judge Sabet has persecuted me on the void on the face restraining order. I have been in and out of false arrests and unlawful and have been drug back and forth to court like a rag doll, all the while being homeless and living in my car because of a retaliatory eviction by Logan Property Management Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck, essentially for complaining about lack of fire safety and criminal behavior on my senior apartment complex. (I am 70 years old.)<br /><br />I soon discovered that five people had died in fires on another property of the owners, Ameriland Group, and Attorney Hollenbeck had evicted several people who complained - mostly handicapped and mentally disabled - from the Alexandria Hotel in Los Angeles. Later, in another fire on a property they owned three more would die in a fire in Vacaville, CA and more than 200 would be displaced. (The owners are now charged with manslaughter, and other charges, and face 18 years in prison.)<br /><br />When I would not comply with the eviction, and go quietly into the night and tried to reason with the owners, Attorney Linda Hollenbeck sent me an email threatening me with a retraining order to shut me up! She then applied for two <i>ex parte orders </i>under CCP 527.8, <i>Workplace Violence</i>: The first, <span style="line-height: 115%;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Case CIVRS900716</span> </b>was dismissed as void as it did not meet the statutory criteria, i.e., there was no violence! The second judge was reluctant to issue an ex parte and stated on the record "she didn't do that much!" i.e., NO VIOLENCE!<br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I was given no real opportunity to
rebut the <st1:stockticker>TRO</st1:stockticker> that was based upon hearsay declarations that were subject to
numerous evidentiary objections, and in fact there was an
insufficient showing <b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: normal;">of unlawful violence or credible acts of violence; CCP 527.8 requires <i>proof by clear and convincing evidence of unlawful violence.</i></span></b><span style="color: #000066; font-size: 10pt;"><b><br />
</b></span><br />From the beginning the TRO was <i>void on the face </i>for not meeting the criteria for violence. A TRO is also void after 14 days.<br /><br />Attorney Linda Hollenbeck then missed the filing date for a hearing by three or four days to issue the restraining order, therefore it became automatically void, however, we did go to the hearing and Attorney Hollenbeck allowed me to put her on as "a witness," and admitted she had tried to have me arrested while making a complaint to the owners/management. (Complaints of any kind are "protected activity" in spite of a restraining order.)<br /><br />Linda Hollenbeck was fired from her law firm the very next day because of her court testimony.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Still, no matter how much I told the owners, the management, or Attorney Hollenbeck the orders were void they continued to have me arrested for such things as getting my mail or sitting in the dinning room eating my breakfast. (I knew the management were afraid of losing their jobs and so complied with Attorney Hollenbeck's instructions to continue to arrest me.)<br /><br />Finally I wrote a Motion to Dismiss Void Judgment </span><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small; font-weight: normal;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: normal;"><b><span style="color: #660000; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"> </span></b></span></span><b style="font-size: small;">Case
MWV902119</b> and on</span><span style="color: black; line-height: 115%;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: 10pt; font-style: italic;"> </span>June </span><span style="color: black; line-height: 115%;">19, 2009</span><b style="line-height: 18px;"> </b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;">went before </span><b style="line-height: 18px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;">Judge Michael R. Libutt</span></b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><b>i</b>, in which he issued a "Stay Away Order," however by this time both the TRO and the Restraining Order were void, and, the court </span><u style="font-size: 16px; line-height: 18px;">may not</u><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"> attach any order onto a void order, therefore his order was void.</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;">Then I am forced into court on a 402 Hearing and I ask that the case be challenged as a void judgment. Judge Sabet is almost gleeful at the start that she "gets to retry a case of another judge; I've never done that before," she declares. She also makes it clear she "knows nothing of void judgments," but proceeds to unlawfully retry the case anyway. (A void judgment can only be heard on the judgment roll of the original hearing.)</span><br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;">Judge Sabet allows Attorney Hollenbeck to sit with the Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu (in spite of protest from my attorney) and feeds him a litany of question after question to witnesses who give false, well coached, fabricated answers that were never given in the original hearing, however, they all say I "never committed any acts of violence." One witness, Ms. Oseth-Oshner totally provably perjures herself. Then they are allowed to bring in two "new witnesses" -- one a convicted felon.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Oy Vey! Judge Sabet has totally lost control and sight of the law of a void judgment challenge hearing.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">At the end she informs the court room she "doesn't know how to rule and the attorneys will need to bring her the law to do so." They don't know the law either! I know the law but no one is asking me.<br /><br />Two weeks later we are back in court and someone has informed Judge Sabet she has totally screwed up the case; she must totally dismiss all 28 counts of the restraining order, which she does, but is obviously very upset.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Then, up jumps Deputy DA, Jackl Liu and Attorney Hollenbeck with the now moot, and void Stay Away Order of Judge Libutti and demands I be incarcerated on a trespass that allegedly took place under the [void] TRO? Judge Sabet, with a snarled lip and obvious pleasure sends me to jail with an unconscionable $150,000 Bail. I am 70 years old, indigent and living in my car -- she has made it impossible for me to get out of jail.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">For ten days I do not eat and I am abused terribly by at least three sadistic and cruel deputies. Two public defenders see the results of that abuse: bloody wrists and more.<br /><br />I am brought back into court but I am not even aware of what I am saying, or pleading to. I just know I cannot go back to jail; I am terrified.<br /><br />After I am released I want to change my plea, based on my incompetent state of mind at the hearing. Judge Sabet again ignores the statutory criteria to set a competency hearing and she declares me to be competent. She has denied me due process. She sets a two year Summary Probation and declares I must give up my constitutional right, and cannot contact Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, the Attorney of Record for the owners, who I now wish to sue for what they have done to me. I KNOW I am allowed to legally sue these people. I serve Attorney Hollenbeck, with Proof of Service, an Intent to Sue Ameriland Group, and Briarwood Partners.<br /><br />Judge Sabet then sentences me at a Vicker's Hearing for this contact to West Valley Detention Center for 120 days for violation of her [void] Summary Probation.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">SUPPORTING CASES AND RULES</span></b></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 18px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b>- CCP 473(d) </b>Void Judgments may be challenged in any court where they are at issue.<br /><br />- <b>30A AM Jur "Judgments" 43, 44, 45 </b>No order may be attached or <i>piggy-backed</i> to an already void order: <u><i>Henderson v. Henderson,</i> 232 BC 380 SE 2d 227 </u> See: Restatement Judgments 8.<br /><br />- The Defendant raised <i>a doubt as to her competency. </i>The court had a duty to to conduct a competency hearing,<u> <i>People v. Sanberg </i>(1981) 124 Cal. App, 3d 944,955.</u> Judge Sabet could not declare me "competent," and her error requires a reversal of judgment. <u><i>People v. Pennington </i>(1967) 66 Cal. 2d 508, 521.</u></span></span></div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br />- <b>CCP 527.8</b> must show, with undeniable proof the criteria of "violence" in order to issue a TRO. No such evidence was ever presented, making the TRO <i>void on the face</i> from the start, and no orders could be added to this void order.<br /><br />- <b>6 Witkin, Cal Procedure (2 nd ed. 1971) Appeal 7, pp 4024-4025:</b> "An Appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a 'dead limb' on the judicial tree -- a void order." Therefore, no Appeal is necessary.<br /><br />- I have sought the court of Judge Shaela S. Sabet for relief. She has ignored my letter.<br /><br />I am presently in pro per.<br /><br />I the undersigned say:<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;"><b> I AM THE PETITIONER IN THIS ACTION. I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THAT THE FOREGOING ALLEGATIONS AND STATEMENT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT, EXCEPT AS TO MATTERS THAT ARE STATED ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF, AND AS TO THOSE MATTERS, I BELIEVE THEM TO BE TRUE.<br /><br />February 5, 2011 Shar</b></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-small;"><b>on Stephens</b></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%;"><b><br /></b></span></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-62513178046391065892011-01-09T08:18:00.000-08:002011-01-09T08:50:02.913-08:00Deputy DA Suspension For Misconduct<br />
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Four-year suspension for ex-deputy DA upheld</span></h1>
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<tr><td align="center" style="padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px; vertical-align: top;" valign="top"><span class="imageCaption" style="font: italic normal normal 10px/normal Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; padding-bottom: 3px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 3px; padding-top: 3px;">Benjamin Field</span></td></tr>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">A former Santa Clara County deputy district <br />attorney abused his office and violated the<br />due process rights of several criminal <br />defendants, a State Bar Court review panel <br />ruled last month, and should therefore lose his law <br />license for four years. Finding that <br />BENJAMIN THOMAS FIELD [#168197] “<i><b>disregarded <br />prosecutorial accountability in favor of winning cases,</b></i>” the <br />three-judge panel upheld the recommendation of hearing <br />Judge Pat McElroy and also urged that Field be given five years <br />of probation.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">The state Supreme Court must rule on the recommendation before it takes effect.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Field, 45, a career prosecutor and one-time rising star in the DA’s office, originally <br />was charged with 25 counts of misconduct in four cases he prosecuted. The bar <br />court dismissed several charges as duplicative.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">“Although our system of administering justice is adversarial in nature and prosecutors <br />must be zealous advocates in prosecuting their cases, it cannot be at the cost of justice,<br />” wrote Judge Catherine Purcell, who was joined in the decision by Judges JoAnn Remke<br /> and Judith Epstein.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">“Field lost sight of this goal,” Purcell continued, “ … and in doing so, he disregarded<br />the foundation from which any prosecutor’s authority flows — ‘The first, best and most <br />effective shield against injustice for an individual accused … must be found … in the<br />integrity of the prosecutor.’”</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">The judges found that Field’s misconduct began shortly after his 1993 admission to<br /> the bar and spanned 10 years. The allegations stemmed from four cases and charged:</span></div>
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<li style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 24px; list-style-type: disc; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 1px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 2px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Field obtained a dental examination of a minor accused of sexual assault in <br />violation of a court order. He was attempting to try the youth, who claimed <br />to be 13, as an adult. A juvenile court judge suppressed the evidence <br />obtained in the examination.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 24px; list-style-type: disc; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 1px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 2px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">In a murder case, Field intentionally withheld a defendant’s statement <br />favorable to co-defendants. As a result, the judge dismissed a 25-year <br />gun enhancement against one of the co-defendants.</span></li>
<li style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 24px; list-style-type: disc; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 1px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 2px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">He made an improper closing argument in a sexually violent predator <br />(SVP) case, which an appellate court described as “deceptive and<br />reprehensible.” The court reversed a judgment committing the man as an SVP.</span></li>
<li style="line-height: 24px; list-style-type: disc; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 1px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 2px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;"><b><u>He intentionally withheld a witness’ statement that was favorable <br />to the defense</u></b> in a 2003 habeas corpus proceeding involving a sexual assault. <br />The judge found that he committed a discovery violation.</span></li>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">In that matter, the review panel found that Field’s misconduct escalated over time and <br />constituted “a calculated scheme to hide evidence favorable to the defense.”</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Two men who were convicted of sexual assault had filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus <br />and provided a declaration by a witness who claimed the 15-year-old victim had made<br /> false accusations because she missed curfew.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Field’s investigator found and interviewed the witness but did not notify the defense. <br />In addition, he instructed his investigator to prepare a misleading declaration and<br />filed it with the court, filed a statement with the court implying he did not know the <br />witness’ whereabouts, and then waited five months before disclosing the interview, <br />only after opposing counsel learned of the interview and had filed a motion alleging <br />prosecutorial misconduct.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Finally, the court concluded, Field urged the court to proceed with the habeas <br />hearing without the witness.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">In the same case, Field obtained five search warrants despite the judge’s doubts about<br />his tactics. Indeed, when Field asked the judge what to do if he needed a warrant in an <br />emergency, the judge testified, “I looked him right in the eye and I said, ‘Ben, just don’t <br />do it.’” Five days later, Field obtained a search warrant in another state without notifying<br />the habeas judge.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">The review panel found that Field committed several acts of moral turpitude and did not <br />obey a court order or follow the law. Field admitted to poor judgment and viewing his <br />discovery obligations too narrowly, and self-reported the finding of prosecutorial <br />misconduct to the bar.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Throughout the trial before Judge McElroy, which drew widespread interest among Field’s <br />colleagues, he defended his behavior. The review department rejected his assertions.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Although the misconduct could have resulted in disbarment, the court found extensive <br />mitigation, including Field’s cooperation with the bar’s investigation, an impressive record <br />of pro bono service and “an extraordinary demonstration of good character.” In particular,<br /> it expressly noted the testimony of former Santa Clara District Attorney George Kennedy,<br /> who lauded Field’s “extraordinary professional skills and good character” and said he <br />considers Field an honest person who is not intentionally corrupt.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Field left the DA’s office and is now chief of staff with Working Partnerships USA, a <br />San Jose company that addresses the needs of working families in Silicon Valley.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) filed an amicus brief on his behalf <br />warning that several of the grounds for discipline involved questions of law that have<br /> not been settled. “Attorneys should be disciplined for conduct that violates clearly<br /> established law, or conduct so outrageous that its illegality is obvious,” the amicus stated,<br /> “but should not be disciplined for conduct where the law is unsettled.”</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: xx-small;">Field’s attorney, Allen Ruby, did not return a phone call for comment, nor did <br />W. Scott Thorpe, CDAA chief executive officer.</span></div>
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</div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-45257218036875528812011-01-07T07:58:00.000-08:002011-01-07T07:58:41.754-08:00More on Vexatious Litigant<br />
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<span class="headline1" style="color: #123f72; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 22px; font-weight: 900; text-transform: uppercase;">HANDLING VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS<br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; color: black; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal; text-transform: none;"><a href="http://www.callawyer.com/cleStory.cfm?qVersionID=290&eid=903322&evid=1" style="color: #0000cc;" target="_blank">http://www.callawyer.com/<wbr></wbr>cleStory.cfm?qVersionID=290&<wbr></wbr>eid=903322&evid=1</a></span></span></div>
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<tr><td class="body" style="color: black; font-style: normal; font-weight: 100; line-height: 19px; text-align: left; vertical-align: top;"><b style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 0.9em;"><span class="byline" style="color: #666666; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 0.8em; font-style: normal; font-weight: bolder; text-align: left; text-decoration: none; text-transform: none;">By Michael C. Denison</span></b><br /><div style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 0.9em; margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="dropcap" style="color: #993300; float: left; font-weight: bolder; line-height: 55px; padding-top: 2px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span></span><span class="dropcap" style="color: #993300; float: left; font-weight: bolder; line-height: 55px; padding-top: 2px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The words <i>vexatious litigant </i>stir up an emotional reaction in anyone who has confronted an abusive or harassing pro se plaintiff. But to be considered vexatious a litigant must really step over the line. Indeed, a judicial determination that a party is vexatious is a powerful tool for defense attorneys. Among other things, a court can require the litigant to post a bond to cover your client's court costs, and in extreme cases it can require the person to obtain court permission before filing another lawsuit. (<i>See</i> Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 391.3, 391.7.)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b>What, Me Vexatious? </b><br />In California, section 391 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the qualifications of a vexatious litigant. Even though such status can bar a person from the courthouse, the statute has been held to be constitutional. (<i>See Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP,</i> 40 Cal. 4th 780 (2007); and<i>Wolfe v. George, </i>486 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2007).)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Under section 391, a vexatious litigant typically is a pro se plaintiff who has (1) lost at least five pro se lawsuits in the preceding seven years, (2) sued the same defendant for the same alleged wrong after losing, (3) repeatedly filed meritless papers, or (4) used frivolous tactical devices or already been declared a vexatious litigant for similar reasons. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b); <i>Wolfe,</i> 486 F.3d at 1124.) Because the statute uses the disjunctive <i>or,</i>the court must separately evaluate each of the four factual scenarios.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">However, two core elements must exist before the court even gets to the four scenarios listed above. First, the person must be a plaintiff or a "plaintiff equivalent." The term <i>plaintiff</i> means the person who commences, institutes, or maintains litigation or who causes it to commence, institute, or maintain, including an attorney acting in pro per. A <i>plaintiff equivalent</i> may be someone who has filed a cross complaint (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(d)). The phrase <i>vexatious litigant</i> does not apply to attorneys representing clients. (<i>Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc.,</i> 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)). Although no published opinion has applied the label to a defendant who is not also a cross-complainant or an appellant, courts have applied section 391(b)(2) and (3) to defendants. For brevity, “plaintiff” will be used in this article to refer to the party against whom the vexatious litigant order is sought.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">A second core element is that the person must be acting without counsel. Thus, to be declared a vexatious litigant the person must be appearing in propria persona, or be referenced in the court filings as appearing in pro per or pro se. If a lawyer represents the party in the subject litigation, the vexatious litigant statute does not apply.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Whenever an unrepresented litigant seems to be out of control, consult section 391 to determine if relief is available.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b>Four Statutory Requirements </b><br />In addition to the two core elements, the first of the four statutory scenarios requires that the plaintiff must have commenced or maintained at least five litigations within the past seven years that were either determined adversely to the plaintiff, or remained pending without good cause for two years without being brought to trial. (<i>See</i> Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b)(1).) Under California's fast-track rules (Cal. Gov. Code § 68600–68620) this latter scenario has become less common.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The vexatious litigant statute defines litigation as "any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court." (<i>See</i> Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(a).) Because the requirement is based on specific numbers, strict compliance is the order of the day. Four or fewer adverse litigations in the past seven years won't qualify; nor will five adverse litigations if one of them lies beyond the seven-year cutoff. Nor will five adverse litigations in the past seven years qualify if the plaintiff was represented by counsel in one or more instances. In short, litigants can't be a little vexatious. In the law's eye, they are either vexatious or they aren't.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The second scenario under section 391 involves attempts to relitigate issues after a prior case went against the plaintiff (§ 391(b)(2)). Unlike the first scenario, only a single prior adverse result is required. The subsequent case must be an attempt to relitigate the prior dispute against the same defendants: It must be another bite of the same apple—relitigation of the same, and already determined, cause of action, claim, controversy, or issue of fact or law.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The third scenario occurs when a pro per litigant repeatedly files non-meritorious motions, pleadings, or other court papers; conducts unnecessary discovery; or engages in tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay (§ 391(b)(3)). In contrast to the first two scenarios, this one requires no prior adverse litigation at all; it is appropriate for claiming vexatious litigant status based entirely on conduct within the present lawsuit.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">No bright-line rule exists to define "repeatedly" or "non-meritorious" under section 391(b)(3), so the determination resides within the discretion of the trial court. The court's discretion is not unfettered. Most cases affirming a vexatious litigant designation for repeatedly filing non-meritorious motions have involved numerous motions during a single case (<i>Morton v. Wagner,</i>156 Cal. App. 4th 963, 971–72 (2007)). In one instance, 20 motions were sufficient (<i>Bravo v. Ismaj,</i> 99 Cal. App. 4th 211, 225 (2002)). In another, three motions over three years did not make the grade (<i>Morton</i>), though the court did clarify that three motions might be sufficient under different circumstances.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">In addition, note that <i>non-meritorious</i> is not synonymous with unsuccessful. The repeated motions must be so devoid of merit and so frivolous that they constitute a flagrant abuse of the system. They must have no reasonable probability of success, and the court must find that they clearly were an attempt to "abuse the processes of the courts and to harass the adverse party. ..." (<i>Morton, </i>156 Cal. App. 4th at 972.)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The fourth scenario provides that a person can qualify as a vexatious litigant if he or she has "previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence." (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b)(4).)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b>Taking Action </b><br />Knowing these requirements sets the stage. But what, specifically, must one do to have an opponent declared a vexatious litigant? Typically, the defendant (or cross-defendant) files a motion requesting such a finding. If a motion is filed prior to trial, the litigation will come to a halt pending the result of the motion (§ 391.6).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The authority for the motion lies in section 391.1, which provides that in any pending litigation, at any time prior to final judgment, a defendant may move that the court, upon notice and hearing, require the plaintiff to furnish security. For purposes of the statute, security means an undertaking (usually in the form of a bond) to assure payment of the moving party's reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees (§ 391(c)). To succeed, the motion must establish both that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant under one of the four scenarios <i>and </i>that there is no reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail in the present case against the moving defendant.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">In addition to seeking security, the moving party can request (or the court on its own motion can issue) an order that prohibits the plaintiff from filing any new litigation in a California court in propria persona without permission from the presiding judge (§ 391.7(a)).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">At the motion hearing, the court considers relevant written or oral evidence furnished by witnesses or affidavits (§ 391.2). If the court determines that the plaintiff is vexatious and that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the present case, the court shall order the plaintiff to furnish security in an amount set by the court.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Once a vexatious litigant order is on file, the clerk of the court is not supposed to permit the plaintiff to file any new litigation without an order from the presiding judge. If the clerk mistakenly permits a new filing, any party may file a notice that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, which automatically stays the litigation and results in an automatic dismissal unless the plaintiff obtains the required filing order from the judge within ten days (§ 391.7(c)).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">In every case in which the court issues a prefiling order, the clerk must provide the California Judicial Council with a copy so it can update the statewide index of vexatious litigants it maintains (§ 391.7(e)).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Vexatious litigant orders have teeth because if security is not furnished as ordered, the litigation must be dismissed (§ 391.4; <i>Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank,</i> 53 Cal. App. 4th 43, 47 (1997)). In addition, disobedience of the prefiling order can be punished as contempt of court (§ 391.7(a)).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b>Counsel for the Plaintiff </b><br />As noted above, the vexatious litigant statute and prefiling orders apply only to pro se plaintiffs and not to a plaintiff represented by counsel. But in <i>Forrest v. Calif. Dept. of Corporations</i> (150 Cal. App. 4th 183 (2007)) a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a vexatious litigant by an attorney who later withdrew from the case, leaving the vexatious litigant unrepresented. The plaintiff had been declared a vexatious litigant in 1994. In 2003 the plaintiff, acting in pro per, filed a wrongful-termination complaint. However, before the plaintiff served the pleading on the defendants, she retained counsel. Three days before trial, the attorney filed a motion to be relieved as counsel and to continue the trial. The motion to be relieved was granted and, after several trial continuances, when the plaintiff failed to retain new counsel, the court dismissed the case.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">On appeal, the court held that the requirements of a prefiling order under section 391.7 remain in effect throughout the life of a lawsuit, and therefore such an order permits dismissal at any point when a vexatious litigant proceeds without counsel or without permission of the presiding judge (<i>Forrest,</i> 150 Cal. App. 4th at 197).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b>Not Permanent </b><br />Even if a plaintiff has been declared vexatious and a prefiling order is in place, there is no absolute prohibition against filing new lawsuits. If it appears that a new case has merit and has not been filed for purposes of harassment or delay, the presiding judge must permit the case to proceed (§ 391.7(b)). As the courts have noted, "[w]hen a vexatious litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable claim, he may enter." (<i>Luckett v. Panos,</i> 161 Cal. App. 4th 77, 81 (2008).)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Moreover, a vexatious litigant determination is not permanent in another sense: A prefiling order may be lifted, modified, or removed on an application by the vexatious litigant (<i>Luckett,</i> 161 Cal. App. 4th at 80–81). The<i> Luckett</i>court duly noted that "fundamental fairness requires the 'vexatious litigant' brand be erasable in appropriate circumstances." (161 Cal. App. 4th at 82.) The court then provided a road map for future cases. "[E]rasure requires substantial evidence that the vexatious litigant has mended 'his ways or conduct' " (161 Cal. App. 4th at 83), which requires the applicant to establish the following: (1) that he or she has a propensity for honesty, including an accurate reckoning with the facts on which the prior finding was made and a notification of any change in financial condition; (2) that he or she has some genuine remorse for the costs of litigation inflicted on the defendants; (3) that he or she has made some genuine effort at restitution to the previous victims; and (4) that he or she actually has given up the habit of suing people as a way of life, including making "efforts at obtaining gainful employment." (161 Cal. App. 4th at 93–94.)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Perhaps recognizing vexatious litigants' propensity for forum shopping, the<i>Luckett</i> court further opined that "any attempt to erase a vexatious litigant prefiling order should be brought in the forum that originally entered the prefiling order." (161 Cal. App. 4th at 95.)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b>Federal Cases </b><br />Federal cases recognize that "there is strong precedent establishing the inherent power of federal courts to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances." (<i>DeLong v. Hennessey, </i>912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990).) The Ninth Circuit has recognized that under the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)), federal courts have inherent power to enjoin litigants who have abusive and lengthy histories (<i>DeLong,</i> 912 F.2d at 1147–48).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Within the Ninth Circuit, several trial courts have adopted a vexatious litigant rule that "provides that the court may 'proceed by reference to the Vexatious Litigants statute of the State of California." (<i>See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc.,</i> 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Central District Local Rule 27A.4 [presently Local Rule 83–8]).) The Eastern District of California also has adopted the California vexatious litigant statute "as a procedural Rule ... on the basis of which the Court may order the giving of security, bond or undertaking. ..." (<i>See</i> Eastern District Local Rule 65.1–151(b).)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Federal courts typically apply five factors to determine vexatious litigant status, but they are not the same factors as set forth in the California statute. The factors utilized in the Ninth Circuit stem from a Second Circuit opinion. (<i>See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp.,</i> 500 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).) The factors include (1) the litigant's history of litigation and, in particular, whether it entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative suits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation—for example, whether the litigant had a good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused unnecessary expense to the parties or placed a needless burden on the courts; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties (<i>Safir v. United States Lines, Inc.,</i> 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)).</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">The Ninth Circuit reviews vexatious litigant orders under a four-part test established in <i>DeLong.</i> The test requires that the trial court afford the plaintiff minimum due process notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an adequate record for review, which should include a showing "that the litigant's activities were numerous and abusive." The trial court must make "substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions," and the order must be "narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered." (<i>DeLong</i> at 1147–48.)</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Having someone declared vexatious does not make up for the cost and emotion expended in defending abusive and burdensome litigation. Nevertheless, a vexatious litigant order can help protect against future misconduct.</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">On the other side of the courtroom, pro se plaintiffs who have been declared vexatious are not denied access to judicial remedies. They simply must establish that their new lawsuits have merit. And, if they desire once again to enjoy unrestricted access to the courts, they must prove that they have mended their ways</span><div style="margin-bottom: 0.7em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span><i style="font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 0.9em;">Michael C. Denison is a partner and civil litigator at the Los Angeles firm of Towle, Denison, Smith & Tavera.</i></td></tr>
</tbody></table>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-26456421427751529652011-01-06T11:57:00.000-08:002011-01-06T11:57:23.117-08:00Pro Se Laws<br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Acting Pro Se can be beneficial, especially if you are in a position where you cannot gain or afford the assistance of an attorney, but it will have to be done correctly in order for it to be accepted with any respect or authority.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-weight: normal;"><b><br /><div style="text-align: left;">
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-weight: normal;"><u><b><i>HAINES v. KERNER, ET AL.</i> 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652.</b> </u>Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 1957 (See Note Below). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (CA2 1944).</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><u><b><i>ESTELLE, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, ET AL. v. GAMBLE</i> 29 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251</b></u>. We now consider whether respondent's complaint states a cognizable 1983 claim. The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed. As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).<br /><br /></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><u><b><i>WILLIAM MCNEIL, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES</i> 113 S. Ct. 1980, 124 L. Ed. 2d 21, 61 U.S.L.W. 4468</b></u>. Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is certainly not a "trap for the unwary." It is no doubt true that there are cases in which a litigant proceeding without counsel may make a fatal procedural error, but the risk that a lawyer will be unable to understand the exhaustion requirement is virtually nonexistent. Our rules of procedure are based on the assumption that litigation is normally conducted by lawyers. While we have insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do not have access to counsel be liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and have held that some procedural rules must give way because of the unique circumstance of incarceration, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (pro se prisoner's notice of appeal deemed filed at time of delivery to prison authorities), we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. As we have noted before, "in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).<br /><br /></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><u><b><i>BALDWIN COUNTY WELCOME CENTER v. BROWN</i> 466 U.S. 147, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196, 52 U.S.L.W. 3751</b></u>. Rule 8(f) provides that " pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." We frequently have stated that pro se pleadings are to be given a liberal construction.<br /><br /></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><b><u><i>HUGHES v. ROWE ET AL. </i>449 U.S. 5, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 49 U.S.L.W. 3346.</u></b> Petitioner's complaint, like most prisoner complaints filed in the Northern District of Illinois, was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that the allegations of such a complaint, "however inartfully pleaded" are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 86 (CA7 1980); French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 996 (CA7 1976). Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines, supra, at 520-521. And, of course, the allegations of the complaint are generally taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">This note added on July 7, 2009, and thanks to Peter Bernegger for the following update. The U.S. Supreme Court case Conley vs Gibson, (Identified Above), has in effect been overturned in the sense that the Federal Courts now use <i><b><u>Bell Atlantic vs Twombly</u></b></i>, decided by the Supreme Court in 2007. In a nutshell Federal Courts across the USA rushed to this new decision to dismiss lawsuits right and left stating that they are not specific enough, don't contain enough facts and such. With Conley vs Gibson they had to take a somewhat conclusionary view and assume in the beginning that the Plaintiff is right. No longer.<br /></span></div>
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<li><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> <b>See</b> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1126</span></li>
<li><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; font-family: 'Times New Roman';"><b style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><div style="display: inline !important; text-align: right;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-weight: normal;"><b style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> See</b></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-weight: normal;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"> http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/11/bone-on-bell-at.html </span></span></div>
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<b style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><div style="text-align: right;">
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<div style="text-align: left;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-weight: normal;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: normal;">Overall, to make a Plaintiff come to the table with more facts is not so bad in my opinion. However, the Judges across the USA have used this new case as a magic wand to go through their stacks of cases, wiping them out right and left by dismissal claiming Bell Atlantic vs Twombly. <b>It is now the number one quoted case when the defendant files a motion to dismiss per www.versuslaw.com.</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-3407445620138377162010-12-21T09:23:00.000-08:002010-12-23T10:39:20.044-08:00PRESIDENT CASES TO SUE A JUDGE and PROSECUTORS<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b><br /></b></span><br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><b>The United States Supreme Court</b></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><i>defined a judicial act of "warring on the constitution" as treason.</i></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><u><i>Cooper v.</i> <i>Aaron</i>, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).</u></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> "Warring on the constitution" includes acting without jurisdiction, in violation of laws.</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">See</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><i>U<u>nited States v. Will, </u></i></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><u>449 U.S. 200, 216 at footnote 19, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); <i>Cohens v. Virginia,</i> 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821</u></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">)"<br /><br /><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"Without authority or jurisdiction, NOT FOLLOWING THE STATUTORY LAW --the prosecutor and the<b> judges lose absolute immunity against suit</b> and are subject to suit for unlawful arrest, unlawful incarceration, and malicious prosecution."</span></span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><a href="http://www.examiner.com/cook-county-government-in-chicago/judge-biebel-and-clerk-brown-violate-oaths-of-office-and-illinois-statutes" style="color: #0000cc;" target="_blank">http://www.examiner.com/cook-<wbr></wbr>county-government-in-chicago/<wbr></wbr>judge-biebel-and-clerk-brown-<wbr></wbr>violate-oaths-of-office-and-<wbr></wbr>illinois-statutes</a></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">(excerpts below)</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"Both Presiding Criminal Court <b>Judge Paul P. Biebel Jr</b>. and Clerk of the Court Dorothy Brown take oaths of office to uphold the law. Both are grossly violating the law and their oaths of office regarding appeals to the Illinois Appellate Court.. There is a fundamental violation of the United States Constitution's 5th and 14th Amendment right to procedural due process ...</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">In violation of the above laws and rules, Dorothy Brown instead of filing the Notice of Appeal with the Illinois Appellate Court, files a "Notice" of Notice of Appeal. She then sends the Notice of Appeal to Judge Biebel and Judge Biebel in a hearing without notice to or presence of litigants or defendant's attorney or counsel makes a ruling as to whether or not he will allow the Notice of Appeal to be transmitted to the Illinois Appellate court. This writer met with Clerk Brown and her staff in December 2009 and she confirmed that her office was following this unlawful procedure. She pledged to look into it, but has not changed the procedure to be lawful as of this date."</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"Judge Biebel has NO jurisdiction or legal authority to hold this hearing or even make any decision as to whether Clerk Brown is going to transmit the Notice of Appeal, as the Circuit Court judges lose all jurisdictional rights upon the filing of a notice of appeal.</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse;"><b><br /></b></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"When Judge Biebel illegally quashes an appeal this denies the defendant his 5th an 14th Amendment Constitutional right to due process. This is an act of defying the constitution or "warring on the constitution," as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. As this is knowingly and willfully done by Judge Biebel, this is treason as defined under federal law. To be called a traitor is a serious allegation, but judges who knowingly impair an appeal in a criminal case in open violation of law fall into this category as this sort of conduct is so egregious and violative of fundamental rights known by all judges. The case against Clerk Brown would be weaker as she claimed that she didn't know what her staff was doing in December 2009 to this writer. However, she has failed to correct this violation of law."</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"This writer was unlawfully charged with Medicaid vendor fraud by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in 2004. The writer was found not guilty by jury trial in February 2009 and has filed a federal civil rights suit against AG Madigan, as well as Judges Jorge Alonso and Kathleen Pantle for unlawfully prosecuting her and unlawfully incarcerating her pre-trial without legal authority to do so, without probable cause, and therefore without jurisdiction. AG Madigan had no jurisdiction under Illinois law to bring these charges as only the county States Attorney has legal authority in Illinois to charge someone with Medicaid vendor fraud. Therefore, technically AG Madigan as well as Judges Alonso and Pantle have committed treason since they were fully knowledgeable of this fact pre-trial through this writer's pre-trial motions.</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">This writer was NOT appealing an acquittal. She was appealing a pre-trial dismissal of a motion concerning the court's jurisdiction. This writer properly argued that AG Madigan did not have authority to bring the charges of Medicaid vendor fraud; the charges were barred by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause since the Federal Medicaid Code specifically allows doctors to bill for services of their employees; and therefore, the Circuit Court of Cook County had no jurisdiction.</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Jurisdiction is a justiciable issue (a controversy in this case) and double jeopardy is not invoked as this writer could not be retried if she wins or loses the appeal. Therefore, United States Supreme Court case law requires that this Illinois Supreme Court rule not be used to deny the appeal by this writer as the dismissal of the appeal violates prior United States Supreme Court holdings on this issue of appeals in cases of acquittal."</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">"Without authority or jurisdiction, the prosecutor and the judges lose absolute immunity against suit and are subject to suit for unlawful arrest, unlawful incarceration, and malicious prosecution."</span><br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"><br /></span>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-35039599567421044282010-12-19T15:31:00.000-08:002010-12-19T15:31:36.344-08:00UPDATE" Thomas Goldstein's District Attorney Lawsuit<br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b>UPDATE: </b></span><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"><span> </span><b>August 2010</b> the city of </span></span><st1:city><st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Long Beach</span></span></st1:place></st1:city><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> paid out an $8 million settlement in a case alleging prosecutorial misconduct brought by <b>Thomas Goldstein</b>. Rebecca Cathcart, <b>Wrongfully Convicted Man Gets $7.95 Million Settlement</b>, N.Y. Times, </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 17px;">Rebecca Cathcart, </span><st1:date day="12" month="8" year="2010"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Aug. 12, 2010</span></span></st1:date><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">.</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 17px;"> </span></div>
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<span class="apple-style-span"><b><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Goldstein,</span></b></span><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> who was convicted of a 1979 murder in </span></span><st1:city><st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Long Beach</span></span></st1:place></st1:city><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">, spent 24 years in prison before being released after a federal judge ruled that </span></span><st1:place><st1:placename><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Los Angeles</span></span></st1:placename><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> </span></span><st1:placetype><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">County</span></span></st1:placetype></st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> prosecutors withheld evidence of deals with a jailhouse informant and failed to correct perjured testimony. <br /><br />Goldstein sued the prosecution, </span></span><st1:city><st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Long Beach</span></span></st1:place></st1:city><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> police officers and the City of </span></span><st1:city><st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Long Beach</span></span></st1:place></st1:city><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">,</span></span><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">asserting that former </span></span><st1:place><st1:placename><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">Los Angeles</span></span></st1:placename><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> </span></span><st1:placetype><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;">County</span></span></st1:placetype></st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"> district attorney John Van De Kamp and his chief deputy failed to adequately train and supervise their deputies on their obligations relating to informants and failed to establish a system that would have facilitated information-sharing among deputy prosecutors.<span> </span><br />Although the Supreme Court rejected Goldstein’s argument </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 17px;">and expanded the prosecutorial actions covered by absolute immunity to activities that cast them “in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate,” <i><u>Van de Kamp,</u></i><u> 129 S.Ct. 855 at 861</u></span></div>
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<span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"><br /><b>Goldstein was permitted to pursue his lawsuit against </b></span></span><st1:city><st1:place><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"><b>Long Beach</b></span></span></st1:place></st1:city><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial; font-size: 13pt;"><b>, resulting in the settlement.<br /><br /></b></span></span></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-24496161991280695012010-12-19T10:33:00.000-08:002010-12-19T15:28:03.247-08:00LETS BRING SUIT AGAINST ROD PACHECO -- RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY<br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The<b> <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-na-scotus15apr15,0,2869765.story" style="border-bottom-width: 0px; border-color: initial; border-left-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px; border-style: initial; border-top-width: 0px; font-style: inherit; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; outline-color: initial; outline-style: initial; outline-width: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: black;">U.S. Supreme Court</span></a> </b>agreed to hear the case of <b>Thomas Goldstein</b>, an ex-marine who was convicted of murdering his neighbor.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Goldstein served 24 years before his conviction was thrown out when the main witness against him was shown to have lied. That witness was a lifelong criminal who was given a deal on his own charges in exchange for testimony that Goldstein confessed to him in a jail cell. Goldstein alleges that the district attorney's office that prosecuted the case routinely used the testimony of so-called "jailhouse snitches" prosecutors knew or should have known were not reliable.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Goldstein's case is unusual because he's not suing the prosecutor who convicted him, but John Van de Camp, the district attorney who supervised that prosecutor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has allowed Goldstein's case to go forward, causing the U.S. Supreme Court to agree to hear it.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: inherit;">Goldstein's lawsuit stems from Federal Law </span><b style="font-style: inherit;">42 U.S.C. 1983</b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: inherit;">, which states that "…</span><i>[e]very person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages," and provides a means for those wronged by government officials to file suit in federal court.</i></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But there are exceptions to Section 1983 suits. In the 1976 case <em>Imbler v. Pachtman</em>, the U.S. Supreme Court carved out a wide exception to the law to exempt prosecutors. The Court said common law tradition grants prosecutors have what's known as "absolute immunity" from civil rights suits, meaning that they can't be sued, provided they're acting in their capacity as prosecutors. Few people enjoy such protections in their own line of work (judges have absolute immunity as well).</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But this complete shield from accountability is especially problematic when we're talking about prosecutors. It's a job that's already plagued by incentive problems. <b>We tend to measure a prosecutor's performance based on how many people he's able to throw in jail, not necessarily by how well he metes out justice.</b></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Rarely, for example, does a prosecutor get public recognition for the cases he <em>doesn't</em> take. So we have people in a position where they have the enormous power to take away someone's freedom, incentives nudging them to err on the side of prosecuting aggressively, and absolute immunity from lawsuits should they overstep their bounds.</span></div>
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<b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It's a recipe for abuse.</span></b></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Generally speaking, it <em>is</em> smart public policy to shield prosecutors from lawsuits when it comes to determining in which cases they'll pursue charges. If we hamstring prosecutors into factoring potential lawsuits into determining whom to charge, we run the risk of bringing politics or the wealth and status of the accused into what should be a question of law, context, and propriety (any more than these things are already factor into such decisions, anyway).</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: inherit;">But you could make a good case that </span><em style="font-style: inherit;">absolute</em><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: inherit;"> immunity takes this idea too far. Even police officers are given what's called "qualified immunity" from civil rights suits, which in 1983 the Supreme Court determined meant, "</span><i>insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known</i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: inherit;">."</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">That sets a hurdle for lawsuits against the police, but not a wall (some would argue that this hurdle is also too high). It might be time to consider applying that standard to prosecutors, too.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But the Goldstein case doesn't even seek to overturn the 1976 decision in <em>Imbler</em>. That would take an act of Congress—and again, perhaps that's something Congress should consider.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: inherit;">Instead, the suit targets Mr. Van de Kamp as the manager of the district attorney's office. It says that he's </span><i>guilty of negligently overseeing his office, and allowing his subordinates to use unreliable, uncorroborated testimony from prison inmates.</i></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="line-height: 21px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Such misconduct Would include<b> knowingly putting on false testimony</b>, <b>withholding exculpatory evidence </b>from defense attorneys, and <b>coercing witnesses, among other transgressions.</b></span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: normal;"><b>"The District Attorney's Office denied Goldstein a fair trial:"</b> Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block said in November, 2002. The ruling was upheld by a federal judge in Los Angeles and three 9th Circuit judges.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b>Punitive damages</b> are award-able in cases where a defendant has been found "guilty" of<b> intentional, reckless or malicious wrongdoing</b>, such as <b>fraud</b>, defamation or<b> false imprisonment.</b> </span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: xx-small;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: collapse;"><br /></span></span></div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-15146227046368228712010-12-17T15:12:00.000-08:002010-12-18T20:01:45.853-08:00Misconduct Still In Riverside County District Attorney Office re: Deputy District Attorney, Earl Lee Roberts SB #251043<br />
Today a new judge gave me another opportunity to amend the void criminal case INF054715 but need to show on the record what was said in court to prove the judgment is <em>void on the face</em>, so need to get the transcripts into the record to prove I was falsely arrested on void judgments by <strong>District Attorney Investigator, Rich Twiss</strong>.<br />
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The judge did not appear too happy with the <strong>Deputy DA, Earl Lee Roberts, SB #251043</strong> who ignored the law, lied and presented false evidence in his written "Opposition" to my Motion to Dismiss, and in verbal comments during the hearing -- setting up a smoke screen to confuse and deceive the court -- essentially committing <em>fraud on the court</em> with the written "Opposition" that was just absurd. It had nothing to do with the law of CCP 473 that addresses void judgments, under which I filed, i.e, Attorney Roberts did not even have the correct law; it was just rather bizarre.<br />
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Attorney Roberts tried to insult me -- calling me "self-serving." I wonder if he even understands what that means and how it would not apply to me. I am only trying to clear my name from the lack of justice of his minoans in the Office of Riverside County District Attorney. How is that self-serving?<br />
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The judge did not even address The Opposition -- it was totally unrelated to my motion -- the judge stayed focused on void judgment law, and ended with what I needed to present the next time. It went very well and the judge allowed me to talk and get a lot "on the record ." He waited until the end of morning session to hear my motion and he acknowledged the "void case" issue here -- ignored the DAs Opposition -- but he needs those certified transcripts. So, again, my case was "temporarily dismissed with out prejudice."<br />
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Attorney Earl Roberts had his own little fellow DA Deputies Peanut Gallery sitting in the back of the court room -- about five or six of them -- vultures waiting to descend - I suppose to give him "support?" -- but wouldn't it be nice if they learned something from all of this as to what <b style="text-decoration: underline;">their responsibility is to a defendant to make sure they present a fair trial.</b> Now it is all about wining at any cost.<br />
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The road in the legal system is an uphill battle for an elderly, mentally challenged, indigent pro per suffering from Post Traumatic Stress, who has had no legal help and no money to get transcripts. The system needs to change to be more fair-minded.<br />
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I tried to do this case without the transcripts using just certified written records because I didn't have the money -- guess I will need to go panhandling on Christmas Day to get the money so as to get back into court in January with the transcript evidence on my Second Amended Motion.<br />
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BTW: I have my own personal stalker -- "Cory Johnson" is a man who has stalked me and my daughter for years, always directing his taunts at me since this bogus criminal case began, even writing to my neighbors, and harassing Jeanine at work. We suspect he is a Cathedral City cop, or a board member from our old HOA. Whoever he is he seems to be mentally ill and obsessed with me and my life. It is a little scary to have this person lurking, and bullying me and my family from the cyber shadows.<br />
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Anyway - it is all positive albeit still ongoing when I thought it would be finished by the end of the year.<br />
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Thank you for your ongoing thoughts and prayers on my behalf.<br />
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~Sharon Stephens<br />
<br />Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-33409866518007979332010-11-29T12:19:00.000-08:002010-11-29T12:19:46.532-08:00CORRUPTION IN INDIO, CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY<br />
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Last Wednesday I appeared in court in Indio, CA to ask that the "void on the face criminal case" # INF054715 against me be dismissed.</div>
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When I was unlawfully arrested for allegedly violating an already void order on June 9, 2007, and sent a to jail for more then a hellish year -- mostly in solitary confinement, losing my home, and then spending a year living in my car I set out to have the case dismissed and have been trying to fight this and clear my name ever since. (Keep in mind: Every 1 out of every 100 Americans are incarcerated. -- the highest in the world. The U.S. Department of Justice [1999] estimates at least 10 % of those are innocent.) </div>
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Last Wednesday I appeared before the right judge. (I was sent through four court rooms this morning; no one wanted to hear it as several judges were named in the motion for " ignoring the law.")</div>
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The District Attorney tried to have my motion dismissed because it was "too long" - not because my law was incorrect. The judge did dismiss it for "being too long," but then told the DA he was "going to hear it on its merits." FINALLY I was able to talk,i.e., be heard -- and I did and was able to convince the judge my motion "has merit to be heard and dismissed." </div>
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The judge "dismissed the motion without prejudice" and gave me the opportunity to "pare it down" and just stick with the [false] arrest that began the whole thing and makes everything else void that came after that. I must keep it to 10 pages [court rules]. I want to rewrite it and file next week and this bogus false case against me shall be over.</div>
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The Deputy District Attorney left the court room quickly,and I did not get his name.</div>
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I went to the DA's Office on the fourth floor and asked the receptionist "Can you please give me the name of</div>
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the attorney who appeared in court this morning on my case, and, what do I need to do to sue the District Attorney?</div>
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THIS WAS LEGITIMATE BUSINESS!</div>
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The receptionist told me to "sit down," which I did, " and I will get someone for you."</div>
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Within a minute a very rotund man literally strutted off the elevator and standing over me stated loudly and very rudely,"Get out of my office or I will have your probation revoked for breaking the law, and have you arrested!"</div>
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"What for?"</div>
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"Trespassing [Penal Code 602] and disturbing the peace."</div>
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I reminded him, "I am here on legitimate business -- that is not trespassing. And, this is not your office it belongs to the people, and YOU are the one shouting and disturbing the peace - and -- if you arrest me it will be a false arrest and your office has already done that to me once!! [Rich Twiss and that is why we are in court now.]."</div>
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Morrison continued to threaten me with arrest, and told me at least twice, "YOU are a defendant and cannot be in here!"</div>
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I said, "I am a pro per and therefore opposing council and have a right to know the name of the attorney in charge of my case."</div>
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Morrison needs to read and follow the law.</div>
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When I asked who was his supervisor he told me he did not have a supervisor, that I should contact Ron Pacheco.</div>
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Morrison became more intimidating in his behavior, and refused to tell me how to make a complaint.</div>
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I became very fearful of Morrison; afraid he was going to physically harm me. I am 70 years old and a heart patient and began to go into an angina attack.</div>
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Two deputies showed up to help arrest me, but they were very nice, telling me "Morrison is our boss and we must do as he tells us to do."</div>
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Indio, D.A. Investigator John Morrison is a bully personified. He is violating the law with his threats and intimidation.</div>
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There is no reason to not be of service to the public wanting to do do legitimate business.</div>
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I shall be making a formal complaint to the Board of Supervisors, Riverside County; The Attorney General, and the Department of Justice, and inquiring about a law suit against the District Attorney's Office.</div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: #888888;">~ss</span></div>
</div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-47852246253548951932010-11-01T17:07:00.000-07:002010-11-01T17:07:21.025-07:00Part 3: JUDGMENT IS VOID WHEN COURT EXCEEDS ITS JURISDICTION<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br />...COURT EXCEEDS ITS JURISDICTION<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <span style="color: black;"> </span></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="color: black;">"A court <u>must </u>vacate any judgment entered in <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">excess of its jurisdiction</b>." (<u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27</span>, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972</u>).).<br /> <span style="font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Judge Bjork did not follow prescribed procedure, and <u>exceeded his jurisdiction</u> to issue an excessive bail on the Defendant, on an unproven misdemeanor. Nor did he have the jurisdiction to incarcerate the Defendant, on a void order and, <u>without due process to be heard</u>; she was <u>not</u> even informed in this court<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>of her “crime.”</span><em><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><u>The U.S. Supreme Court</u></span></em><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">, in Scheuer v. <place w:st="on">Rhodes</place>, </span></u></em><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">supra,</span></u></em><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> </span></u></em></span><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><span style="color: black;">416 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)</span></span></u></em></span></span><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">"A court <u>must </u>vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (<u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27</span></u></i><u>, supra,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972</u>).).<br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“ <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A judgment is <u>void on its face</u> if the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties</i>.” </span><span class="grame"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">(<i><u>Summers v. Superior Court</u></i><u> (1959), supra, ; <i>Roberts v. Roberts</i> (1966) supra, </u>)</span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> Thus, the fact that a judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation does not insulate the judgment from attack on the ground that it is void. </span><span class="grame"><i><u><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">In People v.</span></u></i></span><i><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> One 1941 Chrysler <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Sedan</place></city></span></u></i><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> (1947) 81 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> App. 2d 18, 21-22 [183 P.2d 368</span></u></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">] <br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span></span></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"> To <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ascertain The Truth</i></span></span></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">A Judge <u>Must </u>Allow for Due Process</span></span></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt;"><br /><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 16pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><u>If</u></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> the Defendant had of been allowed due process to be heard</span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">on</b></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> June 9, 2007,</span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> she would have brought to the attention of the court that she was lawfully in court to have a void restraining order validated -- when she was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">unlawfully seized</i> -- <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">that restraining orders were provably <u>already</u> void for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">lack of due process</i></b> -- and she <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>could not </u>be charged, or punished with violation of a void order</i></b><u>.</u> </span><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Mitchell v. Superior Court</span></u></em><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing </span></u><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Fortenbury v. Superior Court</span></u></em><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re </span></u><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Berry</span></u></em></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147</span></u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Investigator Twiss and Judge Bjork were guilty of </span><em><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">recklessness, oppression, fraud on the court, elder abuse, denial of due process, and malice</span></em><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> in the their actions against the Defendant.<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"></i></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights</span></i><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">. <i>Sabariego v Maverick</i>, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461,</span></u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">and, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">is</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">not entitled to respect in any other tribunal</b>. </i>( e.g. a future preliminary hearing where more charges were filed against the Defendant.)</span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Even the most rudimentary of due process procedures gives the opportunity to be heard . . . to anyone directly affected by [an] official’s action.”</span></i><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> ( <i><u>Lockyer v. City & County of <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on">San Francisco</place></city></u></i><u> (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1108. </u><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees.</span></i><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <i><u>Hanson v Denckla</u></i><u>, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228. </u><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></i></span></span></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></b><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Judge Bjork refused <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">to hear</i> what the Defendant had to say.<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"></i></span></b></span></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Defendants who<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>have been treated with unfairness, bias and the appearance of prejudice by this Court ,and the opposing counsel, leaves open the question of how an </span></span></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">uninterested, lay person, would question the partiality and neutrality of this Court.“…<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness</b></span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">.</span></b></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">” <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">In re<i> <u>Murchinson</u></i></span><u>, 349 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 133, 136 (1955).</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This court had a duty to ensure fairness. This Court failed, or refused to ensure that fairness. <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on"><i><u><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Marshall</span></u></i></place></city><i><u><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> v. Jerrico</span></u></i><u>, 100 <place w:st="on">S. Ct.</place> 1610, 446 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 238 </u></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“ Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, </span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Fed. Rules Civ. Proc</span></b></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">U.S.C.A. Const. Amend</b>.<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> 5 </b>- <i><u>Klugh v. <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region>, </u></i></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><u>620 F.Supp., 892 (D.S.C. 1985). </u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Where Due Process is denied, the <u>case is void</u> <span style="color: #1d1b11;">,</span></b></span></span><span style="color: #1d1b11;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>Johnson v. Zerbst</u></i></span></span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">, 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019; <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake,</i> 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bro</i>s., 363 Ill. 25 (1936)<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span></u></span></span><u><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"></span></u></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">FRAUD ON THE COURT!</span></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">"<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fraud upon the court</i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court</i> [<u>JUDGES <stockticker w:st="on">ARE</stockticker> OFFICERS OF THE COURT</u>)]<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication</i>." <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>Kenner</u></i></place></city><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u> v. C.I.R.,</u></i><u> 387 F.3d 689 (1968);</u> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">7 <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Moore</place></city>'s Federal Practice</b>, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">2d ed., p. 512, 60.23</b>. <br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The 7th Circuit further stated "<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final</i>." <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">THE JUDGMENT IS VOID!</b></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;">CONSEQUENCES FOR A JUDGE NOT FOLLOWING THE LAW</span></span></b></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></b><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>"<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his</i></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"></span></b></span></span></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">United States</place></country-region>." </span></span></span></i></div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">[Emphasis supplied in original]. Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, they are <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">warring on the constitution, i.e.,</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">the judge is engaged in</b></span></span></span></i></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">an act or acts of treason</span></i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">.</span></i><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> </span><em><u><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">The U.S</span></u></em><em><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">. <u>Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes</u></span></em><em><u><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">, supra, 416 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)</span></u></em><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> </span><country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on"><em><u><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">U.S.</span></u></em></place></country-region><em><u><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"> v. Will</span></u></em><em><u><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">, 449 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 ); Cohens v. Virgina 19 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> (6 Wheat) 264 (1921.</span></u></em><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></span></span><span style="color: #1d1b11; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">See:</span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span><u><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">Cooper v. Aaron, 358 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 1,78 S.Ct. (1401 1958.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></u></i><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, without authority or jurisdiction, a judge loses absolute immunity and is <u>subject to a law suit</u></b>. (See: DEMAND LETTER, [<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Exhibit 2</u></b>])<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u></u></i></span></span></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></b><u><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></u></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT</span></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">There needed to be <b>experienced counsel</b> from both sides and given the opportunity to discuss with a judicial officer the<b><i> just resolution</i></b> of the Defendant’s case. The truth of these void orders then would have been brought to light. The orders against her were easily proven void, and she could have easily helped to prepare a defense to prove that. . Instead, she was denied that ability, and suffered <strong><i><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">infliction of punishment prior to conviction</span></i></strong></span><em><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">.</span></em></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> <b>No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order</b>.<i> <u>Mitchell v. Superior </u></i><u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Court (1972) 28 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> App. 3d 759, 764, citing<i> Fortenbury v. Superior Court </i>(1940) 16 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> 2d 405, 408-09<i>; see In re <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Berry</place></state> </i>(1968) 68 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> 2d 137, 147</span></u><i> </i><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">(order in excess of jurisdiction</span>).<br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>MOST of the false, perjured accusations brought against the Defendant by the District Attorney were never prosecuted – they could not make their case. </span><span style="color: #29303b;"><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">Too often a person is jailed <b>without any true investigation</b>, even though <stockticker w:st="on">ALL</stockticker> attorneys are held to the duty of “due diligence<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">” <u>All attorneys</u> are held to the duty of “due diligence</i>”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></span><span style="color: black;"><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Butler v State Bar</span></u></em><span style="font-family: Arial;"><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1986) 42 Cal3rd 323 (329) -- </span></u><em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Paul Oil Company v- Fed. Mutual Insurance</span></u></em><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1998) 154 Fed 3rd 1049,</span></u></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> “<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span><span style="color: #29303b; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">DUE DILIGENCE and</span></b></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <strong><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">FRIVOLOUS CASES:</span></strong> <br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rules of Professional Conduct - 3-200 Prohibitive Objectives -- Rules of Professional Conduct - 5-200 -- Business and Profession Code Section 6068 - <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Attorney's Duty to Investigate Case</b> -- </span><em><u><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Butler v State Bar</span></u></em><u><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1986) 42 Cal3rd 323 (329) -- </span></u><em><u><span style="color: black; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Paul Oil Company v- Fed. Mutual Insurance</span></u></em><u><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> (1998) 154 Fed 3rd 1049</span></u></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Defendant was stigmatized simply by being charged, and then not being able to testify or defend herself in the <i>kangaroo-court</i> <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>setting such as what happened with Judge<br />Bjork, then again at the Preliminary Hearing, and then again with Judge Douglas only added to the impression that her silence was an indicator of guilt. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Presumption of innocence</i>, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">reasonable </i></span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">doubt</span></i><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> were totally ignored in these court room settings. Interestingly, the court has held that <i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">it violates due process to use a defendant's silence against him, yet that is exactly what happens in this unjust process</span></i>.<i> <u>Doyle v. <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Ohio</place></state>, </u></i><u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">426 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 610 (1976)</span></u></span></span></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">AN UNETHICAL <stockticker w:st="on">AND</stockticker> OVERZEALOUS DISTRICT ATTORNEY<span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"></span></span></span></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span></b><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Arial;">Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">all persons</b> concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." <em><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Elliot v. Piersol, </span></u></em></span><em><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)</span></u></em><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;">An unethical, overzealous District Attorney</span></span></i></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> is the most powerful</span><span style="color: #29303b;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> and dangerous person in the court room. S/he can make, break or ruin a person's life. <br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the Preliminary Hearing, <b>Deputy District Attorney Kristi Elise Belcher</b> allowed her witnesses to provably commit <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Suborned Perjury.</b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Attorney Belcher absolutely heard them over and over <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">contradict their own police reports</i>, and <u>KNEW</u> Jose Liceaga in particular was perjuring himself, as on the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Cathedral City Police Report 0507-3482</u></b> <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>recorded in this case, where his own witness,<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> Roger Abernathy</b>, confirmed<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> </b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Liceaga was lying</i>. Of course she never called this witness, even though she had the police report documented in this case. </span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>This </u>is fraud on the court.</b><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Deputy District Attorney Kristi Elise Belcher was sent a thirty page document, which is documented in this case, from The Cathedral City Police Department that “closed” the case against the Defendant. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Attorney Beltcher <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>suppressed that report</u></b>, and never submitted it in Discovery to the Public Defender’s Office. <b>This again is Fraud On The Court. </b>Deputy District Attorney, Kristi Elise Belcher used<i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> legal process for fraudulent purposes such as attempting to enforce a judgment on a fictitious claim</span></i></span></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">. </span><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">1 AM J2d Abuse <stockticker w:st="on">PSS</stockticker> 9-12.</span></span></b><i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></i></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, “</span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The role of the prosecutor differs significantly from that of others who practice law, including criminal defense lawyers: <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">A Prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state ... the prosecutor represents 'sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done'</span> <u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Berger v. <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">United States</place></country-region> </span></u></i><u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">(1935) 295 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 78,88<i> (People v. Hill (1998) </i>17 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal</place></state> 4th 800, 8.</span></u></span></span><b><i><span style="color: #29303b;"><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span></i></b><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Prosecutors have a special obligation to promote justice and the ascertainment of truth. ... The duty of the district attorney is not merely that of an advocate. His<b> </b>duty is not<b> </b>to obtain convictions, but to fully and fairly present... the evidence..."<b> </b></span></i><u>People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1378</u></span></span><span style="color: #29303b;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The truth and evidence was there for the District Attorney to ascertain, but the District Attorney' was so anxious to win, at all costs, that they ignored the Defendant’s right to a fair trial, and never did the required investigation of the cases they were prosecuting her for. (<stockticker w:st="on"><b>SEE</b></stockticker>: <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1, cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 1998)</span></b> “… <i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">competent handling of a particular matter involves inquiry into analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.</span></i><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">”</span><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There was never anything fair about the case the District Attorney was building against the Defendant. <i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">As an officer of the court, the prosecutor has a heavy responsibility to the court and <u>to the defendant</u> to conduct a fair trial</span></i>. <u>(<i>United States v. Escalante (9th Cir. 1980) 637 F.2d 1197, 1203</i></u>.) “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The prosecutor's job isn't just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules</span></i>.” (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>United States v. Kojayan</u></i></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><u> (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1315, 1323).</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b><i>An attorney's professional responsibilities, whether prosecutor, or defense are set forth in,</i></b> <i><u>Strickland v. Washington </u></i></span></span><u><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">(1984) 466 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 2668; <i>People v. Pope</i>(1979) 23 Cal.3d 412; as In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal 4th 924.</span></span></u></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span></span><b><i><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">No one can be punished for disobedience</span></i></b><b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> of a</span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <b><i>void order<span style="color: #29303b;">. </span></i></b><i><u><span style="color: #29303b;">Mitchell v. Superior Court </span></u></i><u><span style="color: #29303b; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">(1972) 28 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> App. 3d 759, 764<i>, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) </i>16 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> 2d 405, 408-09; seeIn<i> re <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Berry</place></state> </i>(1968) 68 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> 2d 137, 147; County of <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Ventura</place></city> v.<i> Tillett</i>, 133 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> App. 3d 105, 110.</span></u></span></span></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span></b></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">The Court Has A Responsibility<br />To Correct a Void Judgment</span></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><span style="font-family: Arial;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgmen</span></i></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">t.</span></i></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <span class="grame"><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">(</span></span><span class="spelle"><i><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">Cadenasso</span></u></i></span><span class="grame"><i><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";"> v. Bank of Italy</span></u></i></span><span class="grame"><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">, p. 569; <i>Estate of </i></span></u></span><span class="spelle"><i><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">Pusey</span></u></i></span><span class="grame"><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648</span></u></span><span class="grame"><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">].)</span></span> This rule holds as to <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">all <i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">void</span></i></b> <b><i>judgments</i></b>. In the other two cases cited, <i><u>People v.</u> <span class="spelle"><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">Massengale</span></u></span></i> and <i>In re <span class="spelle"><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">Sande</span></u></span><span class="spelle"><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif";">l</span></span></i>, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">the courts confirmed the</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">judicial power and responsibility to <u>correct</u></b><u> <b><i>void</i></b> <b><i>judgments</i></b></u>.<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"></span></b></span></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;">NO <stockticker w:st="on">ONE</stockticker> CAN PLEAD GUILTY TO A CRIME <br />THAT IS NOT A CRIME<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">The Defendant did plead guilty</b> after a year of incarceration, in solitary confinement, and a few weeks in <place w:st="on"><placename w:st="on">Patton</placename> <placetype w:st="on">State</placetype> <placetype w:st="on">Hospital</placetype></place>, and, knowing she would not be adequately defended by her public defenders due “bad lawyering.” However, the Defendant had not committed any crime, and it was <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">a legally impossible admission</b> to be guilty of a crime she did not commit. “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In this case we hold that since a trial court’s acceptance of a negotiated plea which patently includes <u>a legally impossible admission </u>it constitutes an act in excess of its jurisdiction</i>.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>People v. Soriano</u></i></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><u>, 4 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> App 4<sup>th</sup> 781—1992.</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“ <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">We cannot affirm</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a conviction and sentence imposed for a crime that does not exist…” </i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>People v. Soriano</u></i><u> (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 781,785 [ 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138</u>]) <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">“… where fundamental jurisdiction is lacking… it follows there is no crime, the court lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. This conclusion is compelled not only by the statutes and cases interpreting those statues, this conclusion comports with fundamental principles of justice. The notion that a person can be punished under the</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">criminal law for committing an act that is not a crime is entirely outside our system of jurisprudence</i>.” <u>People v. Vasilyan 174 <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal.</place></state> App. 4<sup>th</sup> 443 – <state w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Cal</place></state> Court of Appeals, 2<sup>nd</sup> Dist. Div. 8, 2009</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See also, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>People v. Dlugas</u></i>, one of the leading cases on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">legal impossibility</i>, also known as <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>People v. Jaffe Court of Appeals of New York</u></i></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><u>, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906)</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Defendant could not plead guilty to the already void judgments from the time of her unlawful seizure, </span></span></span><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">June 9, 2007,</span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> or to any cases filed piggy-back on those void judgment. All were void, and one cannot violate a void order.</span></span></span><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span><span style="color: black;"><strong><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">All proceedings founded on a void judgment are themselves regarded as void. </span></strong><strong><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">A void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place… it is not entitled to enforcement. </span></i></strong><span style="font-family: Arial;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">30A Am Jur Judgments 43, 44, 45.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">Henderson v. <city w:st="on"><place w:st="on">Henderson</place></city>, </span></u></i><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">232 NC 380, 100 SE 2d 227.</span></u></span></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><br /><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>THEREFORE</span></span></span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;">, <u>no judgment could be filed against the Defendant</u>, and all subsequent added judgments, <u>including the sham, felony charges</u>,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>filed by the Riverside County District Attorney on this case are void, and, <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">THEREFORE</b>, on this point alone the Criminal Case against the Defendant needs to be validated as void, and dismissed as such, with an Award of Damages.</span></span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><b><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Arial;">Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>all persons</u> <u>concerned</u></b> in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." <em><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Elliot v. Piersol, </span></u></em></span><em><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 328, 340 (1828)</span></u></em></span></span><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman", "serif"; font-size: 8pt; line-height: 150%;"></span></b><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">CONCLUSION</span></span></b></span></span><span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br />The Defendant is a Pro Per</span></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><strong> <span style="font-size: small;"> <span style="color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span></span></strong></span></span></span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 150%;">It is held that a pro-se pleading requires less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer. <u>Puckett v. Cox</u></span></i><u><span style="line-height: 150%;"> 456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA).</span></u><span style="line-height: 150%;"> And, Justice Blackin in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>Conley v. Gibson,</u></i><u> 355 <country-region w:st="on"><place w:st="on">U.S.</place></country-region> 41 at 48 (1957)</u></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><span style="line-height: 150%;">The Federal Rules</span><span style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the </span></span></span></span></h1>
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<span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice."<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br /><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">“…a pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></i><stockticker w:st="on">SEE</stockticker>:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><u><i>Boag v. MacDougall, </i>454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); <i>Estelle v. Gamble, </i>429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) quoting <i>Conley v. Gibson, </i>355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957</u><u>); </u><em><u>Haines v. </u></em></span></span><span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><em><u>Conley v. Gibson, </u></em><u>355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); </u></span></span><u><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><em>Haines v. Kerner</em>,404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); <em>McDowell v.Delaware State Police, </em>88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); <em>United States v. Day</em>, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992<em>) </em></span></span></u></span><span style="line-height: 150%;"><em><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></em></span></span></div>
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<span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><em><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“A court faced with a motion to dismiss, a pro se complaint must read the complaint’s allegations expansively</em>,” <u><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><em>Haines v. Kerner </em></span>404 U.S.519, 520-21, <place w:st="on">S. Ct.</place> 594, 596, 60 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1972<em>)</em></u></span></span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><em><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Court has a <u>special obligation</u> to construe pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally”</em> <u><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><em>Polling v. Hovnanian Enterprises</em></span>, 99 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000</u></span></span><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><em><u>).</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.”</em> <u><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><em>Tannenbaum v.United States</em></span>, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)</u></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The California Rules</span></b><span style="font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> express <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">a preference for resolution of every case on the merits, even if resolution requires excusing inadvertence by a pro se litigant that would otherwise result in a dismissal</i>. The Judicial Counsel justifies this position based on the idea that "<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing referee... A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the cleverest lawyer prevails regardless of the merits</i>.” (</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;">John Greacen, Greacen Associates LLC, <u>"</u></span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Ethical Issues for Judges in Handling Cases with Self-Represented Litigants"</span></u></b><span style="font-size: 11pt;"> <<a href="http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Ethical/May_07_Ethical_Issues.ppt">http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Ethical/May_07_Ethical_Issues.ppt</a>.></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It suggests the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to insure a fair trial" and says "<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">There is only one reported case in the U.S. finding a judge's specific accommodations have gone too far</i>"<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"></b></span></span></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"> </span></span></span></b><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">As a matter of law, because from the beginning The District Attorney’s Office, Judge Bjork, and then all judges, and defense attorneys, through “bad lawyering” and a lack of <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>due diligence<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">, </b>makes this a frivolous case and a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">void on the face judgment</i>,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>which has violated the Defendant’s right to a fair trial, caused her great harm, pain and suffering, and has left her in a state of Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome to this day, this case needs to be dismissed as void.<br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All that is required to determine the original void case, on which the District Attorney did unlawfully and falsely prosecute the Defendant,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>is to simply review <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black;">the <u>judgment roll record</u></span></i><span style="color: black;"> in<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i></span></span><i><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">Trylson v Stephens </span></u></i><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">INC057008 Riverside County Superior Court, Indio CA</span></u><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> </span></u><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">), and <i><u>Robbins v. Stephens,</u> <em><u><span style="font-family: "Arial", "sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">INC 040482</span></u></em></i></span><u><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> </span></u><u><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">Riverside County Superior Court, Indio, CA</span></u><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;">.</span></i><span style="color: #29303b; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%;"> as is required to determine a void judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u>P</u></i></span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><u><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">eople</span></u></i><u><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">v. American Contractors Indemnity Co</i>., (2004) 33 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at p.661</span></u><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">It is that simple.</b></span></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br /><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This void criminal case against the Defendant, <u>must </u>be dismissed on the record, her record expunged, and an Award for Damages in the minimum amount of $100 @ day, (about $40,500). The court is also asked to award the Defendant punitive damages of $500,00 dollars, for a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">false and malicious prosecution</i> that caused her much harm, from which she still suffers, and, any other damages as the court sees fit.</span></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span><div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Respectfully Submitted.<br /><br />October ___, 2010<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>_______________________</span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 150%; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sharon Dale Stephens</span></span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; font-family: Arial;"></span>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-79163216712242854682010-10-31T22:27:00.000-07:002010-10-31T23:00:31.308-07:00VEXTIOUS LITIGANT DISMSSAL<div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">SHARON STEPHENS</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">PO Box 9475</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91701</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">760.835.8210</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, INDIO COURT<br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> CASE NO.: INS072657</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">SHADOW CREST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Plaintiffs </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />v.<br /><br />SHARON STEPHENS</span><span style="font-size: x-small;"> <br /> Defendant </span></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">DISMISS VOID VEXATIOUS LITIGANT</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">JUDGMENT</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">(Code of Civil Procedure section 473 & </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Code of Civil Procedure section 391)<br />________________ </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Defendant, Sharon Stephens gives NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION to move this court to apply controlling law and recognize and declare as void the order making her a vexatious litigant on July 28, 2004. This motion relies upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, California statues and rules of court, federal laws and multiple constitutional protections, and related points and authorities, and Defendants Declaration. (The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment and may be challenged any time.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> Defendant is not filing “new “ litigation or “maintaining” litigation, but rather she is attempting to “undo” the results of unjust litigation that has been instituted against her, as to be justifiable as “any civil action encompassing civil trial…” <em>McColm v. Westwood Park Association</em> (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 1211,1219; <em>Mahdavi v. Superior Court</em> (228) 166 Cal.App. 4th 42.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">On March 21, 1990 a letter was sent to the Office of Senator Milton Marks, from the Legislative Office of the Courts which declared: “We question whether a litigant should ever be required to post security if litigation has merit and is not filed for purposes of delay or harassment. Would such a requirement be constitutional?...” Of course not!</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">In the same spirit, the Defendant does not need to ask permission to file a motion to dismiss a void judgment, when in effect there is no judgment at all. And, there is no contempt of court as no one can be punished for violation of a void order. A void order is of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">No permission is needed to file in Small Claims Court. (CCP 391)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">This finding of vexatious litigant against Defendant, Sharon Stephens is void on the face as it did not follow the law.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">NO APPEAL IS NEEDED TO CHALLENGE A VOID ORDER. (CCP 473 and 473a)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The defendant asks that monetary damages be awarded to her.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">FACTUAL HISTORY</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">As a disabled individual and indigent person the Defendant was forced into pro se litigation due to the State of California’s failure to protect her (42 U.S.C. 2101(b)(4).6) and her property.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">In a short hearing of less than ten or fifteen minutes, what in essence is a snap judgment, with out any investigation of the evidence as to whether the charges against the Defendant have merit, and where no CONSTITUTIONAL Due Process is offered to the pro se to be heard in oral argument – a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment -- a judge may --[not must]—but may issue a finding, on an overly broad statue to declare a pro per a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure 391 (b)(4), and where they then are blacklisted with a lifelong stigma that destroys a person’s good name and reputation. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The judge therefore has discretion to make a finding, or not. However when a judge does not follow the law, they abuse their discretion. Abuse of Discretion occurs when a judge does not apply the correct law or if it bases its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of a material fact. Where a trial court must exercise discretion in deciding a question, it must do so in a way that is not clearly against logic and the evidence. An improvident exercise of discretion is an error of law and grounds for reversing a decision. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Abuse of Discretion = Abuse of Process [See <em>Rappleyea v. Campbell</em> below.]</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">A finding is not a judgment but the finding that the Defendant, a pro se litigant is a “vexatious litigant was given a res judicata force of a judgment and made applicable to all future actions without benefit of a Due Process hearing for filing four constitutionally protected restraining orders, and one injunction, on the advise of a Cathedral City Police Sergeant, for her own protection against verbal and physical attacks on her person.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">As a homeowner in Shadow Crest Homeowner’s Association, Inc., the Defendant discovered the Board of Directors: President, Kent Robbins, Vice President, Jim Hooten, Treasure, Jose Liceaga, and Secretary, Jill Reed, along with Member at Large, John Weiser, along with the Association Attorney, Brian Moreno were misusing Reserve Funds, and abusing the CC&Rs to collect fines and harass certain home owners. The Defendant had filed for an injunction to stop the board from using invalid restraining orders, but was stopped with a demurrer for which she was charged an unconscionable fee of $20,000.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Defendant was warned by board member they would get restraining orders to keep her out of meetings. Such an action is unlawful. The first one was filed by Secretary, Jill Reed, using CCP 527.6 (with no grounds or the proper statutory criteria), then by President, Kent Robbins, Jim Hooten, John Weiser, and Jose Laceiga. The commissioners and judges ignored the law and granted all of their restraining orders without meeting the statutory criteria and all therefore are void on the face and open to challenge. The Defendant has police reports of the abuses of the board members.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Thus began an ongoing intense period of harassment, slander and physical abuse of the Defendant. C.C.P.D. Sergeant, Laura Hanlon advised her to file for restraining orders. The board members responded with requests for restraining orders, not meetin statutory </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">criteria. In court they would all show up and act as witnesses for each other, even when John Weiser hit the Defendant with his car while she was on foot, he was given a restraining order against her claiming trespassing. There was no proof of a Penal Code 602 trespass! The Association Attorney, Brian Moreno did participated to bring these orders, and then they all supported each other in this conspiracy to bring this vexatious litigant motion against the Defendant to avoid giving her access to the Association Books and Records. In fact, the motion was Fraud on the Court to keep her from presenting her case.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">These void restraining orders were then used, with provable perjury and false accusations to have the Defendant falsely imprisoned for a year. This is being challenged in court now. TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE PLAINTIFF’S VOID CRIMINAL JUDGMENT, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, REQUEST FOR DAMAGES, CASE NO. INF 054715, Riverside County Superior Court, Indio CA. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The person falsely imprisoned may sue the offender for damages. Once the plaintiff has proven the elements of the tort, the defendant has the burden to establish that the detention or arrest was legally justified. See <em>Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co.,</em> 595 P.2d 975, 982 (Cal.'79).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">CONSEQUENCES OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT OF ANY ELDERLY PERSON: <strong>California Penal Code § 368.(f)</strong> Crimes against elder or dependent adults; Any person who commits the false imprisonment of an elder or a dependent adult by the use of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">When the Defendant was unlawfully refused access to the Shadow Crest Association Books and Records she filed a case in Small Claims Court to gain access to them and was hit in court with a Motion, without Notice, to find her a Vexatious Litigant for filing the Injunction for abuse of CC&Rs, and the four restraining orders against board members for harassment, abuse, and battery. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc., Board President, Kent Robbins presented the Motion in court to find the Defendant a Vexatious Litigant. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Defendant’s case was not heard in court that day, and, in fact was never heard at all. Therefore she was never able to access the books and records, which of course was the intent of the attorney and the board members with their filing of the Motion to make her a vexatious litigant. The court quickly [about fifteen minutes] made the order finding the defendant a vexatious litigant, and never allowed her Due Process to be heard, i.e., to defend herself. In so doing The Court aided in the abusive and unlawful </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">behavior of Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. board members and their attorney, Brian Moreno against the Defendant.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">NO ONE can violate a void order, and NO ORDER, such as this finding of vexatious litigant may be attached onto a void order. The Defendant is about to challenge the criminal case, and the void restraining orders of the board members in court; all will be meritorious. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Defendant has NEVER filed numerous and unmeritorious cases as she was dishonestly, and unethically charged with by the current Association Attorney, Margaret G. Wrangler, in her “OPPOSITION TO [Defendant’s] APPEAL, (October 20, 2005)” in this case. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">And, Attorney Wangler needs to understand, Void judgments "never die" in the State of California, and may be challenged anytime even if a case has been dismissed.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">It is stunning how many judges, commissioners, District Attorneys, Public Defenders, defense attorneys, and, association attorneys do not know the law of void judgments.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">POINTS AND AUTHORITIES</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">California’s vexatious litigant law dates back to the early 1960’s when the appellate court in Stafford v. Russell (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 719, 722 suggested the study of vexatious litigation and the unreasonable burdens it places upon the courts. In response, the Legislature enacted sections 391 through 391.6 (Stats. 1963, ch. 1471, § 1, p. 3088) to address problems “created by the persistent and obsessive litigant, appearing in propria persona, who has constantly pending a number of groundless actions.” (Committee on Administration of Justice, Report, (1963) 38 Cal. State Bar J. 485, 489; Rawles, The California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access? (1998) 72 S.Cal. L.Rev. 275, 284-285.) </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth; </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">not just playing referee...</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">What is a Vexatious Litigant and what the Vexatious Litigant Law</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">MUST a judge follow to make A Finding of Vexatious Litigant?</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>CCP 391 through 391.6 (3)</strong> To address problems “created by the persistent and obsessive litigant, appearing in propria persona, who has constantly pending a number of groundless actions.” In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">There was no evidence presented that the Defendant did any of the above. There</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">were no groundless actions, no unmeritorious motions, pleading or other papers…or </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">any tactics that were frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Defendant, in order to protect herself from vicious verbal and physical attacks had </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">filed for four [4] restraining orders on the advice of a police officer -- that is the constitutionally protected expected course of action for self-protection -- and one [1] Injunction to Stop the Unlawful Misuse of CC&Rs (Covenants, Codes and Rules) by the Shadow Crest Homeowners Board of Directors that were being used to abuse certain homeowners.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Restraining Orders are “Constitutionally protected activity, just as the making of police reports, or complaints of any type and are excluded from the meaning of ‘course of conduct ‘ [re: harassment].” <em>Schraer v. Berkley</em> <em>Property Owners Ass'n,</em> 207 Cal. App. 3d 719. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The court did not follow the statutory criteria in entering a required statutory finding of vexatious litigant, and did not allow the defendant Due Process to be heard. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The court had a duty to ensure fairness. This Court failed, or refused to ensure fairness and then worked to see that the case against Sharon Stephens went forward, without lawful notice and without hearing from Defendant, i.e., with no Due Process. <em>Marshall v. Jerrico</em>, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 446 U.S. 238 </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>JUDGE MUST FOLLOW THE LAW</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">When a judge does not follow the law they are a trespasser of the law and </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">force or effect. <strong>The U.S. Supreme Court</strong>, in <em>Scheuer v. Rhodes</em>, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">1683, 1687 (1974)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">"There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction." <em>Joyce v. U.S.</em> 474 2D 215.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">"The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">“Lack of Jurisdiction cannot be corrected by an order nunc pro tunc. The only proper office of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct a mistake in the records; it cannot be used to rewrite history.” <em>Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South</em>, 975 F. 2d 321 325-26 (7th Cir. 1992); <em>United States v. Daniels</em> 902 F. 2d 1238 , 1240, (7th Cir. 1990); <em>King v. Ionization Int'l, Inc.</em>, 825 F.2d 1180, 1188, (7th Cir. 1987); and <em>Central Laborer's Pension and Annuity Funds v.</em> <em>Griffee,</em> 198 F.3d 642, 644, (7th Cir. 1999)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>CONSEQUENCES FOR A JUDGE NOT FOLLOWING THE LAW</strong></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">"When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." <br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">[Emphasis supplied in original]. Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, they are warring on the constitution, i.e., the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. <strong>The U.S. Supreme Court</strong>, in <em>Scheuer v. Rhodes</em>, supra, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) <em>U.S. v. Will,</em> 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 ); <em>Cohens v. Virgina</em> 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1921. See: <em>Cooper v. Aaron</em>, 358 U.S. 1,78 S.Ct. (1401 1958. <br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Therefore, without authority or jurisdiction, a judge loses absolute immunity and is subject to a law suit for at very least abuse of process.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />When a statute authorizes a prescribed procedure and the court acts contrary to the authority conferred, the court exceeds its jurisdiction. (<em>People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co</em>., (2004), 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) </span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">"A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>To Ascertain The Truth, </strong></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>A Judge Must Allow for Due Process</strong></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>Due Process:</strong> A course of legal proceedings according to those Principles and Rules which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence, for the enforcement and protection of Private Rights: The essential elements are (1) NOTICE (2) OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD (3) and to DEFEND in an orderly proceeding adapted to the Nature of the case and Cause of the action, and, requires that every man have the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Where RIGHTS are concerned there can be no rule making which would abrogate them. <em>U.S. V. Miller</em>, supra, 449 U.S. 200<br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">“Due process is best defined in one word — fairness! When a person is treated unfairly by the government, including the courts, they are said to have been deprived of or denied due process.” (<em>United States v. Carolene</em> <em>Products Co</em>., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), </span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Violation of due process, (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">There was no Constitutional Due Process allowed to the defendant. She was <strong>not given notice</strong>, and <strong>not heard</strong>, i.e., allowed to offer oral testimony, or to give evidence to defend her self for the filing of the injunction or restraining orders, which she had filed with merit. Rather the judge made <em>a finding</em> without ascertaining the truth. “A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. [But] the validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard. <em>Earle</em> <em>v. McVeigh,</em> 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also <strong>Restatements, Judgments ' 4(b)</strong> <em>Prather v Loyd,</em> 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">It is a fundamental doctrine of law that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Every person </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. <em>Earle v</em> <em>McVeigh,</em> 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />If the defendant had of been allowed due process to be heard, she would have brought to the attention of the court that the restraining orders she filed were provably for her own protection, advised by the police, and had merit. The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. <em>Hanson v Denckla,</em> 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights. <em>Sabariego v Maverick,</em> 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and, is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">THEREFORE: This void finding of Vexatious Litigant cannot be used to stop the Defendant from filing in any other court case.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />“Even the most rudimentary of due process procedures gives the opportunity to be heard . . . to anyone directly affected by [an] official’s action.” ( <em>Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco</em> (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1108. . </span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Thus under the fundamental requirements of due process before a court enters a defendant’s default in a lawsuit which may result in a judgment depriving the defendant of liberty or property “[a] defendant is entitled to opportunity to be heard upon the allegations of the complaint on which judgment is sought against him.” (<em>Thompson v. Cook</em> (1942) 20 Cal.2d 564, 568 </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Where Due Process is denied, the case is void , <em>Johnson v. Zerbst,</em> 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019; <em>Pure Oil Co. v. City</em> <em>of Northlake,</em> 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) <em>Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros.,</em> 363 Ill. 25 (1936)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">“Defendants who have been treated with unfairness, bias and the appearance of prejudice by this Court ,and the opposing counsel leaves open the question of how an </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">uninterested, lay person, would question the partiality and neutrality of this Court.“…our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” In re <em>Murchinson,</em> 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong><u>IF</u></strong> the defendant had of been allowed Due Process to be heard: </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">She would have made the court aware that the Motion To Find her a Vexatious Litigant was actually just a retaliatory and conspiratorial ploy between the Association Attorney, Brian Moreno, an officer of the court, who wrote the motion, and the board members to keep her case from being heard, because it would have allowed her access to the Association Books and Records, and proof that there was at the very least misuse of Reserve Funds, and more than likely embezzlement by the attorney and board. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">This Motion to find the Defendant a Vexatious Litigant was in fact Abuse of Process: Use of legal process in a wrongful manner with an ulterior motive. (<em>Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital</em> (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 824 [266 Cal.Rptr. 360].) </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Motion was also FRAUD ON THE COURT!</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court [judges and attorneys] so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." <em>Kenner v. C.I.R</em>., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); <strong>7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, 60.23.</strong> The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">As with the many, retaliatory restraining order abuses, motions to request an opposing pro per be found a vexatious litigant is too often a conspiratorial ploy used by unethical attorneys, and their clients to avoid the penalties and consequences of a pending case, and, the court turns a blind eye to justice.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>NO APPEAL NEEDED TO CHALLENGE VOID JUDGMENT:</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Void judgments "never die" in the State of California:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>CCP 473 and 473a:</strong> Because the order of dismissal was void, it can be set aside at any time after its entry, and the six-month time limitation in section CCP 473 for relief from improper orders, is not applicable here. <em>Reid v.</em> <em>Balter</em> (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Motions to vacate void judgments may be made at any time after judgment. <em>County of Ventura v. Tillett,</em> supra, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">An APPEAL will NOT prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree -- a void order. <em>MacMillan Petroleum Corp. v. Griffin</em> (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 523, 533 [222 P.2d 69]; accord: <em>People v. West Coast Shows, Inc.</em> (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467 [89 Cal. Rptr. 290]; <em>Svistunoff v.</em></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><em>Svistunoff </em>(1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P.2d 650]; and see: <strong>6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure</strong> (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 7, pp. 4024-4025.)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">CCP Section 473 permits a trial court, on noticed motion, to set aside void judgments and orders. Other Courts also possess inherent power to grant such relief. <em>Reid v. Balter</em> (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">on motion, at any time after its entry…. <em>Plotitsa v.</em> <em>Superior Court</em> (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>The Law Favors Resolution of Cases On Their Merits</strong> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">And because it does, if any doubts arise about whether Code of Civil Procedure section 473 relief should be granted – “ [Void Judgments] must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [Citations]. Therefore, a trial court denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits. [Citations.]” (<em>Rappleyea v. Campbell</em>(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 (<em>Rappleyea</em>).)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">It is interesting that Justice Mosk began Rappleyea with a succinct statement of the question before the Supreme Court, and its answer: The question is whether a default must be set aside and a default judgment reversed on the ground of abuse of discretion. We conclude that they must be. <em>Rappleyea v. Campbell</em>(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 The question before us is the same. And so is our answer. (8 Cal.4th at p. 978)</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Void Judgments Lack Jurisdiction</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">AND CAN BE LEGALLY IGNORED</span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">They Neither Bind, Nor Bar Anyone:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />Oviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. <strong>7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Judgment, 286, p. 828.) </strong></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br />No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. <em>Mitchell v. Superior Court</em> (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing <em>Fortenbury v. Superior Court (</em>1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 14</span></div>
<strong><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Court Has A Responsibility </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">To Correct a Void Judgment:</span></strong><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (<em>Cadenasso v. Bank of</em> <em>Italy,</em> p. 569; <em>Estate of Pusey,</em> 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648].) </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">This rule holds as to all void judgments. In the other two cases cited, <em>People v. Massengale</em> and In re <em>Sandel</em>, the courts confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct void judgments.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>STANDARD OF PROOF TO LIFT FINDING OF VEXATOIUS LITIGANT?</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">A Change in Facts or Circumstances</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">It has been indicated that a person might have a vexatious litigant status lifted if they can meet the same standard of proof as someone seeking to lift an injunction. “At a minimum to cast off the vexatious litigant label the court would find a change in facts or circumstances relating to the original determination.” <em>PBA ,LLC v.</em> <em>KPOD, LTD</em> (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 965 A void judgment lifts an injunction. PROOF ENOUGH!</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>The Defendant is a Pro Per</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">“…a pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys” SEE: <em>Boag v.</em> <em>MacDougall,</em> 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); <em>Estelle v. Gamble,</em> 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) quoting <em>Conley v. Gibson,</em> 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); <em>Haines v. </em></span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><em>Kerner,</em>404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); <em>McDowell v.Delaware State Police,</em> 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); <em>United States v. Day,</em> 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992) </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">“A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint must read the complaint’s allegations expansively,” <em>Haines v. Kerner</em> 404 U.S.519, 520-21, S. Ct. 594, 596, 60 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1972) “Court has a special obligation to construe </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally” <em>Polling v. Hovnanian Enterprises,</em> 99 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000). “We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.” <em>Tannenbaum v.United States,</em> 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Defendant, Sharon Stephens is not a vexatious litigant. She has never filed any cases that are without merit, nor does she intend to do so in the future.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The California Rules express a preference for resolution of every case on the merits, even if resolution requires excusing inadvertence by a pro se litigant that would otherwise result in a dismissal. The Judicial Counsel justifies this position based on the idea that "Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing referee... A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the cleverest lawyer prevails regardless of the merits. "<strong>Ethical Issues for Judges in Handling Cases with Self-Represented Litigants</strong>" John Greacen, Greacen Associates LLC. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">[http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Ethical/May_07_Ethical_Issues.ppt.]</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">It suggests "the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to insure a fair trial" and says, "There is only one reported case in the U.S. finding a judge's specific accommodations have gone too far"</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><strong>DEFENDANT’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Defendant, Sharon Stephens has suffered much harm as the result of acts of Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc and their agents. She has been damaged financially, socially, and emotionally, and horribly embarrassed and even with shunning by neighbors, family and friends. Additionally, she has been deprived of her right to defend herself, or being suit in court against an unlawful, retaliatory eviction and retaliatory, void restraining orders in San Bernardino County, where she was again unlawfully incarcerated. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Plaintiff’s, Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. have no damages. Any time and/or money they claim as a loss is because of their own unlawful, vindictive and retaliatory behavior in this case, and related cases, that resulted only in the abuse of the Defendant.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Defendant asks the court to award the Defendant General Damages of $7,500 [The Maxim allowed in Small Claims Court] for monies lost due to this false accusation of vexatious litigant by the perpetrators, Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc., board members who did so, with the help of Association Attorney, Brian Moreno and supported now by, Association Attorney, Margaret G. Wangler. ALL participated, and continue to participate in keeping alive this unlawful, unjust and unethical false motion, to find her a vexatious litigant, which at the very least is abuse of process , elder abuse, and intentional infliction of emotional abuse. In doing these acts herein alleged; Plaintiffs, and each of them, acted with oppression, conspiracy, and malice, and DID INJURE THE DEFENDANT, therefore Defendant is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages and she requests $50,000 for the harm she has suffered, and, for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper, including costs as provided in <strong>CCP §998, CCP §1032</strong> and related provisions of law.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">THEREFORE: Defendant, Sharon Stephens requests the court to dismiss The Finding of Vexatious Litigant, notify the Judicial Council that the order is void, and award her the appropriate requested damages.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Respectfully Submitted,</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">by Sharon Stephens</span>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2943196334380451974.post-12685284298188452022010-08-12T16:23:00.000-07:002010-09-16T12:48:43.964-07:00FARETTA MOTION<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Sharon Stephens<br />
PO Box 9475<br />
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91701<br />
760.835.8210</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">PEOPLE</span></strong></div><div style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">v.</span></strong></div><div style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">STEPHENS</span></strong></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><strong>CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT</strong></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">County of San Bernardino</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">8303 North Haven Avenue</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Case NO: MWV90372</span></strong></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">NOTICE OF MOTION</span></strong></div><div style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">AND FARETTA MOTION</span></strong></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The Defendant, Sharon Stephens wishes to proceed in this case pro se.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">The right of self-representation finds support in the structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial jurisprudence from which the Amendment emerged. In California law, as in Federal courts, any defendant who makes a knowing intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel to represent themselves as long as they are competent to stand trial. When "a motion to proceed pro se is timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant to represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a choice might appear to be. <em>Faretta v. California</em>, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">Furthermore, the defendant's 'technical legal knowledge' is irrelevant to the court's assessment of the defendant's knowing exercise of the right to defend herself." <em>People v. Windham</em> (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187 [*8] (Windham), quoting Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836. Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se. <em>McKaskle v. Wiggins</em> (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 104 S. Ct. 944.<br />
<br />
How often we hear, "He who represents himself has a fool for a client."</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">To that it is often said, "He who is represented is usually taken for a fool."</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;">September 17, 2010 <br />
Court Room 7<br />
8:30 Am</span><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Verdana;"></span> </div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div>Sharon Stephenshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17425492851534841247noreply@blogger.com