Tuesday, June 18, 2013
RETIRED JUDGE TELLS HER STORY OF CORRUPTION IN JUDICAIL SYSTEM
THIS ALONG WITH INDIO'S (Riverside County) CORRUPT JUDGES TO APPEAR In LAWLESS AMERICA DOCUMENTARY.
Please view the video and SHARE this post and images
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58XuDxUN-EQ
A Retired Judge Tells Her Story
I have a book titled "Judging Me." This book is written for the
disenfranchised, dispossessed and disillusioned. I grew up poor and
was violently sexually abused for more than ten years, only to become
a well known litigator for civil rights and eventually a federal civil
rights judge.
I am hard-wired for justice and fair play. Unfortunately, I was asked
to change a decision for political reasons, but I refused to do so. I
exposed the corruption within the government and, the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
It was a very traumatic event to have the people who are responsible
for your care and well-being betray you at the most basic level.
As an adult with multiple sclerosis and lupus, the EEOC tried to
destroy me. The EEOC wrote the law on disability, enforces the law and
acts as judge, jury and executioner. The second worst betrayal in my
life.
Working through these issues was a full time project. "If I can take
the debris of my life and help just one other person, then what
happened to me was worthwhile" is a quote from my book "Judging Me."
This is my journey.
Thank you, and Best Wishes!
Honorable Mary Elizabeth Bullock (Retired)
Thursday, May 30, 2013
EX-ASSEMBLYWOMAN BONNIE GARCIA and HER FALSE INCARCERATION OF ME AND MORE
Hi Bill Windsor/ LAWLESS AMERICA
http://www.facebook.com/
Well, got some info to Marshall Gilbert a local radio announcer on the documentary Lawless America this morning. He had guest Ex-Assembly-woman Bonnie Garcia who is running now for California State Senate in 2014.
http://blog.pe.com/
BONNIE GARCIA, along with Cathedral City government members are very much responsible for my unlawful yearlong incarceration; a void case, the illegal taking of my home; a void case and the loss of my life-savings as a result.
I sent the following message to Marshall Gilbert and placed this on
Bonnie's web site: "Bonnie, I have been trying to reach you, I am sure
you remember me -it has been awhile. I am writing a book and I want to
send you what I have written about you so it will give up a heads up.
You can find a good part of it on me blog:
Ain't It Beautiful, http://sharonstephens.
...just look up "Golf Cart Parade" and "Bonnie Garcia." I can send it to Marshall Gilbert at Money Radio 1200/Palm Springs <marshalltalk@aol.com> and he can pass it on to you, or you can email me <sharonstephens.1@gmail.com> and I will send it to you directly.
I am still working on Judicial Corruption issues and of course that deals with illegal incarcerations that you say so concerned about?"
Bonnie has never talked to me about her unethical and unlawful behavior even though she has been told how to contact me.
Looking forward to you soon to be visit to California Bill.
Sincerely,
Sharon Stephens
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
Urge Your Legislators to Hold Prosecutors Accountable
By its controversial 5-4 decision in Connick v. Thompson, the U.S. Supreme Court took away one of the only remaining means for the wrongfully convicted to hold prosecutors accountable for willful misconduct. Although all other professionals, from doctors to airline pilots to clergy, can be held liable for their negligence, the Supreme Court has effectively given district attorney offices complete legal immunity for the actions of their assistants, even when an office knowingly abandonsits responsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence in its zeal to win convictions.
Groups representing prosecutors have argued that there are already mechanisms that effectively address misconduct, yet studies have revealed that these systems hold prosecutors accountable less than one percent of the time.
Recent reports have shown that when prosecutors abuse or misuse the power invested in them by the state they face virtually no consequences for their actions. According to Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997-2009, prosecutors were found by appellate courts to have committed misconduct 707 times from 1997 to 2009, yet were disciplined only 6 times. A USA Today investigation by Brad Heath and Kevin McCoy that was published on Sept. 23, 2010, documented 201 instances where federal prosecutors violated laws or ethics rules since 1997 and noted that only one of those prosecutors was suspended from practicing law - and that was only for one year. While it may be that each of these violations did not merit a severe sanction, each incident required a review anda transparent response. The public has a right to know what happens and whether they can have confidence that errors and misconduct are being addressed and prevented.
Recent reports have shown that when prosecutors abuse or misuse the power invested in them by the state they face virtually no consequences for their actions. According to Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997-2009, prosecutors were found by appellate courts to have committed misconduct 707 times from 1997 to 2009, yet were disciplined only 6 times. A USA Today investigation by Brad Heath and Kevin McCoy that was published on Sept. 23, 2010, documented 201 instances where federal prosecutors violated laws or ethics rules since 1997 and noted that only one of those prosecutors was suspended from practicing law - and that was only for one year. While it may be that each of these violations did not merit a severe sanction, each incident required a review anda transparent response. The public has a right to know what happens and whether they can have confidence that errors and misconduct are being addressed and prevented.
It is now up to our elected officials to strengthen our existing systems and create new ones if necessary to ensure that prosecutor’s offices are accountable and transparent.
Contact your elected officials and demand that they strengthen safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct and protections for the wrongfully convicted in your state.
Friday, January 27, 2012
DOMESTIC SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2003
Interested Persons Memo: Section-by-Section Analysis of Justice Department draft "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003," also known as "PATRIOT Act II" (2/14/2003)
To: Interested Persons
From: Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel
Date: February 14, 2003
Re: Section-by-Section Analysis of Justice Department draft ""Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,"" also known as ""Patriot Act II""
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has been drafting comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation for the past several months. The draft legislation, dated January 9, 2003, grants sweeping powers to the government, eliminating or weakening many of the checks and balances that remained on government surveillance, wiretapping, detention and criminal prosecution even after passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, in 2001.
Among its most severe problems, the bill
Diminishes personal privacy by removing checks on government power, specifically by
Making it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping of U.S. citizens under the authority of the shadowy, top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (Sections 101, 102 and 107)
Permitting the government, under certain circumstances, to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court altogether and conduct warrantless wiretaps and searches. (Sections 103 and 104)
Sheltering federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive Branch officials. (Section 106)
Creating a new category of ""domestic security surveillance"" that permits electronic eavesdropping of entirely domestic activity under looser standards than are provided for ordinary criminal surveillance under Title III. (Section 122)
Using an overbroad definition of terrorism that could cover some protest tactics such as those used by Operation Rescue or protesters at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico as a new predicate for criminal wiretapping and other electronic surveillance. (Sections 120 and 121)
Providing for general surveillance orders covering multiple functions of high tech devices, and by further expanding pen register and trap and trace authority for intelligence surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. (Sections 107 and 124)
Creating a new, separate crime of using encryption technology that could add five years to any sentence for crimes committed with a computer. (Section 404)
Expanding nationwide search warrants so they do not have to meet even the broad definition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act. (Section 125)
Giving the government secret access to credit reports without consent and without judicial process. (Section 126)
Enhancing the government's ability to obtain sensitive information without prior judicial approval by creating administrative subpoenas and providing new penalties for failure to comply with written demands for records. (Sections 128 and 129)
Allowing for the sampling and cataloguing of innocent Americans' genetic information without court order and without consent. (Sections 301-306)
Permitting, without any connection to anti-terrorism efforts, sensitive personal information about U.S. citizens to be shared with local and state law enforcement. (Section 311)
Terminating court-approved limits on police spying, which were initially put in place to prevent McCarthy-style law enforcement persecution based on political or religious affiliation. (Section 312)
Permitting searches, wiretaps and surveillance of United States citizens on behalf of foreign governments - including dictatorships and human rights abusers - in the absence of Senate-approved treaties. (Sections 321-22)
Diminishes public accountability by increasing government secrecy; specifically, by
Authorizing secret arrests in immigration and other cases, such as material witness warrants, where the detained person is not criminally charged. (Section 201)
Threatening public health by severely restricting access to crucial information about environmental health risks posed by facilities that use dangerous chemicals. (Section 202)
Harming fair trial rights for American citizens and other defendants by limiting defense attorneys from challenging the use of secret evidence in criminal cases. (Section 204)
Gagging grand jury witnesses in terrorism cases to bar them from discussing their testimony with the media or the general public, thus preventing them from defending themselves against rumor-mongering and denying the public information it has a right to receive under the First Amendment. (Section 206)
Diminishes corporate accountability under the pretext of fighting terrorism; specifically, by
Granting immunity to businesses that provide information to the government in terrorism investigations, even if their actions are taken with disregard for their customers' privacy or other rights and show reckless disregard for the truth. Such immunity could provide an incentive for neighbor to spy on neighbor and pose problems similar to those inherent in Attorney General Ashcroft's ""Operation TIPS."" (Section 313)
Undermines fundamental constitutional rights of Americans under overbroad definitions of ""terrorism"" and ""terrorist organization"" or under a terrorism pretext; specifically by
Stripping even native-born Americans of all of the rights of United States citizenship if they provide support to unpopular organizations labeled as terrorist by our government, even if they support only the lawful activities of such organizations, allowing them to be indefinitely imprisoned in their own country as undocumented aliens. (Section 501)
Creating 15 new death penalties, including a new death penalty for ""terrorism"" under a definition which could cover acts of protest such as those used by Operation Rescue or protesters at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, if death results. (Section 411)
Further criminalizing association - without any intent to commit specific terrorism crimes - by broadening the crime of providing material support to terrorism, even if support is not given to any organization listed as a terrorist organization by the government. (Section 402)
Permitting arrests and extraditions of Americans to any foreign country - including those whose governments do not respect the rule of law or human rights - in the absence of a Senate-approved treaty and without allowing an American judge to consider the extraditing country's legal system or human rights record. (Section 322)
Unfairly targets immigrants under the pretext of fighting terrorism; specifically by
Undercutting trust between police departments and immigrant communities by opening sensitive visa files to local police for the enforcement of complex immigration laws. (Section 311)
Targeting undocumented workers with extended jail terms for common immigration offenses. (Section 502)
Providing for summary deportations without evidence of crime, criminal intent or terrorism, even of lawful permanent residents, whom the Attorney General says are a threat to national security. (Section 503)
Completely abolishing fair hearings for lawful permanent residents convicted of even minor criminal offenses through a retroactive ""expedited removal"" procedure, and preventing any court from questioning the government's unlawful actions by explicitly exempting these cases from habeas corpus review. Congress has not exempted any person from habeas corpus -- a protection guaranteed by the Constitution -- since the Civil War. (Section 504)
Allowing the Attorney General to deport an immigrant to any country in the world, even if there is no effective government in such a country. (Section 506)
Given the bipartisan controversy that has arisen in the past from DOJ's attempts to weaken basic checks and balances that protect personal privacy and liberty, the DOJ's reluctance to share the draft legislation is perhaps understandable. The DOJ's highly one-sided section-by-section analysis reveals the Administration's strategy is to minimize far-reaching changes in basic powers, as it did in seeking passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, by characterizing them as minor tinkering with statutory language designed to bring government surveillance authorities, detention and deportation powers, and criminal penalties ""up to date.""
This ACLU section-by-section analysis of the text of the legislation, however, reveals that the DOJ's modest descriptions of the powers it is seeking, and the actual scope of the authorities it seeks, are miles apart. The USA PATRIOT Act undercut many of the traditional checks and balances on government power. The new draft legislation threatens to fundamentally alter the constitutional protections that allow us as Americans to be both safe and free. If adopted, the bill would diminish personal privacy by removing important checks on government surveillance authority, reduce the accountability of government to the public by increasing government secrecy, further undermine fundamental constitutional rights of Americans under an already overbroad definition of ""terrorism,"" and seriously erode the right of all persons to due process of law.
Our detailed section-by-section analysis follows.
Title I - Diminishing Personal Privacy by Removing Checks on Government Intelligence and Criminal Surveillance Powers
Title I amends critical statutes that govern intelligence surveillance and criminal surveillance. Both forms of surveillance are subject to Fourth Amendment limitations. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (criminal surveillance); United States v. United States District Court (""Keith""), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (intelligence surveillance). Yet while traditional searches are governed by warrant procedures largely drawn from the common law, wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance are governed by standards and procedures embodied in two federal statutes that respond to Katz and Keith - Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, which governs surveillance of criminal suspects, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 which governs surveillance of foreign powers and agents of a foreign power for intelligence purposes.
Making it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping, including of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, through the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Sections 101-111). The draft bill's proposed amendments to FISA attack key statutory concepts that are critical to providing appropriate limits and meaningful judicial supervision over wiretapping and other intrusive electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. These limits were approved by Congress in 1978 because of a history of abuse by government agents who placed wiretaps and other listening devices on political activists, journalists, rival political parties and candidates, and other innocent targets. These so-called ""national security wiretaps"" and other covert surveillance were undertaken without any court supervision and without even the slightest suspicion that the targets of such surveillance were involved in criminal activities or were acting on behalf of any foreign government or political organization. This pattern of abuse culminated in the crimes of Watergate, which led to substantial reforms and limits on spying for intelligence purposes.
FISA represented a compromise between civil libertarians, who wanted to ban ""national security wiretaps"" altogether, and apologists for Presidential authority, who claimed such unchecked intelligence surveillance authority was inherent in the President's Article II power over foreign relations. The Congress chose to authorize intelligence wiretaps without evidence of crime, subject to a number of key restraints. One of these restraints, separating intelligence gathering from criminal investigations, has been significantly weakened by the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act abolished the ""primary purpose"" test - the requirement that FISA surveillance could only be used if the primary purpose of surveillance was gathering of foreign intelligence, and not criminal prosecution or some other purpose.
The draft bill eliminates or substantially weakens a number of the remaining constraints on intelligence surveillance approved by Congress. Taken as a whole, these changes go a long way to undermine limits on intelligence surveillance essential to preserving civil liberties and to preventing a repeat of the wiretapping abuses of the J. Edgar Hoover and Watergate eras.
Authorizing the government to initiate wiretaps and other electronic surveillance on Americans who have no ties to foreign governments or powers (sec. 101). This section would permit the government to obtain a wiretap, search warrant or electronic surveillance orders targeting American citizens and lawful permanent residents even if they have no ties to a foreign government or other foreign power. Under FISA, the government need not show, in many circumstances, probable cause that the target of a wiretap is involved in any criminal activity. FISA requires an alternate showing - probable cause that the target is acting on behalf of a foreign government or organization, i.e., a ""foreign power."" Section 101 of the draft bill eliminates this requirement for individuals, including United States citizens, suspected of engaging in ""international terrorism."" It does so by redefining individuals, including United States citizens or lawful residents, as ""foreign powers"" even if they are not acting on behalf of any foreign government or organization. The ""foreign power"" requirement was a key reason FISA was upheld in a recent constitutional challenge. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, slip op. at 42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. Nov. 18, 2002) (while FISA requires no showing of probable cause of crime, it is constitutional in part because it provides ""another safeguard . . . that is, the requirement that there be probable cause to believe the target is acting 'for or on behalf of a foreign power.'"")[1]
Permitting surveillance of the lawful activities of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents if they are suspected of gathering information for a foreign power (sec. 102). United States citizens and lawful permanent residents who are not violating any law should not be subject to wiretapping or other intrusive electronic surveillance. The FISA contains dual standards for non-U.S. persons and for U.S. persons with respect to surveillance of ""intelligence gathering activities,"" i.e., the gathering of information for a foreign government or organization. These standards reflect the judgment of Congress that U.S. persons should not face electronic surveillance unless their activities ""involve or may involve"" some violation of law (as, for example, would certainly be the case with respect to any activity in furtherance of terrorism or other crime). For non-U.S. persons, this showing does not have to be made, i.e., the gathering of information by foreign persons for foreign powers is enough to trigger FISA. The draft bill (at section 102) applies the lower standard to U.S. persons.
Lawful gathering of information for a foreign organization does not necessarily pose any threat to national security. This amendment would permit electronic surveillance of a local activist who was preparing a report on human rights for London-based Amnesty International, a ""foreign political organization,"" even if the activist was not engaged in any violation of law. By eliminating this need to show some violation of law may be involved before authorizing surveillance of U.S. persons, Congress could well succeed in rendering FISA unconstitutional, by eliminating another key reason FISA was upheld in a recent court challenge. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, slip op. at 42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. Nov. 18, 2002) (holding that FISA surveillance of U.S. persons meets Fourth Amendment standards in part because a surveillance order may not be granted unless there is probable cause to believe the target is involved in activity that may involve a violation of law).
Permitting the government, under some circumstances, to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court altogether (Sections 103, 104). Section 103 gives the Attorney General the power to authorize intelligence wiretaps and other electronic surveillance without permission from any court, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, for fifteen days, after an attack on the United States or force authorization resolution from the Congress. Under existing federal statutes, a formal declaration of war by the Congress triggers a host of civil liberties consequences, including authorization by the Attorney General to engage in intrusive electronic surveillance for up to fifteen days without any court order at all. The draft bill expands this power dramatically by eliminating judicial review for any surveillance under FISA for a period up to fifteen days pursuant to (1) an authorization of force resolution by the Congress or (2) a ""national emergency"" created by an attack on the United States. For surveillance under the latter circumstance, no action by Congress would be required. Once the President has unilaterally decided such an attack has occurred, the Attorney General could unilaterally decide what constitutes an ""attack"" on the United States, creating an emergency that justifies what would otherwise be plainly illegal wiretaps.
DOJ's rationale for this change is that declarations of war are rare and the statute should be updated to reflect this. This argument fundamentally misconstrues the purpose of this provision. The normal FISA process, including review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, was Congress's attempt to impose meaningful limits over national security surveillance conducted without a formal declaration of war and for continuing threats that cannot easily by defined by reference to traditional war powers. To use Congress' grant of surveillance authority following a declaration of war as an argument to permit surveillance even in the absence of such action by Congress is a fundamental intrusion on Congress's war powers.
The draft bill (at section 104) also expands special surveillance authority, available for up to a year with no court order at all, for property ""under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power"" by permitting eavesdropping on ""spoken communications."" This expansion of authority leaves intact the current requirement that such surveillance can go forward only if the Attorney General certifies under oath that ""there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party."" Still, the new authority would plainly involve eavesdropping on communications protected by the Fourth Amendment, as it would inevitably result in listening - without any court order - to the conversations in the United States of anyone who might be using telephones, computers, or other devices owned by a foreign government, political organization, or company owned by a foreign government.
There are serious questions about whether the secret review of surveillance orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which by its nature can only hear the government's side of the case, is effective in protecting Americans' civil liberties. These amendments would bypass judicial review under FISA altogether.
Sheltering federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive Branch officials (Section 106). This section would encourage unlawful intelligence wiretaps and secret searches by immunizing agents from criminal sanctions if they conduct such surveillance, even if a reasonable official would know it is illegal, by claiming they were acting in ""good faith"" based on the orders of the President or the Attorney General. In order to ensure that FISA was successful in bringing national security surveillance under the rule of law, Congress not only provided a process for legal intelligence surveillance, but also imposed criminal penalties on any government agent who engages in electronic surveillance outside that process. Congress also provided a ""safe harbor"" for agents who engaged in surveillance that was approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, even if such surveillance was not in fact authorized by FISA. The draft bill (at section 106) substantially undercuts the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions for illegal wiretaps or electronic surveillance by expanding the ""safe harbor"" to include surveillance not approved by any court, but simply on the authorization of the Attorney General or the President.
Of course, the very spying abuses FISA was designed to prevent were undertaken with the authorization of high-ranking government officials, including the President. For example, President Nixon authorized just such a covert search of the Brookings Institution, whom he and his staff suspected of possessing classified information that had been leaked to the press. As described by Nixon biographer Richard Reeves:
Nixon sat up. ""Now if you remember Huston's plan [to engage in covert surveillance] . . .""
""Yeah, why?"" Haldeman said.
Kissinger said: ""But couldn't we go over? Now, Brookings has no right to classified-""
The President cut him off, saying, ""I want it implemented. . . . Goddamit get in there and get those files. Blow the safe and get them.""[2]
Any government official acting within the scope of his employment already enjoys ""qualified immunity"" from charges of violating Fourth Amendment or other constitutional rights - i.e., an official cannot be punished or held civilly liable if a reasonable government official would not have known his or her conduct was illegal. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Providing additional protection to government officials who engage in wiretaps or searches without a court order, where a reasonable official would know those wiretaps or searches were clearly illegal, would take away any incentive for such officials to question an illegal authorization by the President, Attorney General or other high official.
Further expanding pen register and trap and trace authority for intelligence surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents beyond terrorism investigations (Section 107). This section allows the government to use intelligence pen registers and trap and trace surveillance devices to obtain detailed information on American citizens and lawful permanent residents, including telephone numbers dialed, Internet addresses to which e-mail is sent or received, and the web addresses a person enters into a web browser, even in an investigation that is entirely unrelated to terrorism or counterintelligence. In so doing, it erodes a limitation on this authority that was part of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The standard for obtaining a pen register or trap and trace order is very low, requiring merely that a government official certify that the information it would reveal is ""relevant"" to an investigation. Under section 216 the USA PATRIOT Act, the government was given new power to obtain this sensitive information for Internet communications merely by making this certification. This expansion was a serious erosion of meaningful judicial oversight of government surveillance because it expanded the authority to get court orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices in a way that permitted the government to access far more detailed content than was available before such authority was extended to the Internet.
For United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, Congress limited the new authority to terrorism and counterintelligence investigations. This section would remove that limitation, opening the door to expanded government surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents under controversial government law enforcement technologies like CARNIVORE and the Total Information Awareness Pentagon ""super-snoop"" program whose development Congress just voted to limit.
Providing cleared, appointed counsel for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Section 108). While we welcome the provision providing for an appointed, cleared counsel to argue in favor of a ruling of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when the government appeals its decisions, it should not substitute for participation, in appropriate cases, by interested civil liberties organizations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approves government orders for electronic surveillance and physical searches under FISA. It meets in secret and never hears from anyone other than the government officials seeking its approval. If an order is denied, the government has the right to seek review of that denial in a special three-judge court of appeals, called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. No one can appeal the approval of a surveillance order, as the target of the surveillance is not notified. Instead, the only challenge to an approved order would occur later, if the information obtained is to be used in a criminal prosecution, in a suppression motion before the district court. If the information is used only for intelligence purposes, there is never an opportunity t
To: Interested Persons
From: Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel
Date: February 14, 2003
Re: Section-by-Section Analysis of Justice Department draft ""Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,"" also known as ""Patriot Act II""
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has been drafting comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation for the past several months. The draft legislation, dated January 9, 2003, grants sweeping powers to the government, eliminating or weakening many of the checks and balances that remained on government surveillance, wiretapping, detention and criminal prosecution even after passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, in 2001.
Among its most severe problems, the bill
Diminishes personal privacy by removing checks on government power, specifically by
Making it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping of U.S. citizens under the authority of the shadowy, top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (Sections 101, 102 and 107)
Permitting the government, under certain circumstances, to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court altogether and conduct warrantless wiretaps and searches. (Sections 103 and 104)
Sheltering federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive Branch officials. (Section 106)
Creating a new category of ""domestic security surveillance"" that permits electronic eavesdropping of entirely domestic activity under looser standards than are provided for ordinary criminal surveillance under Title III. (Section 122)
Using an overbroad definition of terrorism that could cover some protest tactics such as those used by Operation Rescue or protesters at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico as a new predicate for criminal wiretapping and other electronic surveillance. (Sections 120 and 121)
Providing for general surveillance orders covering multiple functions of high tech devices, and by further expanding pen register and trap and trace authority for intelligence surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. (Sections 107 and 124)
Creating a new, separate crime of using encryption technology that could add five years to any sentence for crimes committed with a computer. (Section 404)
Expanding nationwide search warrants so they do not have to meet even the broad definition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act. (Section 125)
Giving the government secret access to credit reports without consent and without judicial process. (Section 126)
Enhancing the government's ability to obtain sensitive information without prior judicial approval by creating administrative subpoenas and providing new penalties for failure to comply with written demands for records. (Sections 128 and 129)
Allowing for the sampling and cataloguing of innocent Americans' genetic information without court order and without consent. (Sections 301-306)
Permitting, without any connection to anti-terrorism efforts, sensitive personal information about U.S. citizens to be shared with local and state law enforcement. (Section 311)
Terminating court-approved limits on police spying, which were initially put in place to prevent McCarthy-style law enforcement persecution based on political or religious affiliation. (Section 312)
Permitting searches, wiretaps and surveillance of United States citizens on behalf of foreign governments - including dictatorships and human rights abusers - in the absence of Senate-approved treaties. (Sections 321-22)
Diminishes public accountability by increasing government secrecy; specifically, by
Authorizing secret arrests in immigration and other cases, such as material witness warrants, where the detained person is not criminally charged. (Section 201)
Threatening public health by severely restricting access to crucial information about environmental health risks posed by facilities that use dangerous chemicals. (Section 202)
Harming fair trial rights for American citizens and other defendants by limiting defense attorneys from challenging the use of secret evidence in criminal cases. (Section 204)
Gagging grand jury witnesses in terrorism cases to bar them from discussing their testimony with the media or the general public, thus preventing them from defending themselves against rumor-mongering and denying the public information it has a right to receive under the First Amendment. (Section 206)
Diminishes corporate accountability under the pretext of fighting terrorism; specifically, by
Granting immunity to businesses that provide information to the government in terrorism investigations, even if their actions are taken with disregard for their customers' privacy or other rights and show reckless disregard for the truth. Such immunity could provide an incentive for neighbor to spy on neighbor and pose problems similar to those inherent in Attorney General Ashcroft's ""Operation TIPS."" (Section 313)
Undermines fundamental constitutional rights of Americans under overbroad definitions of ""terrorism"" and ""terrorist organization"" or under a terrorism pretext; specifically by
Stripping even native-born Americans of all of the rights of United States citizenship if they provide support to unpopular organizations labeled as terrorist by our government, even if they support only the lawful activities of such organizations, allowing them to be indefinitely imprisoned in their own country as undocumented aliens. (Section 501)
Creating 15 new death penalties, including a new death penalty for ""terrorism"" under a definition which could cover acts of protest such as those used by Operation Rescue or protesters at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, if death results. (Section 411)
Further criminalizing association - without any intent to commit specific terrorism crimes - by broadening the crime of providing material support to terrorism, even if support is not given to any organization listed as a terrorist organization by the government. (Section 402)
Permitting arrests and extraditions of Americans to any foreign country - including those whose governments do not respect the rule of law or human rights - in the absence of a Senate-approved treaty and without allowing an American judge to consider the extraditing country's legal system or human rights record. (Section 322)
Unfairly targets immigrants under the pretext of fighting terrorism; specifically by
Undercutting trust between police departments and immigrant communities by opening sensitive visa files to local police for the enforcement of complex immigration laws. (Section 311)
Targeting undocumented workers with extended jail terms for common immigration offenses. (Section 502)
Providing for summary deportations without evidence of crime, criminal intent or terrorism, even of lawful permanent residents, whom the Attorney General says are a threat to national security. (Section 503)
Completely abolishing fair hearings for lawful permanent residents convicted of even minor criminal offenses through a retroactive ""expedited removal"" procedure, and preventing any court from questioning the government's unlawful actions by explicitly exempting these cases from habeas corpus review. Congress has not exempted any person from habeas corpus -- a protection guaranteed by the Constitution -- since the Civil War. (Section 504)
Allowing the Attorney General to deport an immigrant to any country in the world, even if there is no effective government in such a country. (Section 506)
Given the bipartisan controversy that has arisen in the past from DOJ's attempts to weaken basic checks and balances that protect personal privacy and liberty, the DOJ's reluctance to share the draft legislation is perhaps understandable. The DOJ's highly one-sided section-by-section analysis reveals the Administration's strategy is to minimize far-reaching changes in basic powers, as it did in seeking passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, by characterizing them as minor tinkering with statutory language designed to bring government surveillance authorities, detention and deportation powers, and criminal penalties ""up to date.""
This ACLU section-by-section analysis of the text of the legislation, however, reveals that the DOJ's modest descriptions of the powers it is seeking, and the actual scope of the authorities it seeks, are miles apart. The USA PATRIOT Act undercut many of the traditional checks and balances on government power. The new draft legislation threatens to fundamentally alter the constitutional protections that allow us as Americans to be both safe and free. If adopted, the bill would diminish personal privacy by removing important checks on government surveillance authority, reduce the accountability of government to the public by increasing government secrecy, further undermine fundamental constitutional rights of Americans under an already overbroad definition of ""terrorism,"" and seriously erode the right of all persons to due process of law.
Our detailed section-by-section analysis follows.
Title I - Diminishing Personal Privacy by Removing Checks on Government Intelligence and Criminal Surveillance Powers
Title I amends critical statutes that govern intelligence surveillance and criminal surveillance. Both forms of surveillance are subject to Fourth Amendment limitations. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (criminal surveillance); United States v. United States District Court (""Keith""), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (intelligence surveillance). Yet while traditional searches are governed by warrant procedures largely drawn from the common law, wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance are governed by standards and procedures embodied in two federal statutes that respond to Katz and Keith - Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, which governs surveillance of criminal suspects, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 which governs surveillance of foreign powers and agents of a foreign power for intelligence purposes.
Making it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping, including of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, through the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Sections 101-111). The draft bill's proposed amendments to FISA attack key statutory concepts that are critical to providing appropriate limits and meaningful judicial supervision over wiretapping and other intrusive electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. These limits were approved by Congress in 1978 because of a history of abuse by government agents who placed wiretaps and other listening devices on political activists, journalists, rival political parties and candidates, and other innocent targets. These so-called ""national security wiretaps"" and other covert surveillance were undertaken without any court supervision and without even the slightest suspicion that the targets of such surveillance were involved in criminal activities or were acting on behalf of any foreign government or political organization. This pattern of abuse culminated in the crimes of Watergate, which led to substantial reforms and limits on spying for intelligence purposes.
FISA represented a compromise between civil libertarians, who wanted to ban ""national security wiretaps"" altogether, and apologists for Presidential authority, who claimed such unchecked intelligence surveillance authority was inherent in the President's Article II power over foreign relations. The Congress chose to authorize intelligence wiretaps without evidence of crime, subject to a number of key restraints. One of these restraints, separating intelligence gathering from criminal investigations, has been significantly weakened by the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act abolished the ""primary purpose"" test - the requirement that FISA surveillance could only be used if the primary purpose of surveillance was gathering of foreign intelligence, and not criminal prosecution or some other purpose.
The draft bill eliminates or substantially weakens a number of the remaining constraints on intelligence surveillance approved by Congress. Taken as a whole, these changes go a long way to undermine limits on intelligence surveillance essential to preserving civil liberties and to preventing a repeat of the wiretapping abuses of the J. Edgar Hoover and Watergate eras.
Authorizing the government to initiate wiretaps and other electronic surveillance on Americans who have no ties to foreign governments or powers (sec. 101). This section would permit the government to obtain a wiretap, search warrant or electronic surveillance orders targeting American citizens and lawful permanent residents even if they have no ties to a foreign government or other foreign power. Under FISA, the government need not show, in many circumstances, probable cause that the target of a wiretap is involved in any criminal activity. FISA requires an alternate showing - probable cause that the target is acting on behalf of a foreign government or organization, i.e., a ""foreign power."" Section 101 of the draft bill eliminates this requirement for individuals, including United States citizens, suspected of engaging in ""international terrorism."" It does so by redefining individuals, including United States citizens or lawful residents, as ""foreign powers"" even if they are not acting on behalf of any foreign government or organization. The ""foreign power"" requirement was a key reason FISA was upheld in a recent constitutional challenge. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, slip op. at 42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. Nov. 18, 2002) (while FISA requires no showing of probable cause of crime, it is constitutional in part because it provides ""another safeguard . . . that is, the requirement that there be probable cause to believe the target is acting 'for or on behalf of a foreign power.'"")[1]
Permitting surveillance of the lawful activities of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents if they are suspected of gathering information for a foreign power (sec. 102). United States citizens and lawful permanent residents who are not violating any law should not be subject to wiretapping or other intrusive electronic surveillance. The FISA contains dual standards for non-U.S. persons and for U.S. persons with respect to surveillance of ""intelligence gathering activities,"" i.e., the gathering of information for a foreign government or organization. These standards reflect the judgment of Congress that U.S. persons should not face electronic surveillance unless their activities ""involve or may involve"" some violation of law (as, for example, would certainly be the case with respect to any activity in furtherance of terrorism or other crime). For non-U.S. persons, this showing does not have to be made, i.e., the gathering of information by foreign persons for foreign powers is enough to trigger FISA. The draft bill (at section 102) applies the lower standard to U.S. persons.
Lawful gathering of information for a foreign organization does not necessarily pose any threat to national security. This amendment would permit electronic surveillance of a local activist who was preparing a report on human rights for London-based Amnesty International, a ""foreign political organization,"" even if the activist was not engaged in any violation of law. By eliminating this need to show some violation of law may be involved before authorizing surveillance of U.S. persons, Congress could well succeed in rendering FISA unconstitutional, by eliminating another key reason FISA was upheld in a recent court challenge. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, slip op. at 42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev. Nov. 18, 2002) (holding that FISA surveillance of U.S. persons meets Fourth Amendment standards in part because a surveillance order may not be granted unless there is probable cause to believe the target is involved in activity that may involve a violation of law).
Permitting the government, under some circumstances, to bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court altogether (Sections 103, 104). Section 103 gives the Attorney General the power to authorize intelligence wiretaps and other electronic surveillance without permission from any court, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, for fifteen days, after an attack on the United States or force authorization resolution from the Congress. Under existing federal statutes, a formal declaration of war by the Congress triggers a host of civil liberties consequences, including authorization by the Attorney General to engage in intrusive electronic surveillance for up to fifteen days without any court order at all. The draft bill expands this power dramatically by eliminating judicial review for any surveillance under FISA for a period up to fifteen days pursuant to (1) an authorization of force resolution by the Congress or (2) a ""national emergency"" created by an attack on the United States. For surveillance under the latter circumstance, no action by Congress would be required. Once the President has unilaterally decided such an attack has occurred, the Attorney General could unilaterally decide what constitutes an ""attack"" on the United States, creating an emergency that justifies what would otherwise be plainly illegal wiretaps.
DOJ's rationale for this change is that declarations of war are rare and the statute should be updated to reflect this. This argument fundamentally misconstrues the purpose of this provision. The normal FISA process, including review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, was Congress's attempt to impose meaningful limits over national security surveillance conducted without a formal declaration of war and for continuing threats that cannot easily by defined by reference to traditional war powers. To use Congress' grant of surveillance authority following a declaration of war as an argument to permit surveillance even in the absence of such action by Congress is a fundamental intrusion on Congress's war powers.
The draft bill (at section 104) also expands special surveillance authority, available for up to a year with no court order at all, for property ""under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power"" by permitting eavesdropping on ""spoken communications."" This expansion of authority leaves intact the current requirement that such surveillance can go forward only if the Attorney General certifies under oath that ""there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party."" Still, the new authority would plainly involve eavesdropping on communications protected by the Fourth Amendment, as it would inevitably result in listening - without any court order - to the conversations in the United States of anyone who might be using telephones, computers, or other devices owned by a foreign government, political organization, or company owned by a foreign government.
There are serious questions about whether the secret review of surveillance orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which by its nature can only hear the government's side of the case, is effective in protecting Americans' civil liberties. These amendments would bypass judicial review under FISA altogether.
Sheltering federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive Branch officials (Section 106). This section would encourage unlawful intelligence wiretaps and secret searches by immunizing agents from criminal sanctions if they conduct such surveillance, even if a reasonable official would know it is illegal, by claiming they were acting in ""good faith"" based on the orders of the President or the Attorney General. In order to ensure that FISA was successful in bringing national security surveillance under the rule of law, Congress not only provided a process for legal intelligence surveillance, but also imposed criminal penalties on any government agent who engages in electronic surveillance outside that process. Congress also provided a ""safe harbor"" for agents who engaged in surveillance that was approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, even if such surveillance was not in fact authorized by FISA. The draft bill (at section 106) substantially undercuts the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions for illegal wiretaps or electronic surveillance by expanding the ""safe harbor"" to include surveillance not approved by any court, but simply on the authorization of the Attorney General or the President.
Of course, the very spying abuses FISA was designed to prevent were undertaken with the authorization of high-ranking government officials, including the President. For example, President Nixon authorized just such a covert search of the Brookings Institution, whom he and his staff suspected of possessing classified information that had been leaked to the press. As described by Nixon biographer Richard Reeves:
Nixon sat up. ""Now if you remember Huston's plan [to engage in covert surveillance] . . .""
""Yeah, why?"" Haldeman said.
Kissinger said: ""But couldn't we go over? Now, Brookings has no right to classified-""
The President cut him off, saying, ""I want it implemented. . . . Goddamit get in there and get those files. Blow the safe and get them.""[2]
Any government official acting within the scope of his employment already enjoys ""qualified immunity"" from charges of violating Fourth Amendment or other constitutional rights - i.e., an official cannot be punished or held civilly liable if a reasonable government official would not have known his or her conduct was illegal. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Providing additional protection to government officials who engage in wiretaps or searches without a court order, where a reasonable official would know those wiretaps or searches were clearly illegal, would take away any incentive for such officials to question an illegal authorization by the President, Attorney General or other high official.
Further expanding pen register and trap and trace authority for intelligence surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents beyond terrorism investigations (Section 107). This section allows the government to use intelligence pen registers and trap and trace surveillance devices to obtain detailed information on American citizens and lawful permanent residents, including telephone numbers dialed, Internet addresses to which e-mail is sent or received, and the web addresses a person enters into a web browser, even in an investigation that is entirely unrelated to terrorism or counterintelligence. In so doing, it erodes a limitation on this authority that was part of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The standard for obtaining a pen register or trap and trace order is very low, requiring merely that a government official certify that the information it would reveal is ""relevant"" to an investigation. Under section 216 the USA PATRIOT Act, the government was given new power to obtain this sensitive information for Internet communications merely by making this certification. This expansion was a serious erosion of meaningful judicial oversight of government surveillance because it expanded the authority to get court orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices in a way that permitted the government to access far more detailed content than was available before such authority was extended to the Internet.
For United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, Congress limited the new authority to terrorism and counterintelligence investigations. This section would remove that limitation, opening the door to expanded government surveillance of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents under controversial government law enforcement technologies like CARNIVORE and the Total Information Awareness Pentagon ""super-snoop"" program whose development Congress just voted to limit.
Providing cleared, appointed counsel for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Section 108). While we welcome the provision providing for an appointed, cleared counsel to argue in favor of a ruling of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when the government appeals its decisions, it should not substitute for participation, in appropriate cases, by interested civil liberties organizations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approves government orders for electronic surveillance and physical searches under FISA. It meets in secret and never hears from anyone other than the government officials seeking its approval. If an order is denied, the government has the right to seek review of that denial in a special three-judge court of appeals, called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. No one can appeal the approval of a surveillance order, as the target of the surveillance is not notified. Instead, the only challenge to an approved order would occur later, if the information obtained is to be used in a criminal prosecution, in a suppression motion before the district court. If the information is used only for intelligence purposes, there is never an opportunity t
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
Motion to Dismiss Void Judgment CCP 473 (d)
Sharon Stephens
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
760.835.8210
Pro per
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
8303 North Haven Avenue
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
CASE NO.: MWV 903720
NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION TO VOID
and ANNUL ALL ORDERS and JUDGMENTS
INCLUDING ANY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
MADE BY JUDGE SHELA S. SABET;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
DECLARATION OF SHARON STEPHENS
CCP 473(d)
TIME: 8:30 AM
DATE: September 23, 2011
DEPT 7
_______________________________/
TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 23, 2011, at 8:30 a.m. in the department 7, in the above Court located at 8303 North Haven Avenue, Rancho Cucamonga, California, 91730, Sharon Stephens (hereinafter “Stephens”) Petitioner and Defendant in this case will move and hereby moves for an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments, including any contempt charges.
Stephens has already argued that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter any order or judgment in this case including the contempt proceedings therefore making them void. Judge Sabet ignored that, and all arguments of Stephens, therefore Stephens does not now waive anyclaim that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction but adds Judge Sabet committed fraud on the court by sitting on the case at all.
San Bernardino County and its attorneys committed the first fraud upon the court by not disclosing that San Bernardino County was making payments payment to Judge Sabet. Judge Sabet joined in this fraud upon
the court by not disclosing such in violation of Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2). She further violated Canon 3E(1) and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A) (iii) by not disqualifying herself. She also violated Canon 4D(1) by accepting San Bernardino County payments.
During her tenure as a San Bernardino judge from January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011it is estimated that Judge Sabet received approximately $300,000 in payments from San Bernardino County.(EXHIBIT A)
The San Bernardino County payments to judges were held to violate Article VI, section 19, of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08. They were recognized as criminal in California Senate Bill SBx2-11, which gave retroactive immunity to “governmental entity and officers and employees of a governmental entity” including judges from criminal prosecution, civil liability, and disciplinary action for receiving “judicial benefits” effective 5/21/09.
The retroactive immunity did not extend to “fraud on the court” or the obstruction of justice of not disclosing the payments. Nor does it extend to judges presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party before the judges. After 5/21/09, no immunity existed for the payments.
The second fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet, and the San Bernardino County Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu conspired with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, ignored the law of CCP 527.8 and unlawfully incarcerated Stephens in West Valley Detention Center on a void on the face Temporary Restraining Order, and ignored mandated Criminal Charging Affidavits against Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck leaving them free of any charge of misconduct.
The third fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet and San Bernardino County District Attorney, in conspiracy with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck prosecuted Stephens on a void on the face contempt order, and unlawfully incarcerated her in West Valley Detention Center. U.S. Supreme Court precedents hold that fraud upon the court vitiates the case; that all orders and judgments are regarded as nullities and void. SEE: U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61,64,66(1878); Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. (1920))
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Moving Party Stephens Petitioner and former Defendant in this case seeks an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments in this case, and all contempt proceedings.
II. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY PAYMENTS TO STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY
As stated in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08, Counties began making payments to State Superior Court judges in the late 1980s. The Sturgeon case held that these payments violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution.
A letter from Roger M. Whitby written November 10, 1988 was produced in the appellate phase of the Sturgeon case.
Such letter showed that (1) only the State Legislature could “prescribe” the “compensation” of judges, under Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution; (2) “compensation” encompassed fringe benefits, according to two California Attorney General opinions; (3) the Legislature’s duty was not delegable to any other body, according to California case law; (4) Superior Court judges are State Constitutional Officers; and (5) The Board of Supervisors has claimed to have found that in order to attract and retain qualified judges to serve in this County it is necessary
and appropriate to provide them with benefits and a flexible benefit plan contribution – in addition to their State salary, State benefits, and State retirement. It appears the sole purpose of these payments was only be to influence the judges to rule in favor of San Bernardino County, which was often a party before the judges accepting
the money.
Code of Ethics Canon 4(D)(1) prohibits judges from entering into
financial dealings that:
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the
judge’s judicial position, or
(b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or
continuing business relationships with…persons likely to appear
before the court in which the judge serves.
CCP 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) mandated such judges disqualification.
Such Section states:
A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:
[ ] A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that
the judge would be able to be impartial.
Canon 3E(2) requires a judge to: disclose on the record information that
is reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, even if the judge believes there
is no actual basis for disqualification.
Canon 3E(1) requires the judge to “disqualify”
himself or herself in any
proceeding in which disqualification is required by law.
Any judge who received any San Bernardino County benefits was bound to disclose such and disqualify him or her self.
If the judge does not disclose and disqualify themselves they can be facing bribery charges.
After the Sturgeon decision, the legislature enacted Senate BillSBx2-11which recognized that the County payments to judges were criminal. Senate Bill SBx2-11 gave retroactive immunity, effective 5/21/09, from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to a “governmental entity, officer, or employee of a governmental entity.” The retroactive immunity did not extend to the judge’s actions presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party. Nor, did it extend to county payments received after 5/21/09.
At all times, judges who accepted “bribes” from an interested party were biased. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Levine v. United States 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960) citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).
Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.
Further, the judge receiving the payment may be prosecuted for violating the intangible right to honest services under Federal Law 18 U.S.C. section 1346. The U.S. Supreme Court held under Skilling v.United States 561 (Decided 6/24/2010), Slip Options pages 48-49, that section 1346, encompasses bribery and kickbacks.
III. THE FRAUDS UPON THE COURT
A. For more than a year the San Bernardino County Office of
District Attorney and the court, particularly Judge Sabet has
persecuted Stephens on a void on the face restraining order. Stephens
has been in and out of false arrests and unlawful incarcerations, and
has been drug back and forth to court like a rag doll, all the while
being homeless and living in her car because of a retaliatory eviction
by Logan Property Management Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck, essentially
for complaining about lack of fire safety and criminal behavior on her
senior apartment complex.
When Stephens fought the bogus eviction, Attorney Hollenbeck
filed two sham Workplace Violence Restraining Orders, CCP 527.8. One
was promptly and properly dismissed for not meeting the required
statutory or case law to issue the order. The second slipped by and
went into court where it was challenged as void in a 402 Hearing.
Judge Sabet sat through the entire 402 Hearing brought to
challenge this void on the face.
Workplace Violence Restraining Order under CCP 527.8, after admitting,
at the start to “not
knowing the law of void judgments.” There were “complex legal issues;”
she ought to have
recused herself right there, or, taken the time to research the law.
Instead she went on to retry
the case which openly violated legal procedure of deciding a void
judgment challenge. From the
beginning the TRO was void on the face for not meeting the criteria
for violence. A TRO is also
void after 14 days.
"It is well settled that a judgment or order which
is void on its face, and which
requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll
or record to show its invalidity,
may be set aside on motion, at any time after its
entry, by the court which
rendered the judgment or made the order. Other
Courts my also may do the
same. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord
Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983)
140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761
Judge Sabet exceeded her jurisdiction, and therefore committed
fraud upon the court. At the
end of several hours of false, subrogated perjured testimony she then
asked the attorneys to
present points and authorities so she could decide the case. They had none!
Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals
to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or
attempts to, defile the court
itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of
the court [Judges are officers of
the court] so that the judicial machinery can not
perform in the usual manner
its impartial task of adjudging cases that are
presented for adjudication."
Kennerv. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's
Federal Practice,2d ed.,
p. 512, 60.23.
The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced
by fraud upon the court
is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final."
The judgment is void.
On May 26, 2010 Judge Sabet had to dismiss this void on the
face restraining order because someone informed her case was void.
Then, in what can only be called a mean-spirited, retaliatory move she
ignored the law of CCP 527,8, and at the insistence of Deputy District
Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, and with a sneer on
her lips, gave an order to incarcerate Stephens, on the antecedent,
void on the face temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in the case, and
set Bail at $150,000 (Excessive Bail: Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. (1951)
the U.S. Supreme Court: A judge or justice may be censured for
"setting 'grossly excessive' bail and [thus] showing a 'severe
attitude' toward witnesses and litigants," as the Michigan Supreme
Court did to a trial judge recently: Debra Cassens Weiss, writes,
"Judge Censured for Excessive Bail, Severe Attitude", (ABA Journal,
February 8, 2008).
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
[subject matter] jurisdiction to
act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of
treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 );
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
Any judge or attorney who does not report a judge for
treason as required
by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of
treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.
On January 11, 2011 Judge Sabet again unlawfully incarcerates
(“Stephens” ) for 50
days in West Valley Detention for having Attorney Linda Hollenbeck
served with a
Notice of Intent to sue, claiming it is a violation of the void on
the face probation that she
had set.
Such void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and
can legally be ignored
as they neither bind, nor bar anyone. "Obviously a
judgment, though final
and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject
to collateral attack
if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter or person,
and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is
obtained by extrinsic
fraud. [Citations.]" 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,
Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).
B. San Bernardino County and Its Attorneys’ Fraud Upon The Court
San Bernardino County nor its attorneys have never disclosed to
this day that San Bernardino County has made payments to Judge Sabet.
Judge Sabet is a native born Iranian who came to the United
States in 1970 because there was no room for her in the university
there. Judge Sabet feels becoming a judge may be related to genetic
predisposition. Her grandfather was a justice of the Iran Supreme
Court and two cousins also served as judges at a time when a codified
system of justice, was based on code rather than case law, [stare
decisis], an inquisitorial system, such as exists in France. The
judge serves not only as judge but as prosecutor, jury, and arbiter.
The Islamic legal system of Sharia (Islamic law) and Fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence) has always been an influence in the Iranian law system,
where the judge holds absolute power, there is no stare decisis, and
laws allow circumstantial evidence to be used in deciding a case
"under the rubric of `the judge's reasoning."
Stephens has been witness to Judge Sabet practicing this sort of
“law” in the court room.
In Judge Sabet’s biography, written in February 2006 she had
served on the county bench for 12 years, and prior to that served in
the San Bernardino County District Attorneys’ Office. From
January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011 it is estimated that Judge
Sabet received approximately more than $300,000 in payments from San
Bernardino County.
Judge Sabat has never disclosed any of these county payments to
those appearing before her. Stephens is putting her on official
notice that she is reporting Judge Sabet to The Fair Political
Practices Commission for violating the Political Reform Act's
requirement that she disclose this County income on her Form 700, Her
actions were improper. There is a criminal doctrine of law that if you
receive money you are not entitled to, and you keep it -- that is
considered theft.
C. JUDICIAL RACETEERING
We have Judge Sabet along with a group of members of the judiciary
that have effectively engaged in what is called a RICO scheme which is
a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act scheme. And the basis of
the scheme is that you have the illegal payments. You have them taking
place time and time again. You have the judges obstructing justice.
That is a RICO scheme.
The entire judiciary system in California is susceptible to this
scheme and the 38 million people of California are victims of this
scheme.
Ninety percent of the judges in California received illegal
payments and that goes all the way up to five out of the seven
California Supreme Court justices received those illegal payments. So
the system is rife with obstruction.
When a judge is receiving payments from the county and one of
the parties appearing before him is represented by the county the
judge MUST disclose these payments to everybody in the courtroom.
It became an extrinsic fraud when Judge Sabet did not disclose
the payments she received
from the county and it prevented Stephens from getting due process
and a fair trial and that’s
extrinsic fraud and actually deprives the court of jurisdiction. And
when there is no jurisdiction
anything that Judge Sabet did in this case is void.
Judge Sabet, and all judges has a responsibility under the Code
of Judicial Ethics Rule 3E, 3E 1 and 2. to disclose these payments.
The responsibility existed to not even accept the payments under the
Code of Judicial Ethics 4D 1. And the responsibility exists for the
judges to tell other judges about these illegal payments and that is
under the federal statute the misprision of felony, 18 U.S.C. Section
4 which makes it a federal crime for someone who knows of a crime
being committed to not tell a judge about such crime; that is a
federal crime.
And state court judges are bound to follow federal law and that’s
under Article 6 Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
The United States – U.S. Attorney or Attorney General, Eric
Himpton Holder can prosecute
these people;
Judge Sabet ought to be in jail.
D. U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES MANDATE THAT THE ORDER VOIDING
AND ANULLING ALL ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BE ENTERED BASED
ON FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
The U.S. Supreme Court, which the Superior Court is bound to
follow, stated in U.S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878):
“There is no question of the general doctrine that
fraud vitiates
the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.”
The Court continued at page 66:
“Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally
with a contract . . .”
(citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499).
The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920):
“Courts are constituted by authority, and they
cannot [act] beyond the
power delegated to them. If they act beyond
that authority, and
certainly in contravention of it, their
judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable,
but simply void, and this
even prior to reversal.” Elliott v. Lessee of
Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
328, 340; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Austin v. Smith,
312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962), in
light of F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5), held:
“…if the underlying judgment is void, the
judgment based upon it is also
void. “
“When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they
are a trespasser of the law,
the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and
the judges orders are void,
of no legal force or effect.” The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated
that, "when a state officer
acts under a state law in a manner violative of
the Federal Constitution, he
comes into conflict with the superior authority
of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct.
The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States."
[Emphasis supplied in original].
Judge Shaela S. Sabet no longer has immunity from a lawsuit against her.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is undeniable proof that Judge Sabet violated her
responsibility to give due process and a fair trial to Stephens, and
in making judgments she had no authority to make the judgments and
orders that caused Stephens a great deal of hurt and harm. Stephens
has standing to disqualify her, and to have all of her judgments
dismissed as void.
This obstruction of justice must not be allowed to continue.
It has already destroyed
the integrity of the California judicial system. Unless it is
stopped now, it will destroy what little
remains of the California judicial system. A report from the
Administrative Office of the Courts
shows that 90% of the judges receive County payments. Unlawfully
incarcerating people such as Stephens and others has resulted in
arousing the anger of many. Calls for prosecution of the judges and
the supervisors have begun and will not stop until this problem is
resolved and the judicial system is reformed.
It is time for the Superior Court to obey the law and void and
annul all the orders and
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
760.835.8210
Pro per
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
8303 North Haven Avenue
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
CASE NO.: MWV 903720
NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION TO VOID
and ANNUL ALL ORDERS and JUDGMENTS
INCLUDING ANY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
MADE BY JUDGE SHELA S. SABET;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
DECLARATION OF SHARON STEPHENS
CCP 473(d)
TIME: 8:30 AM
DATE: September 23, 2011
DEPT 7
_______________________________/
TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 23, 2011, at 8:30 a.m. in the department 7, in the above Court located at 8303 North Haven Avenue, Rancho Cucamonga, California, 91730, Sharon Stephens (hereinafter “Stephens”) Petitioner and Defendant in this case will move and hereby moves for an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments, including any contempt charges.
Stephens has already argued that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter any order or judgment in this case including the contempt proceedings therefore making them void. Judge Sabet ignored that, and all arguments of Stephens, therefore Stephens does not now waive anyclaim that Judge Sabet did not have subject matter jurisdiction but adds Judge Sabet committed fraud on the court by sitting on the case at all.
San Bernardino County and its attorneys committed the first fraud upon the court by not disclosing that San Bernardino County was making payments payment to Judge Sabet. Judge Sabet joined in this fraud upon
the court by not disclosing such in violation of Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2). She further violated Canon 3E(1) and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A) (iii) by not disqualifying herself. She also violated Canon 4D(1) by accepting San Bernardino County payments.
During her tenure as a San Bernardino judge from January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011it is estimated that Judge Sabet received approximately $300,000 in payments from San Bernardino County.(EXHIBIT A)
The San Bernardino County payments to judges were held to violate Article VI, section 19, of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08. They were recognized as criminal in California Senate Bill SBx2-11, which gave retroactive immunity to “governmental entity and officers and employees of a governmental entity” including judges from criminal prosecution, civil liability, and disciplinary action for receiving “judicial benefits” effective 5/21/09.
The retroactive immunity did not extend to “fraud on the court” or the obstruction of justice of not disclosing the payments. Nor does it extend to judges presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party before the judges. After 5/21/09, no immunity existed for the payments.
The second fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet, and the San Bernardino County Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu conspired with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, ignored the law of CCP 527.8 and unlawfully incarcerated Stephens in West Valley Detention Center on a void on the face Temporary Restraining Order, and ignored mandated Criminal Charging Affidavits against Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck leaving them free of any charge of misconduct.
The third fraud on the court occurred when Judge Sabet and San Bernardino County District Attorney, in conspiracy with Attorney Linda Hollenbeck prosecuted Stephens on a void on the face contempt order, and unlawfully incarcerated her in West Valley Detention Center. U.S. Supreme Court precedents hold that fraud upon the court vitiates the case; that all orders and judgments are regarded as nullities and void. SEE: U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61,64,66(1878); Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. (1920))
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Moving Party Stephens Petitioner and former Defendant in this case seeks an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments in this case, and all contempt proceedings.
II. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY PAYMENTS TO STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY
As stated in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles 167Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08, Counties began making payments to State Superior Court judges in the late 1980s. The Sturgeon case held that these payments violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution.
A letter from Roger M. Whitby written November 10, 1988 was produced in the appellate phase of the Sturgeon case.
Such letter showed that (1) only the State Legislature could “prescribe” the “compensation” of judges, under Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution; (2) “compensation” encompassed fringe benefits, according to two California Attorney General opinions; (3) the Legislature’s duty was not delegable to any other body, according to California case law; (4) Superior Court judges are State Constitutional Officers; and (5) The Board of Supervisors has claimed to have found that in order to attract and retain qualified judges to serve in this County it is necessary
and appropriate to provide them with benefits and a flexible benefit plan contribution – in addition to their State salary, State benefits, and State retirement. It appears the sole purpose of these payments was only be to influence the judges to rule in favor of San Bernardino County, which was often a party before the judges accepting
the money.
Code of Ethics Canon 4(D)(1) prohibits judges from entering into
financial dealings that:
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the
judge’s judicial position, or
(b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or
continuing business relationships with…persons likely to appear
before the court in which the judge serves.
CCP 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) mandated such judges disqualification.
Such Section states:
A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:
[ ] A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that
the judge would be able to be impartial.
Canon 3E(2) requires a judge to: disclose on the record information that
is reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, even if the judge believes there
is no actual basis for disqualification.
Canon 3E(1) requires the judge to “disqualify”
himself or herself in any
proceeding in which disqualification is required by law.
Any judge who received any San Bernardino County benefits was bound to disclose such and disqualify him or her self.
If the judge does not disclose and disqualify themselves they can be facing bribery charges.
After the Sturgeon decision, the legislature enacted Senate BillSBx2-11which recognized that the County payments to judges were criminal. Senate Bill SBx2-11 gave retroactive immunity, effective 5/21/09, from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to a “governmental entity, officer, or employee of a governmental entity.” The retroactive immunity did not extend to the judge’s actions presiding over cases in which the county who paid them was a party. Nor, did it extend to county payments received after 5/21/09.
At all times, judges who accepted “bribes” from an interested party were biased. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Levine v. United States 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960) citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).
Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.
Further, the judge receiving the payment may be prosecuted for violating the intangible right to honest services under Federal Law 18 U.S.C. section 1346. The U.S. Supreme Court held under Skilling v.United States 561 (Decided 6/24/2010), Slip Options pages 48-49, that section 1346, encompasses bribery and kickbacks.
III. THE FRAUDS UPON THE COURT
A. For more than a year the San Bernardino County Office of
District Attorney and the court, particularly Judge Sabet has
persecuted Stephens on a void on the face restraining order. Stephens
has been in and out of false arrests and unlawful incarcerations, and
has been drug back and forth to court like a rag doll, all the while
being homeless and living in her car because of a retaliatory eviction
by Logan Property Management Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck, essentially
for complaining about lack of fire safety and criminal behavior on her
senior apartment complex.
When Stephens fought the bogus eviction, Attorney Hollenbeck
filed two sham Workplace Violence Restraining Orders, CCP 527.8. One
was promptly and properly dismissed for not meeting the required
statutory or case law to issue the order. The second slipped by and
went into court where it was challenged as void in a 402 Hearing.
Judge Sabet sat through the entire 402 Hearing brought to
challenge this void on the face.
Workplace Violence Restraining Order under CCP 527.8, after admitting,
at the start to “not
knowing the law of void judgments.” There were “complex legal issues;”
she ought to have
recused herself right there, or, taken the time to research the law.
Instead she went on to retry
the case which openly violated legal procedure of deciding a void
judgment challenge. From the
beginning the TRO was void on the face for not meeting the criteria
for violence. A TRO is also
void after 14 days.
"It is well settled that a judgment or order which
is void on its face, and which
requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll
or record to show its invalidity,
may be set aside on motion, at any time after its
entry, by the court which
rendered the judgment or made the order. Other
Courts my also may do the
same. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord
Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983)
140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761
Judge Sabet exceeded her jurisdiction, and therefore committed
fraud upon the court. At the
end of several hours of false, subrogated perjured testimony she then
asked the attorneys to
present points and authorities so she could decide the case. They had none!
Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals
to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or
attempts to, defile the court
itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of
the court [Judges are officers of
the court] so that the judicial machinery can not
perform in the usual manner
its impartial task of adjudging cases that are
presented for adjudication."
Kennerv. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's
Federal Practice,2d ed.,
p. 512, 60.23.
The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced
by fraud upon the court
is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final."
The judgment is void.
On May 26, 2010 Judge Sabet had to dismiss this void on the
face restraining order because someone informed her case was void.
Then, in what can only be called a mean-spirited, retaliatory move she
ignored the law of CCP 527,8, and at the insistence of Deputy District
Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, and with a sneer on
her lips, gave an order to incarcerate Stephens, on the antecedent,
void on the face temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in the case, and
set Bail at $150,000 (Excessive Bail: Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. (1951)
the U.S. Supreme Court: A judge or justice may be censured for
"setting 'grossly excessive' bail and [thus] showing a 'severe
attitude' toward witnesses and litigants," as the Michigan Supreme
Court did to a trial judge recently: Debra Cassens Weiss, writes,
"Judge Censured for Excessive Bail, Severe Attitude", (ABA Journal,
February 8, 2008).
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have
[subject matter] jurisdiction to
act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of
treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 );
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
Any judge or attorney who does not report a judge for
treason as required
by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of
treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.
On January 11, 2011 Judge Sabet again unlawfully incarcerates
(“Stephens” ) for 50
days in West Valley Detention for having Attorney Linda Hollenbeck
served with a
Notice of Intent to sue, claiming it is a violation of the void on
the face probation that she
had set.
Such void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and
can legally be ignored
as they neither bind, nor bar anyone. "Obviously a
judgment, though final
and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject
to collateral attack
if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter or person,
and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is
obtained by extrinsic
fraud. [Citations.]" 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,
Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).
B. San Bernardino County and Its Attorneys’ Fraud Upon The Court
San Bernardino County nor its attorneys have never disclosed to
this day that San Bernardino County has made payments to Judge Sabet.
Judge Sabet is a native born Iranian who came to the United
States in 1970 because there was no room for her in the university
there. Judge Sabet feels becoming a judge may be related to genetic
predisposition. Her grandfather was a justice of the Iran Supreme
Court and two cousins also served as judges at a time when a codified
system of justice, was based on code rather than case law, [stare
decisis], an inquisitorial system, such as exists in France. The
judge serves not only as judge but as prosecutor, jury, and arbiter.
The Islamic legal system of Sharia (Islamic law) and Fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence) has always been an influence in the Iranian law system,
where the judge holds absolute power, there is no stare decisis, and
laws allow circumstantial evidence to be used in deciding a case
"under the rubric of `the judge's reasoning."
Stephens has been witness to Judge Sabet practicing this sort of
“law” in the court room.
In Judge Sabet’s biography, written in February 2006 she had
served on the county bench for 12 years, and prior to that served in
the San Bernardino County District Attorneys’ Office. From
January 11,1999 through April 11, 2011 it is estimated that Judge
Sabet received approximately more than $300,000 in payments from San
Bernardino County.
Judge Sabat has never disclosed any of these county payments to
those appearing before her. Stephens is putting her on official
notice that she is reporting Judge Sabet to The Fair Political
Practices Commission for violating the Political Reform Act's
requirement that she disclose this County income on her Form 700, Her
actions were improper. There is a criminal doctrine of law that if you
receive money you are not entitled to, and you keep it -- that is
considered theft.
C. JUDICIAL RACETEERING
We have Judge Sabet along with a group of members of the judiciary
that have effectively engaged in what is called a RICO scheme which is
a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act scheme. And the basis of
the scheme is that you have the illegal payments. You have them taking
place time and time again. You have the judges obstructing justice.
That is a RICO scheme.
The entire judiciary system in California is susceptible to this
scheme and the 38 million people of California are victims of this
scheme.
Ninety percent of the judges in California received illegal
payments and that goes all the way up to five out of the seven
California Supreme Court justices received those illegal payments. So
the system is rife with obstruction.
When a judge is receiving payments from the county and one of
the parties appearing before him is represented by the county the
judge MUST disclose these payments to everybody in the courtroom.
It became an extrinsic fraud when Judge Sabet did not disclose
the payments she received
from the county and it prevented Stephens from getting due process
and a fair trial and that’s
extrinsic fraud and actually deprives the court of jurisdiction. And
when there is no jurisdiction
anything that Judge Sabet did in this case is void.
Judge Sabet, and all judges has a responsibility under the Code
of Judicial Ethics Rule 3E, 3E 1 and 2. to disclose these payments.
The responsibility existed to not even accept the payments under the
Code of Judicial Ethics 4D 1. And the responsibility exists for the
judges to tell other judges about these illegal payments and that is
under the federal statute the misprision of felony, 18 U.S.C. Section
4 which makes it a federal crime for someone who knows of a crime
being committed to not tell a judge about such crime; that is a
federal crime.
And state court judges are bound to follow federal law and that’s
under Article 6 Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
The United States – U.S. Attorney or Attorney General, Eric
Himpton Holder can prosecute
these people;
Judge Sabet ought to be in jail.
D. U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES MANDATE THAT THE ORDER VOIDING
AND ANULLING ALL ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BE ENTERED BASED
ON FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
The U.S. Supreme Court, which the Superior Court is bound to
follow, stated in U.S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878):
“There is no question of the general doctrine that
fraud vitiates
the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.”
The Court continued at page 66:
“Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally
with a contract . . .”
(citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499).
The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920):
“Courts are constituted by authority, and they
cannot [act] beyond the
power delegated to them. If they act beyond
that authority, and
certainly in contravention of it, their
judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable,
but simply void, and this
even prior to reversal.” Elliott v. Lessee of
Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
328, 340; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Austin v. Smith,
312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962), in
light of F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5), held:
“…if the underlying judgment is void, the
judgment based upon it is also
void. “
“When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they
are a trespasser of the law,
the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and
the judges orders are void,
of no legal force or effect.” The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated
that, "when a state officer
acts under a state law in a manner violative of
the Federal Constitution, he
comes into conflict with the superior authority
of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct.
The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States."
[Emphasis supplied in original].
Judge Shaela S. Sabet no longer has immunity from a lawsuit against her.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is undeniable proof that Judge Sabet violated her
responsibility to give due process and a fair trial to Stephens, and
in making judgments she had no authority to make the judgments and
orders that caused Stephens a great deal of hurt and harm. Stephens
has standing to disqualify her, and to have all of her judgments
dismissed as void.
This obstruction of justice must not be allowed to continue.
It has already destroyed
the integrity of the California judicial system. Unless it is
stopped now, it will destroy what little
remains of the California judicial system. A report from the
Administrative Office of the Courts
shows that 90% of the judges receive County payments. Unlawfully
incarcerating people such as Stephens and others has resulted in
arousing the anger of many. Calls for prosecution of the judges and
the supervisors have begun and will not stop until this problem is
resolved and the judicial system is reformed.
It is time for the Superior Court to obey the law and void and
annul all the orders and
judgments in the case and in all contempt proceeding.
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