Part 3: JUDGMENT IS VOID WHEN COURT EXCEEDS ITS JURISDICTION

...COURT EXCEEDS ITS JURISDICTION

     "A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).).
      Judge Bjork did not follow prescribed procedure, and exceeded his jurisdiction to issue an excessive bail on the Defendant, on an unproven misdemeanor. Nor did he have the jurisdiction to incarcerate the Defendant, on a void order and, without due process to be heard; she was not even informed in this court  of her “crime.”     The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)          "A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, supra,  453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).).
    “ A judgment is void on its face if the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties.” (Summers v. Superior Court (1959), supra, ; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) supra, ) Thus, the fact that a judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation does not insulate the judgment from attack on the ground that it is void. In People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan (1947) 81 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21-22 [183 P.2d 368] 
                                          To Ascertain The Truth

A Judge Must Allow for Due Process

  

   If the Defendant had of been allowed due process to be heard on June 9, 2007, she would have brought to the attention of the court that she was lawfully in court to have a void restraining order validated -- when she was unlawfully seized --  that restraining orders were provably already void for lack of due process -- and she could not be charged, or punished with violation of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147     Investigator Twiss and Judge Bjork were guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud on the court, elder abuse, denial of due process, and malice in the their actions against the Defendant.

      A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and, is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal. ( e.g. a future preliminary hearing where more charges were filed against the Defendant.)

     “Even the most rudimentary of due process procedures gives the opportunity to be heard . . . to anyone directly affected by [an] official’s action.” ( Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1108. . 

      The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.      
     Judge Bjork refused to hear what the Defendant had to say.

     “Defendants who  have been treated with unfairness, bias and the appearance of prejudice by this Court ,and the opposing counsel, leaves open the question of how an

uninterested, lay person, would question the partiality and neutrality of this Court.“…our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
      This court had a duty to ensure fairness. This Court failed, or refused to ensure that fairness. Marshall v. Jerrico, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 446 U.S. 238

    “ Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp., 892 (D.S.C. 1985).        Where Due Process is denied, the case is void , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill. 25 (1936)

FRAUD ON THE COURT!

"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court [JUDGES ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT)] so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, 60.23.
     The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." THE JUDGMENT IS VOID!

                             CONSEQUENCES FOR A JUDGE NOT FOLLOWING THE LAW

      "When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his

person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."

[Emphasis supplied in original]. Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, they are warring on the constitution, i.e., the judge is engaged in

an act or acts of treason. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 ); Cohens v. Virgina 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1921.   See: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,78 S.Ct. (1401 1958.       Therefore, without authority or jurisdiction, a judge loses absolute immunity and is subject to a law suit. (See: DEMAND LETTER, [Exhibit 2])

 

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

There needed to be experienced counsel from both sides and given the opportunity to discuss with a judicial officer the just resolution of the Defendant’s case. The truth of these void orders then would have been brought to light. The orders against her were easily proven void, and she could have easily helped to prepare a defense to prove that. . Instead, she was denied that ability, and suffered infliction of punishment prior to conviction. No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147 (order in excess of jurisdiction).
      MOST of the false, perjured accusations brought against the Defendant by the District Attorney were never prosecuted – they could not make their case.
     Too often a person is jailed without any true investigation, even though ALL attorneys are held to the duty of “due diligence” All attorneys are held to the duty of “due diligence”   Butler v State Bar (1986) 42 Cal3rd 323 (329) -- Paul Oil Company  v- Fed. Mutual Insurance (1998) 154 Fed 3rd 1049, “

     DUE DILIGENCE and FRIVOLOUS CASES:

     Rules of Professional Conduct - 3-200 Prohibitive Objectives -- Rules of Professional Conduct - 5-200 --  Business and Profession Code Section 6068 - Attorney's Duty to Investigate Case -- Butler v State Bar (1986) 42 Cal3rd 323 (329) -- Paul Oil Company  v- Fed. Mutual Insurance (1998) 154 Fed 3rd 1049

    The Defendant was stigmatized simply by being charged, and then not being able to testify or defend herself in the kangaroo-court  setting such as what happened with Judge
Bjork, then again at the Preliminary Hearing, and then again with Judge Douglas only added to the impression that her silence was an indicator of guilt. Presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt were totally ignored in these court room settings. Interestingly, the court has held that it violates due process to use a defendant's silence against him, yet that is exactly what happens in this unjust process. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)

AN UNETHICAL AND OVERZEALOUS DISTRICT ATTORNEY

     Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
     An unethical, overzealous District Attorney is the most powerful and dangerous person in the court room. S/he can make, break or ruin a person's life.
     At the Preliminary Hearing, Deputy District Attorney Kristi Elise Belcher allowed her witnesses to provably commit Suborned Perjury.  Attorney Belcher absolutely heard them over and over contradict their own police reports, and KNEW Jose Liceaga in particular was perjuring himself, as on the Cathedral City Police Report 0507-3482  recorded in this case, where his own witness, Roger Abernathy, confirmed Liceaga was lying. Of course she never called this witness, even though she had the police report documented in this case. This is fraud on the court.     Deputy District Attorney Kristi Elise Belcher was sent a thirty page document, which is documented in this case, from The Cathedral City Police Department that “closed” the case against the Defendant.  Attorney Beltcher suppressed that report, and never submitted it in Discovery to the Public Defender’s Office. This again is Fraud On The Court. Deputy District Attorney, Kristi Elise Belcher used legal process for fraudulent purposes such as attempting to enforce a judgment on a fictitious claim. 1 AM J2d Abuse PSS 9-12.        However, “The role of the prosecutor differs significantly from that of others who practice law, including criminal defense lawyers: A Prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state ... the prosecutor represents 'sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done' Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78,88 (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal 4th 800, 8.
     Prosecutors have a special obligation to promote justice and the ascertainment of truth. ... The duty of the district attorney is not merely that of an advocate. His duty is not to obtain convictions, but to fully and fairly present... the evidence..." People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1378
     The truth and evidence was there for the District Attorney to ascertain, but the District Attorney' was so anxious to win, at all costs, that they ignored the Defendant’s right to a fair trial, and never did the required investigation of the cases they were prosecuting her for. (SEE: Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1, cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 1998) “… competent handling of a particular matter involves inquiry into analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”
     There was never anything fair about the case the District Attorney was building against the Defendant. As an officer of the court, the prosecutor has a heavy responsibility to the court and to the defendant to conduct a fair trial. (United States v. Escalante (9th Cir. 1980) 637 F.2d 1197, 1203.) “The prosecutor's job isn't just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules.” (United States v. Kojayan (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1315, 1323).     An attorney's professional responsibilities, whether prosecutor, or defense are set forth in, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 2668; People v. Pope(1979) 23 Cal.3d 412; as In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal 4th 924.     No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; seeIn re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147; County of Ventura v. Tillett, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110.

The Court Has A Responsibility
To Correct a Void Judgment

        The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, p. 569; Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648].) This rule holds as to all void judgments. In the other two cases cited, People v. Massengale and In re Sandel, the courts confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct void judgments.

NO ONE CAN PLEAD GUILTY TO A CRIME
THAT IS NOT A CRIME

     The Defendant did plead guilty after a year of incarceration, in solitary confinement, and a few weeks in Patton State Hospital, and, knowing she would not be adequately defended by her public defenders due “bad lawyering.” However, the Defendant had not committed any crime, and it was a legally impossible admission to be guilty of a crime she did not commit. “In this case we hold that since a trial court’s acceptance of a negotiated plea which patently includes a legally impossible admission it constitutes an act in excess of its jurisdiction.”  People v. Soriano, 4 Cal. App 4^th 781—1992.       “ We cannot affirm a conviction and sentence imposed for a crime that does not exist…”  (People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4^th 781,785 [ 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138])   
       “… where fundamental jurisdiction is lacking… it follows there is no crime, the court lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. This conclusion is compelled not only by the statutes and cases interpreting those statues, this conclusion comports with fundamental principles of justice. The notion that a person can be punished under the criminal law for committing an act that is not a crime is entirely outside our system of jurisprudence.” People v. Vasilyan 174 Cal. App. 4^th 443 – Cal Court of Appeals, 2^nd Dist. Div. 8, 2009.  See also, People v. Dlugas, one of the leading cases on legal impossibility, also known as People v. Jaffe Court of Appeals of New York, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906)     The Defendant could not plead guilty to the already void judgments from the time of her unlawful seizure, June 9, 2007, or to any cases filed piggy-back on those void judgment. All were void, and one cannot violate a void order.
     All proceedings founded on a void judgment are themselves regarded as void. A void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place… it is not entitled to enforcement. 30A Am Jur Judgments 43, 44, 45.  Henderson v. Henderson, 232 NC 380, 100 SE 2d 227.
     THEREFORE, no judgment could be filed against the Defendant, and all subsequent added judgments, including the sham, felony charges,  filed by the Riverside County District Attorney on this case are void, and, THEREFORE, on this point alone the Criminal Case against the Defendant needs to be validated as void, and dismissed as such, with an Award of Damages.
          Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
CONCLUSION

The Defendant is a Pro Per

     It is held that a pro-se pleading requires less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer. Puckett v. Cox 456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA). And, Justice Blackin in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)

     The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the

purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice." 
     “…a pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys”  SEE:  Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Haines v. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v.Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)           

     “A court faced with a motion to dismiss, a pro se complaint must read the complaint’s allegations expansively,” Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S.519, 520-21, S. Ct. 594, 596, 60 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1972) 
      “Court has a special obligation to construe pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally” Polling v. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).  
     “We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.” Tannenbaum v.United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)

     The California Rules express a preference for resolution of every case on the merits, even if resolution requires excusing inadvertence by a pro se litigant that would otherwise result in a dismissal. The Judicial Counsel justifies this position based on the idea that "Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing referee... A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the cleverest lawyer prevails regardless of the merits.” (John Greacen, Greacen Associates LLC, "Ethical Issues for Judges in Handling Cases with Self-Represented Litigants" <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Ethical/May_07_Ethical_Issues.ppt.>

     It suggests the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to insure a fair trial" and says "There is only one reported case in the U.S. finding a judge's specific accommodations have gone too far"

     As a matter of law, because from the beginning The District Attorney’s Office, Judge Bjork, and then all judges, and defense attorneys, through “bad lawyering” and a lack of  due diligence, makes this a frivolous case and a void on the face judgment,  which has violated the Defendant’s right to a fair trial, caused her great harm, pain and suffering, and has left her in a state of Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome to this day, this case needs to be dismissed as void.
    All that is required to determine the original void case, on which the District Attorney did unlawfully and falsely prosecute the Defendant,  is to simply review the judgment roll record in Trylson v Stephens INC057008 Riverside County Superior Court, Indio CA ), and Robbins v. Stephens, INC 040482 Riverside County Superior Court, Indio, CA. as is required to determine a void judgment.  People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., (2004) 33 Cal.4^th at p.661).  It is that simple.
     This void criminal case against the Defendant, must be dismissed on the record, her record expunged, and an Award for Damages in the minimum amount of $100 @ day, (about $40,500). The court is also asked to award the Defendant punitive damages of $500,00 dollars, for a false and malicious prosecution that caused her much harm, from which she still suffers, and, any other damages as the court sees fit.

                                                                           Respectfully Submitted.

October ___, 2010                                         _______________________

                                                                            Sharon Dale Stephens



VEXTIOUS LITIGANT DISMSSAL

SHARON STEPHENSPO Box 9475Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91701760.835.8210

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, INDIO COURT
 CASE NO.: INS072657

SHADOW CREST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION                          Plaintiffs
v.

SHARON STEPHENS                                         
  Defendant                                               

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS VOID VEXATIOUS LITIGANTJUDGMENT(Code of Civil Procedure section 473 & Code of Civil Procedure section 391)
________________  

Defendant, Sharon Stephens gives NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION to move this court to apply controlling law and recognize and declare as void the order making her a vexatious litigant on July 28, 2004. This motion relies upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, California statues and rules of court, federal laws and multiple constitutional protections, and related points and authorities, and Defendants Declaration. (The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment and may be challenged any time. Defendant is not filing “new “ litigation or “maintaining” litigation, but rather she is attempting to “undo” the results of unjust litigation that has been instituted against her, as to be justifiable as “any civil action encompassing civil trial…” McColm v. Westwood Park Association (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 1211,1219; Mahdavi v. Superior Court (228) 166 Cal.App. 4th 42.
On March 21, 1990 a letter was sent to the Office of Senator Milton Marks, from the Legislative Office of the Courts which declared: “We question whether a litigant should ever be required to post security if litigation has merit and is not filed for purposes of delay or harassment. Would such a requirement be constitutional?...” Of course not!In the same spirit, the Defendant does not need to ask permission to file a motion to dismiss a void judgment, when in effect there is no judgment at all. And, there is no contempt of court as no one can be punished for violation of a void order. A void order is of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)
No permission is needed to file in Small Claims Court. (CCP 391)
This finding of vexatious litigant against Defendant, Sharon Stephens is void on the face as it did not follow the law.
NO APPEAL IS NEEDED TO CHALLENGE A VOID ORDER. (CCP 473 and 473a)
The defendant asks that monetary damages be awarded to her.
FACTUAL HISTORY
As a disabled individual and indigent person the Defendant was forced into pro se litigation due to the State of California’s failure to protect her (42 U.S.C. 2101(b)(4).6) and her property.
In a short hearing of less than ten or fifteen minutes, what in essence is a snap judgment, with out any investigation of the evidence as to whether the charges against the Defendant have merit, and where no CONSTITUTIONAL Due Process is offered to the pro se to be heard in oral argument – a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment -- a judge may --[not must]—but may issue a finding, on an overly broad statue to declare a pro per a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure 391 (b)(4), and where they then are blacklisted with a lifelong stigma that destroys a person’s good name and reputation.
The judge therefore has discretion to make a finding, or not. However when a judge does not follow the law, they abuse their discretion. Abuse of Discretion occurs when a judge does not apply the correct law or if it bases its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of a material fact. Where a trial court must exercise discretion in deciding a question, it must do so in a way that is not clearly against logic and the evidence. An improvident exercise of discretion is an error of law and grounds for reversing a decision.
Abuse of Discretion = Abuse of Process [See Rappleyea v. Campbell below.]
A finding is not a judgment but the finding that the Defendant, a pro se litigant is a “vexatious litigant was given a res judicata force of a judgment and made applicable to all future actions without benefit of a Due Process hearing for filing four constitutionally protected restraining orders, and one injunction, on the advise of a Cathedral City Police Sergeant, for her own protection against verbal and physical attacks on her person.
As a homeowner in Shadow Crest Homeowner’s Association, Inc., the Defendant discovered the Board of Directors: President, Kent Robbins, Vice President, Jim Hooten, Treasure, Jose Liceaga, and Secretary, Jill Reed, along with Member at Large, John Weiser, along with the Association Attorney, Brian Moreno were misusing Reserve Funds, and abusing the CC&Rs to collect fines and harass certain home owners. The Defendant had filed for an injunction to stop the board from using invalid restraining orders, but was stopped with a demurrer for which she was charged an unconscionable fee of $20,000.
The Defendant was warned by board member they would get restraining orders to keep her out of meetings. Such an action is unlawful. The first one was filed by Secretary, Jill Reed, using CCP 527.6 (with no grounds or the proper statutory criteria), then by President, Kent Robbins, Jim Hooten, John Weiser, and Jose Laceiga. The commissioners and judges ignored the law and granted all of their restraining orders without meeting the statutory criteria and all therefore are void on the face and open to challenge. The Defendant has police reports of the abuses of the board members.
Thus began an ongoing intense period of harassment, slander and physical abuse of the Defendant. C.C.P.D. Sergeant, Laura Hanlon advised her to file for restraining orders. The board members responded with requests for restraining orders, not meetin statutory criteria. In court they would all show up and act as witnesses for each other, even when John Weiser hit the Defendant with his car while she was on foot, he was given a restraining order against her claiming trespassing. There was no proof of a Penal Code 602 trespass! The Association Attorney, Brian Moreno did participated to bring these orders, and then they all supported each other in this conspiracy to bring this vexatious litigant motion against the Defendant to avoid giving her access to the Association Books and Records. In fact, the motion was Fraud on the Court to keep her from presenting her case.
These void restraining orders were then used, with provable perjury and false accusations to have the Defendant falsely imprisoned for a year. This is being challenged in court now. TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE PLAINTIFF’S VOID CRIMINAL JUDGMENT, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, REQUEST FOR DAMAGES, CASE NO. INF 054715, Riverside County Superior Court, Indio CA.
The person falsely imprisoned may sue the offender for damages. Once the plaintiff has proven the elements of the tort, the defendant has the burden to establish that the detention or arrest was legally justified. See Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 982 (Cal.'79).
CONSEQUENCES OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT OF ANY ELDERLY PERSON: California Penal Code § 368.(f) Crimes against elder or dependent adults; Any person who commits the false imprisonment of an elder or a dependent adult by the use of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.
When the Defendant was unlawfully refused access to the Shadow Crest Association Books and Records she filed a case in Small Claims Court to gain access to them and was hit in court with a Motion, without Notice, to find her a Vexatious Litigant for filing the Injunction for abuse of CC&Rs, and the four restraining orders against board members for harassment, abuse, and battery.
Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc., Board President, Kent Robbins presented the Motion in court to find the Defendant a Vexatious Litigant.
Defendant’s case was not heard in court that day, and, in fact was never heard at all. Therefore she was never able to access the books and records, which of course was the intent of the attorney and the board members with their filing of the Motion to make her a vexatious litigant. The court quickly [about fifteen minutes] made the order finding the defendant a vexatious litigant, and never allowed her Due Process to be heard, i.e., to defend herself. In so doing The Court aided in the abusive and unlawful behavior of Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. board members and their attorney, Brian Moreno against the Defendant.
NO ONE can violate a void order, and NO ORDER, such as this finding of vexatious litigant may be attached onto a void order. The Defendant is about to challenge the criminal case, and the void restraining orders of the board members in court; all will be meritorious.
The Defendant has NEVER filed numerous and unmeritorious cases as she was dishonestly, and unethically charged with by the current Association Attorney, Margaret G. Wrangler, in her “OPPOSITION TO [Defendant’s] APPEAL, (October 20, 2005)” in this case.
And, Attorney Wangler needs to understand, Void judgments "never die" in the State of California, and may be challenged anytime even if a case has been dismissed.
It is stunning how many judges, commissioners, District Attorneys, Public Defenders, defense attorneys, and, association attorneys do not know the law of void judgments.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
California’s vexatious litigant law dates back to the early 1960’s when the appellate court in Stafford v. Russell (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 719, 722 suggested the study of vexatious litigation and the unreasonable burdens it places upon the courts. In response, the Legislature enacted sections 391 through 391.6 (Stats. 1963, ch. 1471, § 1, p. 3088) to address problems “created by the persistent and obsessive litigant, appearing in propria persona, who has constantly pending a number of groundless actions.” (Committee on Administration of Justice, Report, (1963) 38 Cal. State Bar J. 485, 489; Rawles, The California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access? (1998) 72 S.Cal. L.Rev. 275, 284-285.)
Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth; not just playing referee...
What is a Vexatious Litigant and what the Vexatious Litigant Law
MUST a judge follow to make A Finding of Vexatious Litigant?
CCP 391 through 391.6 (3) To address problems “created by the persistent and obsessive litigant, appearing in propria persona, who has constantly pending a number of groundless actions.” In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."
There was no evidence presented that the Defendant did any of the above. Therewere no groundless actions, no unmeritorious motions, pleading or other papers…or any tactics that were frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
The Defendant, in order to protect herself from vicious verbal and physical attacks had filed for four [4] restraining orders on the advice of a police officer -- that is the constitutionally protected expected course of action for self-protection -- and one [1] Injunction to Stop the Unlawful Misuse of CC&Rs (Covenants, Codes and Rules) by the Shadow Crest Homeowners Board of Directors that were being used to abuse certain homeowners.
Restraining Orders are “Constitutionally protected activity, just as the making of police reports, or complaints of any type and are excluded from the meaning of ‘course of conduct ‘ [re: harassment].” Schraer v. Berkley Property Owners Ass'n, 207 Cal. App. 3d 719.
The court did not follow the statutory criteria in entering a required statutory finding of vexatious litigant, and did not allow the defendant Due Process to be heard.
The court had a duty to ensure fairness. This Court failed, or refused to ensure fairness and then worked to see that the case against Sharon Stephens went forward, without lawful notice and without hearing from Defendant, i.e., with no Due Process. Marshall v. Jerrico, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 446 U.S. 238
JUDGE MUST FOLLOW THE LAW
When a judge does not follow the law they are a trespasser of the law and loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct.1683, 1687 (1974)
"There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215.
"The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416
“Lack of Jurisdiction cannot be corrected by an order nunc pro tunc. The only proper office of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct a mistake in the records; it cannot be used to rewrite history.” Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 975 F. 2d 321 325-26 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Daniels 902 F. 2d 1238 , 1240, (7th Cir. 1990); King v. Ionization Int'l, Inc., 825 F.2d 1180, 1188, (7th Cir. 1987); and Central Laborer's Pension and Annuity Funds v. Griffee, 198 F.3d 642, 644, (7th Cir. 1999)
CONSEQUENCES FOR A JUDGE NOT FOLLOWING THE LAW

"When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
[Emphasis supplied in original]. Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, they are warring on the constitution, i.e., the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 ); Cohens v. Virgina 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1921. See: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,78 S.Ct. (1401 1958.

Therefore, without authority or jurisdiction, a judge loses absolute immunity and is subject to a law suit for at very least abuse of process.

When a statute authorizes a prescribed procedure and the court acts contrary to the authority conferred, the court exceeds its jurisdiction. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., (2004), 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.)

"A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).).
To Ascertain The Truth, A Judge Must Allow for Due Process

Due Process: A course of legal proceedings according to those Principles and Rules which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence, for the enforcement and protection of Private Rights: The essential elements are (1) NOTICE (2) OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD (3) and to DEFEND in an orderly proceeding adapted to the Nature of the case and Cause of the action, and, requires that every man have the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Where RIGHTS are concerned there can be no rule making which would abrogate them. U.S. V. Miller, supra, 449 U.S. 200
“Due process is best defined in one word — fairness! When a person is treated unfairly by the government, including the courts, they are said to have been deprived of or denied due process.” (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),

Violation of due process, (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct.
There was no Constitutional Due Process allowed to the defendant. She was not given notice, and not heard, i.e., allowed to offer oral testimony, or to give evidence to defend her self for the filing of the injunction or restraining orders, which she had filed with merit. Rather the judge made a finding without ascertaining the truth. “A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. [But] the validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also Restatements, Judgments ' 4(b) Prather v Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910.

It is a fundamental doctrine of law that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

If the defendant had of been allowed due process to be heard, she would have brought to the attention of the court that the restraining orders she filed were provably for her own protection, advised by the police, and had merit. The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and, is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.THEREFORE: This void finding of Vexatious Litigant cannot be used to stop the Defendant from filing in any other court case.

“Even the most rudimentary of due process procedures gives the opportunity to be heard . . . to anyone directly affected by [an] official’s action.” ( Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1108. .

Thus under the fundamental requirements of due process before a court enters a defendant’s default in a lawsuit which may result in a judgment depriving the defendant of liberty or property “[a] defendant is entitled to opportunity to be heard upon the allegations of the complaint on which judgment is sought against him.” (Thompson v. Cook (1942) 20 Cal.2d 564, 568
Where Due Process is denied, the case is void , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill. 25 (1936)
“Defendants who have been treated with unfairness, bias and the appearance of prejudice by this Court ,and the opposing counsel leaves open the question of how an uninterested, lay person, would question the partiality and neutrality of this Court.“…our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
IF the defendant had of been allowed Due Process to be heard: She would have made the court aware that the Motion To Find her a Vexatious Litigant was actually just a retaliatory and conspiratorial ploy between the Association Attorney, Brian Moreno, an officer of the court, who wrote the motion, and the board members to keep her case from being heard, because it would have allowed her access to the Association Books and Records, and proof that there was at the very least misuse of Reserve Funds, and more than likely embezzlement by the attorney and board.
This Motion to find the Defendant a Vexatious Litigant was in fact Abuse of Process: Use of legal process in a wrongful manner with an ulterior motive. (Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 824 [266 Cal.Rptr. 360].)
The Motion was also FRAUD ON THE COURT!"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court [judges and attorneys] so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
As with the many, retaliatory restraining order abuses, motions to request an opposing pro per be found a vexatious litigant is too often a conspiratorial ploy used by unethical attorneys, and their clients to avoid the penalties and consequences of a pending case, and, the court turns a blind eye to justice.
NO APPEAL NEEDED TO CHALLENGE VOID JUDGMENT:
Void judgments "never die" in the State of California:
CCP 473 and 473a: Because the order of dismissal was void, it can be set aside at any time after its entry, and the six-month time limitation in section CCP 473 for relief from improper orders, is not applicable here. Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194
Motions to vacate void judgments may be made at any time after judgment. County of Ventura v. Tillett, supra, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110.
An APPEAL will NOT prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree -- a void order. MacMillan Petroleum Corp. v. Griffin (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 523, 533 [222 P.2d 69]; accord: People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467 [89 Cal. Rptr. 290]; Svistunoff v.Svistunoff (1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P.2d 650]; and see: 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 7, pp. 4024-4025.)
CCP Section 473 permits a trial court, on noticed motion, to set aside void judgments and orders. Other Courts also possess inherent power to grant such relief. Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.
It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry…. Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761
The Law Favors Resolution of Cases On Their Merits
And because it does, if any doubts arise about whether Code of Civil Procedure section 473 relief should be granted – “ [Void Judgments] must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [Citations]. Therefore, a trial court denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits. [Citations.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 (Rappleyea).)
It is interesting that Justice Mosk began Rappleyea with a succinct statement of the question before the Supreme Court, and its answer: The question is whether a default must be set aside and a default judgment reversed on the ground of abuse of discretion. We conclude that they must be. Rappleyea v. Campbell(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 The question before us is the same. And so is our answer. (8 Cal.4th at p. 978)

Void Judgments Lack Jurisdiction
AND CAN BE LEGALLY IGNOREDThey Neither Bind, Nor Bar Anyone:

Oviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Judgment, 286, p. 828.)

No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 14

The Court Has A Responsibility To Correct a Void Judgment:
The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, p. 569; Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648].)
This rule holds as to all void judgments. In the other two cases cited, People v. Massengale and In re Sandel, the courts confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct void judgments.
STANDARD OF PROOF TO LIFT FINDING OF VEXATOIUS LITIGANT?
A Change in Facts or Circumstances
It has been indicated that a person might have a vexatious litigant status lifted if they can meet the same standard of proof as someone seeking to lift an injunction. “At a minimum to cast off the vexatious litigant label the court would find a change in facts or circumstances relating to the original determination.” PBA ,LLC v. KPOD, LTD (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 965 A void judgment lifts an injunction. PROOF ENOUGH!
The Defendant is a Pro Per
“…a pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys” SEE: Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v.Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)
“A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint must read the complaint’s allegations expansively,” Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S.519, 520-21, S. Ct. 594, 596, 60 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1972) “Court has a special obligation to construe pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally” Polling v. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000). “We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.” Tannenbaum v.United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Defendant, Sharon Stephens is not a vexatious litigant. She has never filed any cases that are without merit, nor does she intend to do so in the future.
The California Rules express a preference for resolution of every case on the merits, even if resolution requires excusing inadvertence by a pro se litigant that would otherwise result in a dismissal. The Judicial Counsel justifies this position based on the idea that "Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing referee... A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the cleverest lawyer prevails regardless of the merits. "Ethical Issues for Judges in Handling Cases with Self-Represented Litigants" John Greacen, Greacen Associates LLC. [http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Ethical/May_07_Ethical_Issues.ppt.]
It suggests "the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to insure a fair trial" and says, "There is only one reported case in the U.S. finding a judge's specific accommodations have gone too far"
DEFENDANT’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
The Defendant, Sharon Stephens has suffered much harm as the result of acts of Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc and their agents. She has been damaged financially, socially, and emotionally, and horribly embarrassed and even with shunning by neighbors, family and friends. Additionally, she has been deprived of her right to defend herself, or being suit in court against an unlawful, retaliatory eviction and retaliatory, void restraining orders in San Bernardino County, where she was again unlawfully incarcerated.
The Plaintiff’s, Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. have no damages. Any time and/or money they claim as a loss is because of their own unlawful, vindictive and retaliatory behavior in this case, and related cases, that resulted only in the abuse of the Defendant.
The Defendant asks the court to award the Defendant General Damages of $7,500 [The Maxim allowed in Small Claims Court] for monies lost due to this false accusation of vexatious litigant by the perpetrators, Shadow Crest Homeowners Association, Inc., board members who did so, with the help of Association Attorney, Brian Moreno and supported now by, Association Attorney, Margaret G. Wangler. ALL participated, and continue to participate in keeping alive this unlawful, unjust and unethical false motion, to find her a vexatious litigant, which at the very least is abuse of process , elder abuse, and intentional infliction of emotional abuse. In doing these acts herein alleged; Plaintiffs, and each of them, acted with oppression, conspiracy, and malice, and DID INJURE THE DEFENDANT, therefore Defendant is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages and she requests $50,000 for the harm she has suffered, and, for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper, including costs as provided in CCP §998, CCP §1032 and related provisions of law.
THEREFORE: Defendant, Sharon Stephens requests the court to dismiss The Finding of Vexatious Litigant, notify the Judicial Council that the order is void, and award her the appropriate requested damages.
Respectfully Submitted,
by Sharon Stephens

FARETTA MOTION

Sharon Stephens
PO Box 9475
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91701
760.835.8210

PEOPLE

v.

STEPHENS

CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT

County of San Bernardino

8303 North Haven Avenue

Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730

Case NO: MWV90372

NOTICE OF MOTION

AND FARETTA MOTION

The Defendant, Sharon Stephens wishes to proceed in this case pro se.

The right of self-representation finds support in the structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial jurisprudence from which the Amendment emerged. In California law, as in Federal courts, any defendant who makes a knowing intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel to represent themselves as long as they are competent to stand trial. When "a motion to proceed pro se is timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant to represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a choice might appear to be. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

Furthermore, the defendant's 'technical legal knowledge' is irrelevant to the court's assessment of the defendant's knowing exercise of the right to defend herself." People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187 [*8] (Windham), quoting Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836. Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se. McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 104 S. Ct. 944.

How often we hear, "He who represents himself has a fool for a client."

To that it is often said, "He who is represented is usually taken for a fool."

September 17, 2010
Court Room 7
8:30 Am

 

MOTION TO DECLARE A JUDGMENT VOID

Sharon Stephens
PO Box 9475
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91701
760,835.8210

"In Pro Per"

    SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

8303 Haven Avenue

    Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730

PEOPLE                                                          CASE NO.: MWV903720
Plaintiffs
                                             NOTICE OF MOTION AND     v                                                    MOTION TO VOID, July 2, 2010 ORDER
                                                      DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE WITH
                                                      PREJUDICE, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES,  
SHARON STEPHENS                   DECLARATION, AND ATTACHMENTS
Defendant.                     
                                                          Date:
                                              Court Room:
                                              Time;
_______________________________________/

     Defendant, Sharon Stephens gives Notice of Motion, and moves and requests this court to apply controlling law and declare void the Temporary Restraining Order, and Stay Away orders that caused Judge S. Sabet on May 25, 2010 to place the defendant into an unlawful incarceration. Also, that all orders rendered on the basis of those void orders also be declared void. This motion relies upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, California statutes and rules of court, federal laws and multiple constitutional protections, and related points and authorities, and Defendant’s Declaration.

                                                           FACTS

     In thousands of ten to twenty minute hearings held all over the Country, judges are now able to do what the Marxists have only dreamed of doing before now, and could never hope to do before they were able to use the pretext of 'violence' to issue restraining orders. However, the real violence is almost always to the rights of the defendant, and to the Constitution itself. However, when a judge does not follow the law, the judgment is void.

      May 7, 2010: Judge Sabet was assigned to hear a 402 Hearing. At this hearing she stated she did "not know the law on void judgments" but proceeded to retry the void restraining order issued by Judge Rex Victor. Not only did Judge Victor issue the order without the needed legal criteria to make the order valid, but Attorney Hollenbeck missed the filing date for the hearing by three [3] days making the order also invalid, and the TRO void.

     Judge Sabet allowed Attorney Linda Hollenbeck (who was on "The Witness List) to sit at the table with Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu (making her a co-prosecuter) and to continually feed him questions that were not in the original transcripts of the trail. Judge Sabet, Attorney Hollenbeck knew this, as did prosecuter Liu as they all had a copy of the transcripts. Attorney Hollenbeck and Jack Liu also brought in two witnesses that were never a part of the original trial.

     The witnesses' trufully testified under oath that I had never done anything violent, nor even threatened any violence. That is the criteria to issue a Workplace Restraining Order under Civil Code of Procedure 527.8.

        The average person looking at this situation would see a bias toward the defendant based on unsupported fabricated and provable subordinated perjury brought by Deputy District Attorney Jack Liu's and Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck's witnesses, of which Judge Sabet did willingly listen to, accepted as true, and allowed to influence her.

      May 25, 2010 after a year of false arrests, harassment by Amerland Group/Logan Property Management and their resident management staff, Judge Sabet, after stating she "did not know the law," had a legal research team make a finding on this void judgment and then on those findings had to legally declare the restraining order void and dismiss all counts. (The TRO was still undecided but I address that void order here as it is at issue.) However, Judge Sabet had already listened to several hours of subrogated perjury by "witnesses" that was instigated by Deputy District Attorney Jack Liu, and Attorney Linda T. Hollenbeck, When hearing a motion to dismiss a void judgement, the court may only consider the judgement roll. Judge Sabet's attitude toward me indicated she had already been influenced by the subrogated perjury.

     However, Judge Sabet then took me [unlawfully] into custody on May 25, 2010 on a [void] Stay Away Order at the insistence of Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu, who was accompanied by Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, for Logan Property, Karen Brooks, Resident Manager of Briarwood, and Martha Enrique, owner, Amerland Group and Logan Property Management.

     In the May 26, 2010 order to incarcerate me, she still did not know the law of void judgments, and set Bail at $150,000 (Excessive Bail: Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. (1951) the U.S. Supreme Court: A judge or justice may be censured for "setting 'grossly excessive' bail and [thus] showing a 'severe attitude' toward witnesses and litigants," as the Michigan Supreme Court did to a trial judge recently: Debra Cassens Weiss, writes, "Judge Censured for Excessive Bail, Severe Attitude", (ABA Journal, February 8, 2008).    

     The Stay Away Order had been piggy-backed on a void restraining order by Judge Libutti in June 2009, when I brought a motion to dismiss the judgment as void. Both the TRO and Restraining Order were already void at this hearing. I had sent emails to Attorney Hollenbeck, the owners, and resident staff that the order was void. They continued to have me falsely arrested for such things as getting my mail, making complaints, asking for a key when I was locked out, or claiming falsey I was trespassing.

     However, I knew a void judgment or proceeding founded on a void judgment is void: I was stunned at her decision to incarcerate me, her apparent bias attitude toward me in her demeanor and language, and then her excessive Bail of $150,000 that may have been "retaliation under color of law" by Judge Sabet. (See; Motion to Recuse Judge Sabet)

     Findings of fact and conclusions of law, by the judge were necessary legal requirements for rendering an order on a void injunction, and this requirement was violated. The law requires that the judge rendering such a decision on a void injunction make findings of fact and conclusions of law specifically addressing each of these requirements, according to the judgment record of the injunction. Judge Sabet did not do this.

     Then Judge Sabet then became quite rude, not hiding her bias toward me when she said with a curled lip and venomous implications in her tone, "Read my lips, IF YOU SHOULD MAKE BAIL...'" She then made implications in this ruling where she made a number of fact findings and mixed fact and law findings that were simply contrary to the evidence, or, the lack of evidence, presented by Deputy Jack Liu and Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck in unsubstantiated, corrupted and incompetent testimony to alleged facts and heard in subrogated perjury by witnesses.

     Instead of meeting the lawful requirements to protect the person suffering harm from the unlawful acts -- the void injunctive orders that had deprived Defendant, who was suffering great harm both emotinally and physically with several hospitalizations for heart problems brought on by alleged bogus violations of the void orders, and had no protection in law, rather, it seemed the parties perpetrating the violations and unlawful acts were being protected in spite of subrogation of perjury, presenting perjured documents on a void TRO and restraining order which resulted in false arrests, harassments and elder abuse and harmed the interests of the defendant by subverting legal and constitutional protections. I, the defendant became the victim and never received any protection from the District Attorney, or the court.

     Judge Sabet did not follow the law: California law holds that an order rendered in violation of law or without jurisdiction is a nullity.

     July 2, 2010 I am brought back before Judge Sabet, where I am offered what I only realize later is a plea bargain. I am in a terrible state of shock, and suffering a psychotic break with reality due to the abuse and torture I endured while incarcerated for 10 days. (Please Take Judicial Notice of attached  Complaint to San Bernardino Sheriff's Dept.) Although I apparently appeared normal at the hearing, I was not. I still do not have much of a memory of what is said. I know, I was not understanding what I was being charged with. I do believe I hear Judge Sabet take away my constitutional right to bring a law suit against "them," i.e., Logan Property Management, Amerland Group, and Briarwood Manor. I learn later I am being charged with trespassing on a police report that is over a year old. Prosecuter Liu made his case for incarceration by saying I had "contacted the victims a week ago, and violated the year old, and now void Stay Away Order."

 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

     It is remarkable how many judges, deputy district attorneys, public defenders, and defense attorneys don't know or understand "void judgments." It has been estimated that the number of void judgments on the books in America’s courthouses is so great, there is no practical way to estimate how many there are! What I have learned about the legal system -- particularly void judgments -- in the last ten years has left me literally stunned, but feeling particularly qualified to address this in this motion.

     I have been incarcerated three times on void judgments, by judges who either ignored the law, or did not know the law. Judge Sabet made it clear from the start that she "did not know the law of void judgments and could not make a ruling." She did however listen to several hours of subornation of perjury (where much testimony was introduced that was never in the original hearing by "witnesses" -- two of whom were not even at the original hearing) instigated by Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu, and Attorney Linda T. Hollenbeck, both whom Judge Sabet allowed to sit together and act as prosecutors, and both of whom had transcripts and knew the testimony they were bringing in was not in the original hearing.

     Judge Sabet did not follow the law in her rulings: When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they are a trespasser of the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect. A judge may only look at the judgment roll record; she may not retry the case and allow for any "new testimony, etc." Federal decisions addressing void state court judgments include Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) 308 US 433, 60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed 370; Ex parte Rowland (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861:

     When a judge does not follow the law, i.e., they are a trespasser of the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)

     Judge Sabet needed to learn about void judgements before she came to court. "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its wants of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off..." People v. Greene, 71 Cal. 100 [16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448].

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IS VOID

     Findings of fact and conclusions of law were necessary lawful statutory requirements of workplace violence, that being "violence!" for rendering an injunction, and this requirement was violated by Judge Rex Victor. The law requires that the judge rendering an injunction make findings of fact and conclusions of law specifically addressing each of these requirements. Judge Victor ignored the legal criteria to issue the order and this is obvious in the judgment record. he even stated on the record 'She has doone nothing that bad she shouldn't be here, and order Attorney Hollenbeck to notify me." She never did. Federal Rule 52(a) requires that the court granting or denying a preliminary injunction "shall set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action."

     In Granny Good Foods, Inc. v. Bth=d of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County (1974) 415 US 423, 994 S Ct 1113, 39 L ed2d 435, the court held that where a temporary restraining order had been continued beyond the time limits permitted by Rule 65(b) and the required findings of fact and conclusions of law had not been set forth making the order invalid.

     Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65. (b) Temporary Restraining Order. Every temporary restraining order issued without notice must state the date and hour it was issued; describe the injury and state why it is irreparable; state why the order was issued without notice; and be promptly filed in the clerk's office and entered in the record. The order expires at the time after entry — not to exceed 14 days — that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension. The reasons for an extension must be entered in the record.

     After 14 days the TRO was void. But, Attorney Hollenbeck allowed me to put her under oath at the hearing, which was already three days late and already void, and admitted she tried to have me [illeglly] arrested for making a complaint to resident management about a man exposing himself. Her lawfirm fired her the very next day. "Constitutionally protected activity, such as making police reports, or complaints of any type are excluded from the meaning of 'course of conduct [re: harassment]'. Schraerv. Berkley Property Owners Ass'n, 207 Cal. App. 3d 719. 

                                      STAY AWAY ORDER IS VOID

     No one can attach a stay away order order onto a void order, and I could not be incarcerated on the void Stay Away Order, placed on the void TRO, or Restraining Order.

     ...All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. A void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. ... It is not entitled to enforcement. 30A Am Jur Judgments '' 43, 44, 45. Henderson v. Henderson, 232 NC 380, 100 SE2d 227. See Restatement, Judgments, ' 8.

        Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 )

                               THERE IS A DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE

     Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu and Attorney Linda Hollenbeck who have an obligation of due diligence to research the law,  are also trespassers of the law: Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and ALL PERSONS concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
 
                          A VOID ORDER MAY LEGALLY BE IGNORED

     The Defendant is not bound by any void orders made by Judge Sabet: Such void on the face judgments lack jurisdiction and can legally be ignored as they neither bind, nor bar anyone. "Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations.]"  7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).

     No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147.

                              CONPIRACY and COLLUSION

     I seems apparent that Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu, Attorney Linda T. Hollenbeck, Martha Enrique, Karen Brooks, and Cassandra Oseth-Oschner are all guilty of a conspiracy to bring a false case against me. California Penal Code Section 182 (a) If two or more persons conspire: (2) Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure another to be charged or arrested for any crime. (3) Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action, or proceeding.

    Common law – At common law, a conspiracy need not be based on an express agreement. Furthermore, an agreement can exist although not all of the parties to it have knowledge of every detail of the arrangement, as long as each party is aware of its essential nature. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1947) Moreover, a "conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense."Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) It is enough that each person agrees, at a minimum, to commit or facilitate some of the acts leading to the substantive crime. 

    Fraud Related To Rendering Orders or collusion in connection with the rendition of a judgment is regarded as rendering the judgment void: The validity of a judgment may be affected by fraud in the obtainment of such a judgment. Wyman v. Newhouse (CA 2d) 93 F2d 313, 115 ALR 460

               VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS                              

     The original intent of the Equal Protection Clause in the Civil Rights Act was to give the humblest and poorest the same civil rights as the most powerful and wealthy

     "A claim under the civil rights act expressly gives the District Court Jurisdiction, no matter how imperfectly the claim is stated." Harmon v. Superior Ct of the State of California, 307 F 2d 796, CA 9(1962)

     Judge Sabet entered an order on my probation that I must give up my constitutional rights of due process to sue the opposing side, making it a crime if I do so. This suggest some collusion on her part with Attorney Hollenbeck, Amerland, Logan Property, and Briarwood Manor. "The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted to a crime." Miller v.U. S., 230 F 486 at 489; "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional rights." Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F 2d 946(1973)

     "It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of the citizen, against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. U.S., 116 US 616, 635, (1885)

    Judge Sabet has an apparent bias attitude toward me in her demeanor and language, and then her excessive Bail of $150,000 that may have been "retaliation under color of law." It is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242). "Color of law" simply means that the person doing the act is using power given to him or her by a governmental agency (local, State, or Federal).Enforcement of these provisions does not require that any racial, religious, or other discriminatory motive existed. 

     U.S.C. 42 §12203 The Equal Protection Clause, part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." “Prohibition against retaliation and coercion” (a) Retaliation No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. (b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation. It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter. U.S.C. 42 §12203.

     The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]."When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it." State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147 65 NW 262 30 LRA 630 AM ST 459

     "Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction." Bradley v. Fisher, US 13 Wall 335 (1871)

     "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of...rights on the strength of 18 U.S.C. 242." Imbler v. Pachtman, US 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct 37. "Judges have no immunity from prosecution for their judicial acts." Bradley v. Fisher, US 13 Wall 335(1871) 

    NO ONE CAN PLEAD "GUILTY' TO A CRIME
THAT IS NOT A CRIME

      July 2, 2010: I plead guilty to "trespass" but no violation of a trespass took place, so I could not plead guilty to a crime I did not do! That would be a legally impossible admission. People v. Soriano, 4 Cal. App. 4th 781 - 1992 - "In this case we hold that since a trial court's acceptance of a negotiated plea which patently includes a legally impossible admission it constitutes an act in excess of its jurisdiction."

People v. Vasilyan 174 Cal. App. 4th 443 - Cal: Court of Appeals, 2nd Dist., Div. 8, 2009.  "We cannot affirm a conviction and sentence imposed for a crime that does not exist..." (See People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781, 785 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 138] "...where fundamental jurisdiction is lacking... It follows that if there is no crime, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. This conclusion is compelled not only by the statutes and cases interpreting those statutes, this conclusion comports with fundamental principles of justice. The notion that a person can be punished under the criminal law for committing an act that is not a crime is entirely outside our system of jurisprudence."

     Penal Code 602: "If one is accused of entering someone else’s property with the intent to interfere with or obstruct the business activities conducted on that property, then one must have actually interfered with or obstructed that business. If one didn't, then one has not committed a criminal trespass! In re Wallace (1970) 3 Cal.3d 289. This case holds that Actual damage … an obstruction or interference with the property’s business…is required before a Penal Code 602 California criminal trespass charge may be sustained. ALSO: One cannot be charged with "trespass" if they are visiting a person on the property. It gets down to "legitimate activity" Byers v. Cathcart, 57 Cal. App. 4th 805 (1997); SEE: Penal Code 602(o), end note 15: People v. Wilkinson (1967)248 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 910: The pertinent part reads as follows, "However, this subdivision shall not be applicable to persons engaged in lawful labor union activities…to persons on the premises who are engaging in activities protected by the California or United States Constitution, or to persons who are on the premises at the request of a resident or management.”


When a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)

                           VOID JUDGMENTS "NEVER DIE"
                           IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

     CCP 473 and 473a has no direct reference to void judgments: Because the order of dismissal was void on its face, it can be set aside at any time after its entry, and the six-month time limitation in section CCP 473 for relief from improper orders is not applicable here. Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194

    CCP Section 473 does permit a trial court, on noticed motion, to set aside void judgments and orders. Courts also possess inherent power to grant such relief. Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.

    Any court where it is at issue may dismiss this void judgment as well: "A void act or judgment may be attacked in any forum, state or federal, where its validity may be drawn in issue.' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [24 L. Ed. 565 ] (1878).

                                               PRO SE PLEADINGS    

     It is held that a pro-se pleading requires less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer (Puckett v. Cox 456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA). And, Justice Blackin, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)

     "The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is not a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice."   

                  DEFENDANT REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING RELIEF

      ALL void judgments rendered by Judge Sabbet to be recognized as "dismissed with prejudice:" "It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761

     Include in the order that all subsequent orders and acts that are void, that Judge Sabet relied on be declared void with prejucdice.

     That the court take Judicial Notice of both attached Criminal Charging Affidavits and act accordingly.

DECLARATION

I, Sharon Stephens, the Defendant in this case, declare under penalty of perjury, and can testify that all of the statements made in this motion are true, partly from my own knowledge, and partly from knowledge and belief.

August , 2010                                      ___________________________


                                                            Sharon Stephens