Request For Judicial Benefits

From: Sharon Stephens
Sent:  Monday, July 11, 2012
Subject: Public Records Act
             GOVT. CODE §§ 6250 - 6276.48.

Pursuant to the provisions of the California Public Records Act, request is hereby made for documents showing all payments from Riverside County commonly known as "local Judicial Benefits" to Riverside County Judges THOMAS N. DOUGLASS and B. J. BJORKfrom the commencement of such payments believed to be in the 1980's through the present. A yearly summary of "Megaflex cafeteria plan benefits' 401(k), 457 or other retirement contributions, "professional allowances" and any other retirement contributions, "professional development allowances" and any other Riverside County compensations for each year that the "Local Judicial Benefits" were paid will be sufficient.

Time is of the essence. An e-mail response to sharonstephens.1@gmail.com containing all available records or a summary thereof will be sufficient to this most urgent matter.

Thank you for your attention to this most urgent matter.

Sincerely,

Sharon Stephens

Dear California Attorney General, Kamala Harris

WHAT ABOUT JUDICIAL BENEFITS
 

In the State of California we have judges breaking the law every day by sitting on cases where they have lost their right to do so due to taking "bribes" in the form of local judicial benefits from their counties. YES! Those are bribes according to Federal Law and are void CCP Sec. 473(d), a violation of CCP Sec. 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii), and Code of Judicial Ethics, Cannons 2A, #E (1) and (2), and 4D(1), and an Obstruction of Justice.

As stated in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08, [counties]  began making payments to State Superior Court judges in the late 1980s.  The Sturgeon case held that these payments violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution.

If the judge did not reveal such payments and recuse themselves, the judge could be facing a bribery charge.  After the Sturgeon decision, the legislature enacted Senate Bill SBx2-11, which recognized that the County payments to judges were  criminal.  Senate Bill SBx2-11 gave retroactive immunity, effective 5/21/09, from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to a “governmental entity, officer, or employee of a governmental entity,”including judges who were paid or received  “judicial benefits.” The retroactive immunity did not extend to the judge’s actions of presiding over cases in which  the county who paid them was a party.  Nor, did it extend to county payments received after 5/21/09.   

At all times, judges who accepted “bribes” from an interested party were biased.  The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).  Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.   

Further, the judge receiving the payment may be prosecuted for violating the intangible right to honest services under Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1346.  The U.S. Supreme Court held in  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. (decided 6/24/2010), Slip Opinion pages 48-49, that § 1346 encompasses bribery and 

kickbacks.

The judges and the county and its attorneys have never disclosed to this day that the countys have made payments to judges. This is fraud on the court.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases Mandate That the Order  Voiding and Annulling All Orders and Judgments be Entered Based Upon Fraud Upon the Court .

The U.S. Supreme Court, which the Superior Court is bound to follow, stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878): 

There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. 

  

The Court continued at page 66: Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract . . .(citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499).  

"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court [JUDGES AREOFFICERS OF THE COURT)] so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kennerv. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice,2d ed., p. 512, 60.23.

The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." THE JUDGMENT IS VOID!

The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in  Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920): Courts are constituted by authority, and they cannot [act] beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their  judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.  They are not voidable,  but simply void! 

I am filing motions against such judges next week:

People v. Stephens CASE NO.:  MWV 903720 San Bernardino County
      (Judge S. Sabet has received over $300,000 in judicial benefits.)

People v. Stephens CASE NO.:  INF054715 Riverside County
      (There are several cases I shall be challenging including one
        involving Cathedral City, and ALL home owner board members.)

There are several more cases I shall be filling motions against as well.

~Sharon Stephens

 

Attorney Richard Fine's Model for Void Judgment

http://www.fulldisclosure.net/Blogs/96.php

Los Angeles, CA Former U S Prosecutor Dr. Richard I Fine explains how citizens can disqualify a State judge who is "on the take". All 430 California Superior Court Judges in L A County can be disqualified by citizens who have been involved in litigation against the County of Los Angeles in the last two decades. If you lost your case and did not know your judge was getting money from the County, Richard Fine says you can "Null & Void" the Judge's Order and get a new trial.

GET YOUR MONEY BACK?
If you paid money to the County, you now have a chance to recover that money, according to Dr. Fine's experience, he has already disqualified five judges who have been "On the Take" in his cases involving the County of L.A. That is why he was locked up in L A County jail for 18 months without being charged or convicted of a crime. Now he can show you the way to get JUSTICE. Featured here are Dr. Fine's Motions to "Null & Void" that were used by him to disqualify the five Judges so far in his case.

DO IT YOURSELF OR HAVE YOUR ATTORNEY FILE?
Richard Fine suggests that you can file "In Pro-Per" or better yet ask your attorney to use Dr. Fine's Motions To Null & Void the Decision made by your Judge. The templates he used are shown below.

Step 1	Contact L A County Auditor-Controller: Greg IversonGIVERSON@auditor.lacounty.gov to request amount County paid to your judge since 1987 (link to Richard Fine's example below). Use the Template with name & E-mail address where to send: (download & print here) (and here)
Step 2	Download Richard Fine's TEMPLATE Motions to Disqualify & Null & Void Judge's Orders: Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Judge David Yaffe (Aug. 6, 2010) (Aug. 27, 2010) Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Judge Robert O'Brien (Dec. 2010) (Jan. 27, 2011) Reply Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Elihu Berle ( Mar 2, 2011) Motion to Disqualify, Null & Void Judge Carolyn B. Kuhl (RemoveJudgeKuhl)
Step 3	Send a copy of your Motion with Case number to Full Disclosure Network, 333 Washington Blvd. Suite #24, Marina del Rey, CA 90402 or E-mail it tofeedback@fulldisclosure.net so Full Disclosure Network can follow and report on YOUR case.

NOTE: Please send Full Disclosure a copy of the L A Auditor-Controller's response to you with the amount of money your Judge received. We will post a chart with the totals to inform the public on how much the Judges are receiving in this illegal Double Benefits.

SHAELA S. SABET

AN UNJUST JUDGE
Writ Of Habeas Corpus

SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
RANCHO CUCAMONGA DIVISION
CASE NO. MWV903720

COMES NOW SHARON STEPHENS to submit a petition for a PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS on a sentence imposed by JUDGE SHAELA S. SABET on January 11, 2011 on a void on the face judgment. Judge Sabet had admitted, on the record she "does not know void judgment law," but refused to let me recuse her on a CCP 170.1 so that another judge might hear the case.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Judge Shaela Sabet imposed on me an unlawful incarceration that began with a void on the face temporary restraining order [TRO] and then became a void on the face Restraining Order.

SUPPORTING FACTS

For more than a year the San Bernardino Office of District Attorney and this court, particularly Judge Sabet has persecuted me on the void on the face restraining order. I have been in and out of false arrests and unlawful and have been drug back and forth to court like a rag doll, all the while being homeless and living in my car because of a retaliatory eviction by Logan Property Management Attorney, Linda Hollenbeck, essentially for complaining about lack of fire safety and criminal behavior on my senior apartment complex. (I am 70 years old.)

I soon discovered that five people had died in fires on another property of the owners, Ameriland Group, and Attorney Hollenbeck had evicted several people who complained - mostly handicapped and mentally disabled  - from the Alexandria Hotel in Los Angeles. Later, in another fire on a property they owned three more would die in a fire in Vacaville, CA and more than 200 would be displaced. (The owners are now charged with manslaughter, and other charges,  and face 18 years in prison.)

When I would not comply with the eviction, and go quietly into the night and tried to reason with the owners, Attorney Linda Hollenbeck sent me an email threatening me with  a retraining order to shut me up! She then applied for two ex parte orders under CCP 527.8, Workplace Violence: The first, Case CIVRS900716 was dismissed as void as it did not meet the statutory criteria, i.e., there was no violence! The second judge was reluctant to issue an ex parte and stated on the record "she didn't do that much!" i.e., NO VIOLENCE!

I was given no real opportunity to rebut the TRO that was based upon hearsay declarations that were subject to numerous evidentiary objections, and in fact there was an insufficient showing of unlawful violence or credible acts of violence; CCP 527.8 requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of unlawful violence.

From the beginning the TRO was void on the face for not meeting the criteria for violence. A TRO is also void after 14 days.

Attorney Linda Hollenbeck then missed the filing date for a hearing by three or four days to issue the restraining order, therefore it became automatically void, however, we did go to the hearing and Attorney Hollenbeck allowed me to put her on as "a witness," and admitted she had tried to have me arrested while making a complaint to the owners/management. (Complaints of any kind are "protected activity" in spite of a restraining order.)

Linda Hollenbeck was fired from her law firm the very next day because of her court testimony.

Still, no matter how much I told the owners, the management, or Attorney Hollenbeck the orders were void they continued to have me arrested for such things as getting my mail or sitting in the dinning room eating my breakfast. (I knew the management were afraid of losing their jobs and so complied with Attorney Hollenbeck's instructions to continue to arrest me.)

Finally I wrote a Motion to Dismiss Void Judgment  Case MWV902119 and on June 19, 2009 went before Judge Michael R. Libutti, in which he issued a "Stay Away Order," however by this time both the TRO and the Restraining Order were void, and, the court may not attach any order onto a void order, therefore his order was void.

Then I am forced into court on a 402 Hearing and I ask that the case be challenged as a void judgment. Judge Sabet is almost gleeful at the start that she "gets to retry a case of another judge; I've never done that before," she declares. She also makes it clear she "knows nothing of void judgments," but proceeds to unlawfully retry the case anyway. (A void judgment can only be heard on the judgment roll of the original hearing.)

Judge Sabet allows Attorney Hollenbeck to sit with the Deputy District Attorney, Jack Liu (in spite of protest from my attorney) and feeds him a litany of question after question to witnesses who give false, well coached, fabricated answers that were never given in the original hearing, however, they all say I "never committed any acts of violence." One witness, Ms. Oseth-Oshner totally provably perjures herself. Then they are allowed to bring in two "new witnesses" -- one a convicted felon.

Oy Vey! Judge Sabet has totally lost control and sight of the law of a void judgment challenge hearing.

At the end she informs the court room she "doesn't know how to rule and the attorneys will need to bring her the law to do so." They don't know the law either! I know the law but no one is asking me.

Two weeks later we are back in court and someone has informed Judge Sabet she has totally screwed up the case; she must totally dismiss all 28 counts of the restraining order, which she does, but is obviously very upset.

Then, up jumps Deputy DA, Jackl Liu and Attorney Hollenbeck with the now moot, and void Stay Away Order of Judge Libutti and demands I be incarcerated on a trespass that allegedly took place under the [void] TRO? Judge Sabet, with a snarled lip and obvious pleasure sends me to jail with an unconscionable  $150,000 Bail. I am 70 years old, indigent and living in my car -- she has made it impossible for me to get out of jail.

For ten days I do not eat and I am abused terribly by at least three sadistic and cruel deputies. Two public defenders see the results of that abuse: bloody wrists and more.

I am brought back into court but I am not even aware of what I am saying, or pleading to. I just know I cannot go back to jail; I am terrified.

After I am released I want to change my plea, based on my incompetent state of mind at the hearing. Judge Sabet again ignores the statutory criteria to set a competency hearing and she declares me to be competent. She has denied me due process. She sets a two year Summary Probation and declares I must give up my constitutional right, and cannot contact Attorney Linda Hollenbeck, the Attorney of Record for the owners, who I now wish to sue for what they have done to me. I KNOW I am allowed to legally sue these people. I  serve Attorney Hollenbeck, with Proof of Service, an Intent to Sue Ameriland Group, and Briarwood Partners.

Judge Sabet then sentences me at a Vicker's Hearing for this contact to West Valley Detention Center for 120 days for violation of her [void] Summary Probation.

SUPPORTING CASES AND RULES

- CCP 473(d)  Void Judgments may be challenged in any court where they are at issue.

- 30A AM Jur "Judgments" 43, 44, 45 No order may be attached or piggy-backed to an already void order: Henderson v. Henderson, 232 BC 380 SE 2d 227  See: Restatement Judgments 8.

- The Defendant raised a doubt as to her competency. The court had a duty to to conduct a competency hearing, People v. Sanberg (1981) 124 Cal. App, 3d 944,955.  Judge Sabet could not declare me "competent," and her error requires a reversal of judgment.  People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 508, 521.

- CCP 527.8 must show, with undeniable proof the criteria of "violence" in order to issue a TRO. No such evidence was ever presented, making the TRO void on the face from the start, and no orders could be added to this void order.

- 6 Witkin, Cal Procedure (2 nd ed. 1971) Appeal 7, pp 4024-4025: "An Appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a 'dead limb' on the judicial tree -- a void order." Therefore, no Appeal is necessary.

- I have sought the court of Judge Shaela S. Sabet for relief. She has ignored my letter.

I am presently in pro per.

I the undersigned say: I AM THE PETITIONER IN THIS ACTION. I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THAT THE FOREGOING ALLEGATIONS AND STATEMENT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT, EXCEPT AS TO MATTERS THAT ARE STATED ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF, AND AS TO THOSE MATTERS, I BELIEVE THEM TO BE TRUE.

February 5, 2011                                                    Sharon Stephens

   

Deputy DA Suspension For Misconduct

Four-year suspension for ex-deputy DA upheld

Benjamin Field

A former Santa Clara County deputy district
attorney abused his office and violated the
due process rights of several criminal
defendants, a State Bar Court review panel
ruled last month, and should therefore lose his law
license for four years. Finding that
BENJAMIN THOMAS FIELD [#168197] “disregarded
prosecutorial accountability in favor of winning cases,” the
three-judge panel upheld the recommendation of hearing
Judge Pat McElroy and also urged that Field be given five years
of probation.

The state Supreme Court must rule on the recommendation before it takes effect.

Field, 45, a career prosecutor and one-time rising star in the DA’s office, originally
was charged with 25 counts of misconduct in four cases he prosecuted. The bar
court dismissed several charges as duplicative.

“Although our system of administering justice is adversarial in nature and prosecutors
must be zealous advocates in prosecuting their cases, it cannot be at the cost of justice,
” wrote Judge Catherine Purcell, who was joined in the decision by Judges JoAnn Remke
 and Judith Epstein.

“Field lost sight of this goal,” Purcell continued, “ … and in doing so, he disregarded
the foundation from which any prosecutor’s authority flows — ‘The first, best and most
effective shield against injustice for an individual accused … must be found … in the
integrity of the prosecutor.’”

The judges found that Field’s misconduct began shortly after his 1993 admission to
 the bar and spanned 10 years. The allegations stemmed from four cases and charged:

• Field obtained a dental examination of a minor accused of sexual assault in
  violation of a court order. He was attempting to try the youth, who claimed
  to be 13, as an adult. A juvenile court judge suppressed the evidence
  obtained in the examination.
• In a murder case, Field intentionally withheld a defendant’s statement
  favorable to co-defendants. As a result, the judge dismissed a 25-year
  gun enhancement against one of the co-defendants.
• He made an improper closing argument in a sexually violent predator
  (SVP) case, which an appellate court described as “deceptive and
  reprehensible.” The court reversed a judgment committing the man as an SVP.
• He intentionally withheld a witness’ statement that was favorable
  to the defense in a 2003 habeas corpus proceeding involving a sexual assault.
  The judge found that he committed a discovery violation.

In that matter, the review panel found that Field’s misconduct escalated over time and
constituted “a calculated scheme to hide evidence favorable to the defense.”

Two men who were convicted of sexual assault had filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus
and provided a declaration by a witness who claimed the 15-year-old victim had made
 false accusations because she missed curfew.

Field’s investigator found and interviewed the witness but did not notify the defense.
In addition, he instructed his investigator to prepare a misleading declaration and
filed it with the court, filed a statement with the court implying he did not know the
witness’ whereabouts, and then waited five months before disclosing the interview,
only after opposing counsel learned of the interview and had filed a motion alleging
prosecutorial misconduct.

Finally, the court concluded, Field urged the court to proceed with the habeas
hearing without the witness.

In the same case, Field obtained five search warrants despite the judge’s doubts about
his tactics. Indeed, when Field asked the judge what to do if he needed a warrant in an
emergency, the judge testified, “I looked him right in the eye and I said, ‘Ben, just don’t
do it.’” Five days later, Field obtained a search warrant in another state without notifying
the habeas judge.

The review panel found that Field committed several acts of moral turpitude and did not
obey a court order or follow the law. Field admitted to poor judgment and viewing his
discovery obligations too narrowly, and self-reported the finding of prosecutorial
misconduct to the bar.

Throughout the trial before Judge McElroy, which drew widespread interest among Field’s
colleagues, he defended his behavior. The review department rejected his assertions.

Although the misconduct could have resulted in disbarment, the court found extensive
mitigation, including Field’s cooperation with the bar’s investigation, an impressive record
of pro bono service and “an extraordinary demonstration of good character.” In particular,
 it expressly noted the testimony of former Santa Clara District Attorney George Kennedy,
 who lauded Field’s “extraordinary professional skills and good character” and said he
considers Field an honest person who is not intentionally corrupt.

Field left the DA’s office and is now chief of staff with Working Partnerships USA, a
San Jose company that addresses the needs of working families in Silicon Valley.

The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) filed an amicus brief on his behalf
warning that several of the grounds for discipline involved questions of law that have
 not been settled. “Attorneys should be disciplined for conduct that violates clearly
 established law, or conduct so outrageous that its illegality is obvious,” the amicus stated,
 “but should not be disciplined for conduct where the law is unsettled.”

Field’s attorney, Allen Ruby, did not return a phone call for comment, nor did
W. Scott Thorpe, CDAA chief executive officer.

More on Vexatious Litigant

HANDLING VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS http://www.callawyer.com/cleStory.cfm?qVersionID=290&eid=903322&evid=1
By Michael C. Denison The words vexatious litigant stir up an emotional reaction in anyone who has confronted an abusive or harassing pro se plaintiff. But to be considered vexatious a litigant must really step over the line. Indeed, a judicial determination that a party is vexatious is a powerful tool for defense attorneys. Among other things, a court can require the litigant to post a bond to cover your client's court costs, and in extreme cases it can require the person to obtain court permission before filing another lawsuit. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 391.3, 391.7.) What, Me Vexatious?  In California, section 391 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the qualifications of a vexatious litigant. Even though such status can bar a person from the courthouse, the statute has been held to be constitutional. (See Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP, 40 Cal. 4th 780 (2007); andWolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2007).) Under section 391, a vexatious litigant typically is a pro se plaintiff who has (1) lost at least five pro se lawsuits in the preceding seven years, (2) sued the same defendant for the same alleged wrong after losing, (3) repeatedly filed meritless papers, or (4) used frivolous tactical devices or already been declared a vexatious litigant for similar reasons. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b); Wolfe, 486 F.3d at 1124.) Because the statute uses the disjunctive or,the court must separately evaluate each of the four factual scenarios. However, two core elements must exist before the court even gets to the four scenarios listed above. First, the person must be a plaintiff or a "plaintiff equivalent." The term plaintiff means the person who commences, institutes, or maintains litigation or who causes it to commence, institute, or maintain, including an attorney acting in pro per. A plaintiff equivalent may be someone who has filed a cross complaint (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(d)). The phrase vexatious litigant does not apply to attorneys representing clients. (Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)). Although no published opinion has applied the label to a defendant who is not also a cross-complainant or an appellant, courts have applied section 391(b)(2) and (3) to defendants. For brevity, “plaintiff” will be used in this article to refer to the party against whom the vexatious litigant order is sought. A second core element is that the person must be acting without counsel. Thus, to be declared a vexatious litigant the person must be appearing in propria persona, or be referenced in the court filings as appearing in pro per or pro se. If a lawyer represents the party in the subject litigation, the vexatious litigant statute does not apply. Whenever an unrepresented litigant seems to be out of control, consult section 391 to determine if relief is available. Four Statutory Requirements  In addition to the two core elements, the first of the four statutory scenarios requires that the plaintiff must have commenced or maintained at least five litigations within the past seven years that were either determined adversely to the plaintiff, or remained pending without good cause for two years without being brought to trial. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b)(1).) Under California's fast-track rules (Cal. Gov. Code § 68600–68620) this latter scenario has become less common. The vexatious litigant statute defines litigation as "any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court." (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(a).) Because the requirement is based on specific numbers, strict compliance is the order of the day. Four or fewer adverse litigations in the past seven years won't qualify; nor will five adverse litigations if one of them lies beyond the seven-year cutoff. Nor will five adverse litigations in the past seven years qualify if the plaintiff was represented by counsel in one or more instances. In short, litigants can't be a little vexatious. In the law's eye, they are either vexatious or they aren't. The second scenario under section 391 involves attempts to relitigate issues after a prior case went against the plaintiff (§ 391(b)(2)). Unlike the first scenario, only a single prior adverse result is required. The subsequent case must be an attempt to relitigate the prior dispute against the same defendants: It must be another bite of the same apple—relitigation of the same, and already determined, cause of action, claim, controversy, or issue of fact or law. The third scenario occurs when a pro per litigant repeatedly files non-meritorious motions, pleadings, or other court papers; conducts unnecessary discovery; or engages in tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay (§ 391(b)(3)). In contrast to the first two scenarios, this one requires no prior adverse litigation at all; it is appropriate for claiming vexatious litigant status based entirely on conduct within the present lawsuit. No bright-line rule exists to define "repeatedly" or "non-meritorious" under section 391(b)(3), so the determination resides within the discretion of the trial court. The court's discretion is not unfettered. Most cases affirming a vexatious litigant designation for repeatedly filing non-meritorious motions have involved numerous motions during a single case (Morton v. Wagner,156 Cal. App. 4th 963, 971–72 (2007)). In one instance, 20 motions were sufficient (Bravo v. Ismaj, 99 Cal. App. 4th 211, 225 (2002)). In another, three motions over three years did not make the grade (Morton), though the court did clarify that three motions might be sufficient under different circumstances. In addition, note that non-meritorious is not synonymous with unsuccessful. The repeated motions must be so devoid of merit and so frivolous that they constitute a flagrant abuse of the system. They must have no reasonable probability of success, and the court must find that they clearly were an attempt to "abuse the processes of the courts and to harass the adverse party. ..." (Morton, 156 Cal. App. 4th at 972.) The fourth scenario provides that a person can qualify as a vexatious litigant if he or she has "previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence." (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b)(4).) Taking Action  Knowing these requirements sets the stage. But what, specifically, must one do to have an opponent declared a vexatious litigant? Typically, the defendant (or cross-defendant) files a motion requesting such a finding. If a motion is filed prior to trial, the litigation will come to a halt pending the result of the motion (§ 391.6). The authority for the motion lies in section 391.1, which provides that in any pending litigation, at any time prior to final judgment, a defendant may move that the court, upon notice and hearing, require the plaintiff to furnish security. For purposes of the statute, security means an undertaking (usually in the form of a bond) to assure payment of the moving party's reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees (§ 391(c)). To succeed, the motion must establish both that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant under one of the four scenarios and that there is no reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail in the present case against the moving defendant. In addition to seeking security, the moving party can request (or the court on its own motion can issue) an order that prohibits the plaintiff from filing any new litigation in a California court in propria persona without permission from the presiding judge (§ 391.7(a)). At the motion hearing, the court considers relevant written or oral evidence furnished by witnesses or affidavits (§ 391.2). If the court determines that the plaintiff is vexatious and that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the present case, the court shall order the plaintiff to furnish security in an amount set by the court. Once a vexatious litigant order is on file, the clerk of the court is not supposed to permit the plaintiff to file any new litigation without an order from the presiding judge. If the clerk mistakenly permits a new filing, any party may file a notice that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, which automatically stays the litigation and results in an automatic dismissal unless the plaintiff obtains the required filing order from the judge within ten days (§ 391.7(c)). In every case in which the court issues a prefiling order, the clerk must provide the California Judicial Council with a copy so it can update the statewide index of vexatious litigants it maintains (§ 391.7(e)). Vexatious litigant orders have teeth because if security is not furnished as ordered, the litigation must be dismissed (§ 391.4; Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal. App. 4th 43, 47 (1997)). In addition, disobedience of the prefiling order can be punished as contempt of court (§ 391.7(a)). Counsel for the Plaintiff  As noted above, the vexatious litigant statute and prefiling orders apply only to pro se plaintiffs and not to a plaintiff represented by counsel. But in Forrest v. Calif. Dept. of Corporations (150 Cal. App. 4th 183 (2007)) a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a vexatious litigant by an attorney who later withdrew from the case, leaving the vexatious litigant unrepresented. The plaintiff had been declared a vexatious litigant in 1994. In 2003 the plaintiff, acting in pro per, filed a wrongful-termination complaint. However, before the plaintiff served the pleading on the defendants, she retained counsel. Three days before trial, the attorney filed a motion to be relieved as counsel and to continue the trial. The motion to be relieved was granted and, after several trial continuances, when the plaintiff failed to retain new counsel, the court dismissed the case. On appeal, the court held that the requirements of a prefiling order under section 391.7 remain in effect throughout the life of a lawsuit, and therefore such an order permits dismissal at any point when a vexatious litigant proceeds without counsel or without permission of the presiding judge (Forrest, 150 Cal. App. 4th at 197). Not Permanent  Even if a plaintiff has been declared vexatious and a prefiling order is in place, there is no absolute prohibition against filing new lawsuits. If it appears that a new case has merit and has not been filed for purposes of harassment or delay, the presiding judge must permit the case to proceed (§ 391.7(b)). As the courts have noted, "[w]hen a vexatious litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable claim, he may enter." (Luckett v. Panos, 161 Cal. App. 4th 77, 81 (2008).) Moreover, a vexatious litigant determination is not permanent in another sense: A prefiling order may be lifted, modified, or removed on an application by the vexatious litigant (Luckett, 161 Cal. App. 4th at 80–81). The Luckettcourt duly noted that "fundamental fairness requires the 'vexatious litigant' brand be erasable in appropriate circumstances." (161 Cal. App. 4th at 82.) The court then provided a road map for future cases. "[E]rasure requires substantial evidence that the vexatious litigant has mended 'his ways or conduct' " (161 Cal. App. 4th at 83), which requires the applicant to establish the following: (1) that he or she has a propensity for honesty, including an accurate reckoning with the facts on which the prior finding was made and a notification of any change in financial condition; (2) that he or she has some genuine remorse for the costs of litigation inflicted on the defendants; (3) that he or she has made some genuine effort at restitution to the previous victims; and (4) that he or she actually has given up the habit of suing people as a way of life, including making "efforts at obtaining gainful employment." (161 Cal. App. 4th at 93–94.) Perhaps recognizing vexatious litigants' propensity for forum shopping, theLuckett court further opined that "any attempt to erase a vexatious litigant prefiling order should be brought in the forum that originally entered the prefiling order." (161 Cal. App. 4th at 95.) Federal Cases  Federal cases recognize that "there is strong precedent establishing the inherent power of federal courts to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances." (DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990).) The Ninth Circuit has recognized that under the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)), federal courts have inherent power to enjoin litigants who have abusive and lengthy histories (DeLong, 912 F.2d at 1147–48). Within the Ninth Circuit, several trial courts have adopted a vexatious litigant rule that "provides that the court may 'proceed by reference to the Vexatious Litigants statute of the State of California." (See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Central District Local Rule 27A.4 [presently Local Rule 83–8]).) The Eastern District of California also has adopted the California vexatious litigant statute "as a procedural Rule ... on the basis of which the Court may order the giving of security, bond or undertaking. ..." (See Eastern District Local Rule 65.1–151(b).) Federal courts typically apply five factors to determine vexatious litigant status, but they are not the same factors as set forth in the California statute. The factors utilized in the Ninth Circuit stem from a Second Circuit opinion. (See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).) The factors include (1) the litigant's history of litigation and, in particular, whether it entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative suits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation—for example, whether the litigant had a good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused unnecessary expense to the parties or placed a needless burden on the courts; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties (Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit reviews vexatious litigant orders under a four-part test established in DeLong. The test requires that the trial court afford the plaintiff minimum due process notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an adequate record for review, which should include a showing "that the litigant's activities were numerous and abusive." The trial court must make "substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions," and the order must be "narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered." (DeLong at 1147–48.) Having someone declared vexatious does not make up for the cost and emotion expended in defending abusive and burdensome litigation. Nevertheless, a vexatious litigant order can help protect against future misconduct. On the other side of the courtroom, pro se plaintiffs who have been declared vexatious are not denied access to judicial remedies. They simply must establish that their new lawsuits have merit. And, if they desire once again to enjoy unrestricted access to the courts, they must prove that they have mended their ways Michael C. Denison is a partner and civil litigator at the Los Angeles firm of Towle, Denison, Smith & Tavera.