Tuesday, December 21, 2010


The United States Supreme Court defined a judicial act of "warring on the constitution" as treason.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).  "Warring on the constitution" includes acting without jurisdiction, in violation of laws. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 at footnote 19, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)"

"Without authority or jurisdiction, NOT FOLLOWING THE STATUTORY LAW --the prosecutor and the judges lose absolute immunity against suit and are subject to suit for unlawful arrest, unlawful incarceration, and malicious prosecution."


(excerpts below)

"Both Presiding Criminal Court Judge Paul P. Biebel Jr. and Clerk of the Court Dorothy Brown take oaths of office to uphold the law. Both are grossly violating the law and their oaths of office regarding appeals to the Illinois Appellate Court..  There is a fundamental violation of the United States Constitution's 5th and 14th Amendment right to procedural due process ...

In violation of the above laws and rules, Dorothy Brown instead of filing the Notice of Appeal with the Illinois Appellate Court, files a "Notice" of Notice of Appeal. She then sends the Notice of Appeal to Judge Biebel and Judge Biebel in a hearing without notice to or presence of litigants or defendant's attorney or counsel makes a ruling as to whether or not he will allow the Notice of Appeal to be transmitted to the Illinois Appellate court. This writer met with Clerk Brown and her staff in December 2009 and she confirmed that her office was following this unlawful procedure. She pledged to look into it, but has not changed the procedure to be lawful as of this date."

"Judge Biebel has NO jurisdiction or legal authority to hold this hearing or even make any decision as to whether Clerk Brown is going to transmit the Notice of Appeal, as the Circuit Court judges lose all jurisdictional rights upon the filing of a notice of appeal.

"When Judge Biebel illegally quashes an appeal this denies the defendant his 5th an 14th Amendment Constitutional right to due process. This is an act of defying the constitution or "warring on the constitution," as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.  As this is knowingly and willfully done by Judge Biebel, this is treason as defined under federal law. To be called a traitor is a serious allegation, but judges who knowingly impair an appeal in a criminal case in open violation of law fall into this category as this sort of conduct is so egregious and violative of fundamental rights known by all judges. The case against Clerk Brown would be weaker as she claimed that she didn't know what her staff was doing in December 2009 to this writer. However, she has failed to correct this violation of law."

"This writer was unlawfully charged with Medicaid vendor fraud by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in 2004. The writer was found not guilty by jury trial in February 2009 and has filed a federal civil rights suit against AG Madigan, as well as Judges Jorge Alonso and Kathleen Pantle for unlawfully prosecuting her and unlawfully incarcerating her pre-trial without legal authority to do so, without probable cause, and therefore without jurisdiction. AG Madigan had no jurisdiction under Illinois law to bring these charges as only the county States Attorney has legal authority in Illinois to charge someone with Medicaid vendor fraud. Therefore, technically AG Madigan as well as Judges Alonso and Pantle have committed treason since they were fully knowledgeable of this fact pre-trial through this writer's pre-trial motions.

This writer was NOT appealing an acquittal. She was appealing a pre-trial dismissal of a motion concerning the court's jurisdiction. This writer properly argued that AG Madigan did not have authority to bring the charges of Medicaid vendor fraud; the charges were barred by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause since the Federal Medicaid Code specifically allows doctors to bill for services of their employees; and therefore, the Circuit Court of Cook County had no jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is a justiciable issue (a controversy in this case) and double jeopardy is not invoked as this writer could not be retried if she wins or loses the appeal. Therefore, United States Supreme Court case law requires that this Illinois Supreme Court rule not be used to deny the appeal by this writer as the dismissal of the appeal violates prior United States Supreme Court holdings on this issue of appeals in cases of acquittal."

"Without authority or jurisdiction, the prosecutor and the judges lose absolute immunity against suit and are subject to suit for unlawful arrest, unlawful incarceration, and malicious prosecution."

Sunday, December 19, 2010

UPDATE" Thomas Goldstein's District Attorney Lawsuit

UPDATE:  August 2010 the city of Long Beach paid out an $8 million settlement in a case alleging prosecutorial misconduct brought by Thomas Goldstein. Rebecca Cathcart, Wrongfully Convicted Man Gets $7.95 Million Settlement, N.Y. Times, Rebecca Cathcart, Aug. 12, 2010. 

Goldstein, who was convicted of a 1979 murder in Long Beach, spent 24 years in prison before being released after a federal judge ruled that Los Angeles County prosecutors withheld evidence of deals with a jailhouse informant and failed to correct perjured testimony.

Goldstein sued the prosecution, 
Long Beach police officers and the City of Long Beach,asserting that former Los Angeles County district attorney John Van De Kamp and his chief deputy failed to adequately train and supervise their deputies on their obligations relating to informants and failed to establish a system that would have facilitated information-sharing among deputy prosecutors.  
Although the Supreme Court rejected Goldstein’s argument 
and expanded the prosecutorial actions covered by absolute immunity to activities that cast them “in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate,” Van de Kamp, 129 S.Ct. 855 at 861

Goldstein was permitted to pursue his lawsuit against 
Long Beach, resulting in the settlement.


The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of Thomas Goldstein, an ex-marine who was convicted of murdering his neighbor.
Goldstein served 24 years before his conviction was thrown out when the main witness against him was shown to have lied. That witness was a lifelong criminal who was given a deal on his own charges in exchange for testimony that Goldstein confessed to him in a jail cell. Goldstein alleges that the district attorney's office that prosecuted the case routinely used the testimony of so-called "jailhouse snitches" prosecutors knew or should have known were not reliable.
Goldstein's case is unusual because he's not suing the prosecutor who convicted him, but John Van de Camp, the district attorney who supervised that prosecutor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has allowed Goldstein's case to go forward, causing the U.S. Supreme Court to agree to hear it.
Goldstein's lawsuit stems from Federal Law 42 U.S.C. 1983, which states that "…[e]very person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages," and provides a means for those wronged by government officials to file suit in federal court.
But there are exceptions to Section 1983 suits. In the 1976 case Imbler v. Pachtman, the U.S. Supreme Court carved out a wide exception to the law to exempt prosecutors. The Court said common law tradition grants prosecutors have what's known as "absolute immunity" from civil rights suits, meaning that they can't be sued, provided they're acting in their capacity as prosecutors. Few people enjoy such protections in their own line of work (judges have absolute immunity as well).
But this complete shield from accountability is especially problematic when we're talking about prosecutors. It's a job that's already plagued by incentive problems. We tend to measure a prosecutor's performance based on how many people he's able to throw in jail, not necessarily by how well he metes out justice.
Rarely, for example, does a prosecutor get public recognition for the cases he doesn't take. So we have people in a position where they have the enormous power to take away someone's freedom, incentives nudging them to err on the side of prosecuting aggressively, and absolute immunity from lawsuits should they overstep their bounds.
It's a recipe for abuse.
Generally speaking, it is smart public policy to shield prosecutors from lawsuits when it comes to determining in which cases they'll pursue charges. If we hamstring prosecutors into factoring potential lawsuits into determining whom to charge, we run the risk of bringing politics or the wealth and status of the accused into what should be a question of law, context, and propriety (any more than these things are already factor into such decisions, anyway).
But you could make a good case that absolute immunity takes this idea too far. Even police officers are given what's called "qualified immunity" from civil rights suits, which in 1983 the Supreme Court determined meant, "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
That sets a hurdle for lawsuits against the police, but not a wall (some would argue that this hurdle is also too high). It might be time to consider applying that standard to prosecutors, too.
But the Goldstein case doesn't even seek to overturn the 1976 decision in Imbler. That would take an act of Congress—and again, perhaps that's something Congress should consider.
Instead, the suit targets Mr. Van de Kamp as the manager of the district attorney's office. It says that he's guilty of negligently overseeing his office, and allowing his subordinates to use unreliable, uncorroborated testimony from prison inmates.
Such misconduct Would include knowingly putting on false testimonywithholding exculpatory evidence from defense attorneys, and coercing witnesses, among other transgressions.
"The District Attorney's Office denied Goldstein a fair trial:" Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block said in November, 2002. The ruling was upheld by a federal judge in Los Angeles and three 9th Circuit judges.
Punitive damages are award-able in cases where a defendant has been found "guilty" of intentional, reckless or malicious wrongdoing, such as fraud, defamation or false imprisonment. 

Friday, December 17, 2010

Misconduct Still In Riverside County District Attorney Office re: Deputy District Attorney, Earl Lee Roberts SB #251043

Today a new judge gave me another opportunity to amend the void criminal  case INF054715 but need to show on the record what was said in court to prove the judgment is void on the face, so need to get the transcripts into the record to prove I was falsely arrested on void judgments by District Attorney Investigator, Rich Twiss.

 The judge did not appear too happy with the Deputy DA, Earl Lee Roberts, SB #251043 who ignored the law,  lied and presented false evidence in his written "Opposition" to my Motion to Dismiss, and in verbal comments during the hearing -- setting up a smoke screen to confuse and deceive the court -- essentially committing  fraud on the court with the written "Opposition" that was just absurd. It had nothing to do with the law of CCP 473  that addresses void judgments, under which I filed, i.e, Attorney Roberts did not even have the correct law; it was just rather bizarre.

Attorney Roberts  tried to insult me -- calling me "self-serving." I wonder if he even  understands what that means and how it would not apply to me. I am only trying to clear my name from the lack of justice of his minoans in the Office of Riverside County District Attorney. How is that self-serving?

The judge did not even address The Opposition  -- it was totally unrelated to my motion --  the judge stayed focused on void judgment law, and ended with what I needed to present the next time. It went very well  and the judge allowed me to talk and get a lot "on the record ." He waited until the end of morning session to hear my motion and he acknowledged the "void case" issue here -- ignored the DAs Opposition --  but he needs those certified transcripts. So, again, my case was "temporarily dismissed with out prejudice."

Attorney Earl Roberts had his own little fellow DA Deputies Peanut Gallery sitting in the back of the court room -- about five or six of them -- vultures  waiting to descend - I suppose to give him "support?" -- but wouldn't it be nice if they learned something from all of this as to what their responsibility is to a defendant to make sure they present a fair trial. Now it is all about wining at any cost.

The road in the legal system is an uphill battle for an elderly, mentally challenged, indigent pro per suffering from Post Traumatic Stress, who has had no legal help and no money to get transcripts. The system needs to change to be more fair-minded.

I tried to do this case without the transcripts using just certified written records because I didn't have the money -- guess I will need to go panhandling on Christmas Day to get the money so as to get  back into court in January with the transcript evidence on my  Second Amended Motion.

BTW: I have my own personal stalker -- "Cory Johnson" is a man who has stalked me and my daughter for years, always directing his taunts at me since this bogus criminal case began, even writing to my neighbors, and harassing Jeanine at work.  We suspect he is a Cathedral City cop, or a board member from our old HOA. Whoever he is he seems to be mentally ill and obsessed with me and my life. It is a little scary to have this person lurking, and bullying me and my family from the cyber shadows.

Anyway - it is all positive albeit still ongoing when I thought it would be finished by the end of the year.

Thank you for your ongoing thoughts and prayers on my behalf.

~Sharon Stephens

Monday, November 29, 2010


Last Wednesday I appeared in court in Indio, CA to ask that the "void on the face criminal case" # INF054715 against me be dismissed.
When I was unlawfully arrested for allegedly violating an already void order on June 9, 2007, and sent a to jail for more then a hellish year -- mostly in solitary confinement, losing my home, and then spending a year living in my car I set out to have the case dismissed and have been trying to fight this and clear my name ever since. (Keep in mind: Every 1 out of every 100 Americans are incarcerated. -- the highest in the world. The U.S. Department of Justice [1999] estimates at least 10 % of those are innocent.) 

Last Wednesday I appeared before the right judge. (I was sent through four court rooms this morning; no one wanted to hear it as several judges were named in the motion for " ignoring the law.")
The District Attorney tried to have my motion dismissed because it was "too long" - not because my law was incorrect. The judge did dismiss it for "being too long," but then told the DA he was "going to hear it on its merits." FINALLY  I was able to talk,i.e., be heard -- and I did and was able to convince the judge my motion "has merit to be heard and dismissed." 
The judge "dismissed the motion without prejudice" and gave me the opportunity to "pare it down" and just stick with the [false] arrest that began the whole thing and makes everything else void that came after that. I must keep it to 10 pages [court rules]. I want to rewrite it and file next week and this bogus false case against me shall be over.
The Deputy District Attorney left the court room quickly,and I did not get his name.

I went to the DA's Office on the fourth floor and asked the receptionist "Can you please give me the name of
the attorney who appeared in court this morning on my case,  and, what do I need to do to sue the District Attorney?


     The receptionist told me to "sit down," which I did, " and I will get someone for you."

     Within a minute a very rotund man literally strutted off the elevator and standing over me stated loudly and very rudely,"Get out of my office or I will have your probation revoked for breaking the law,  and have you arrested!"

     "What for?"

     "Trespassing [Penal Code 602] and disturbing the peace."

     I reminded him, "I am here on legitimate business -- that is not trespassing. And, this is not your office it belongs to the people, and YOU are the one shouting and disturbing the peace - and -- if you arrest me it will be a false arrest and your office has already done that to me once!! [Rich Twiss and that is why we are in court now.]."

     Morrison continued to threaten me with arrest, and told me at least twice, "YOU are a defendant and cannot be in here!"

     I said, "I am a pro per and therefore opposing council and have a right to know the name of the attorney in charge of my case."

     Morrison needs to read and follow the law.

     When I asked who was his supervisor he told me he did not have a supervisor,  that I should contact Ron Pacheco.

     Morrison became more intimidating in his behavior, and refused to tell me how to make a complaint.

     I became very fearful of Morrison; afraid he was going to physically harm me. I am 70 years old and a heart patient and began to go into an angina attack.

     Two deputies showed up to help arrest me, but they were very nice, telling me "Morrison is our boss and we must do as he tells us to do."

     Indio, D.A. Investigator John Morrison is a bully personified. He is violating the law with his threats and intimidation.

     There is no reason to not be of service to the public wanting to do do legitimate business.

     I shall be making a formal complaint to the Board of Supervisors, Riverside County; The Attorney General, and the Department of Justice, and inquiring about a law suit against the District Attorney's Office.


Monday, November 1, 2010



     "A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).).
      Judge Bjork did not follow prescribed procedure, and exceeded his jurisdiction to issue an excessive bail on the Defendant, on an unproven misdemeanor. Nor did he have the jurisdiction to incarcerate the Defendant, on a void order and, without due process to be heard; she was not even informed in this court  of her “crime.”     The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra,
416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)
          "A court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction." (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, supra,  453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).).
    A judgment is void on its face if the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties.”
(Summers v. Superior Court (1959), supra, ; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) supra, ) Thus, the fact that a judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation does not insulate the judgment from attack on the ground that it is void. In People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan (1947) 81 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21-22 [183 P.2d 368

                                          To Ascertain The Truth
A Judge Must Allow for Due Process

   If the Defendant had of been allowed due process to be heard on June 9, 2007, she would have brought to the attention of the court that she was lawfully in court to have a void restraining order validated -- when she was unlawfully seized --  that restraining orders were provably already void for lack of due process -- and she could not be charged, or punished with violation of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147     Investigator Twiss and Judge Bjork were guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud on the court, elder abuse, denial of due process, and malice in the their actions against the Defendant.
      A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights. Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461, and, is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal. ( e.g. a future preliminary hearing where more charges were filed against the Defendant.)
     “Even the most rudimentary of due process procedures gives the opportunity to be heard . . . to anyone directly affected by [an] official’s action.”Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1108. . 
      The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.      
     Judge Bjork refused to hear what the Defendant had to say.
     “Defendants who  have been treated with unfairness, bias and the appearance of prejudice by this Court ,and the opposing counsel, leaves open the question of how an
uninterested, lay person, would question the partiality and neutrality of this Court.“…our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
      This court had a duty to ensure fairness. This Court failed, or refused to ensure that fairness. Marshall v. Jerrico, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 446 U.S. 238
    “ Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp., 892 (D.S.C. 1985).        Where Due Process is denied, the case is void , Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill. 25 (1936)


"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court [JUDGES ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT)] so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, 60.23.
     The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." THE JUDGMENT IS VOID!


      "When a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
[Emphasis supplied in original]. Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, they are warring on the constitution, i.e., the judge is engaged in
an act or acts of treason. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980 ); Cohens v. Virgina 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1921.   See: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,78 S.Ct. (1401 1958.       Therefore, without authority or jurisdiction, a judge loses absolute immunity and is subject to a law suit. (See: DEMAND LETTER, [Exhibit 2])


There needed to be experienced counsel from both sides and given the opportunity to discuss with a judicial officer the just resolution of the Defendant’s case. The truth of these void orders then would have been brought to light. The orders against her were easily proven void, and she could have easily helped to prepare a defense to prove that. . Instead, she was denied that ability, and suffered infliction of punishment prior to conviction. No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147 (order in excess of jurisdiction).
      MOST of the false, perjured accusations brought against the Defendant by the District Attorney were never prosecuted – they could not make their case.

Too often a person is jailed without any true investigation, even though ALL attorneys are held to the duty of “due diligenceAll attorneys are held to the duty of “due diligence  
Butler v State Bar (1986) 42 Cal3rd 323 (329) -- Paul Oil Company  v- Fed. Mutual Insurance (1998) 154 Fed 3rd 1049,
     Rules of Professional Conduct - 3-200 Prohibitive Objectives -- Rules of Professional Conduct - 5-200 --  Business and Profession Code Section 6068 - Attorney's Duty to Investigate Case -- Butler v State Bar (1986) 42 Cal3rd 323 (329) -- Paul Oil Company  v- Fed. Mutual Insurance (1998) 154 Fed 3rd 1049
    The Defendant was stigmatized simply by being charged, and then not being able to testify or defend herself in the kangaroo-court  setting such as what happened with Judge
Bjork, then again at the Preliminary Hearing, and then again with Judge Douglas only added to the impression that her silence was an indicator of guilt. Presumption of innocence, and reasonable
doubt were totally ignored in these court room settings. Interestingly, the court has held that it violates due process to use a defendant's silence against him, yet that is exactly what happens in this unjust process. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)

     Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
An unethical, overzealous District Attorney
is the most powerful and dangerous person in the court room. S/he can make, break or ruin a person's life.
     At the Preliminary Hearing, Deputy District Attorney Kristi Elise Belcher allowed her witnesses to provably commit Suborned Perjury.  Attorney Belcher absolutely heard them over and over contradict their own police reports, and KNEW Jose Liceaga in particular was perjuring himself, as on the Cathedral City Police Report 0507-3482  recorded in this case, where his own witness, Roger Abernathy, confirmed Liceaga was lying. Of course she never called this witness, even though she had the police report documented in this case.
This is fraud on the court.     Deputy District Attorney Kristi Elise Belcher was sent a thirty page document, which is documented in this case, from The Cathedral City Police Department that “closed” the case against the Defendant.  Attorney Beltcher suppressed that report, and never submitted it in Discovery to the Public Defender’s Office. This again is Fraud On The Court. Deputy District Attorney, Kristi Elise Belcher used legal process for fraudulent purposes such as attempting to enforce a judgment on a fictitious claim. 1 AM J2d Abuse PSS 9-12.   
    However, “The role of the prosecutor differs significantly from that of others who practice law, including criminal defense lawyers: A Prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state ... the prosecutor represents 'sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done' Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78,88 (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal 4th 800, 8.
Prosecutors have a special obligation to promote justice and the ascertainment of truth. ... The duty of the district attorney is not merely that of an advocate. His duty is not to obtain convictions, but to fully and fairly present... the evidence..." People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1378
     The truth and evidence was there for the District Attorney to ascertain, but the District Attorney' was so anxious to win, at all costs, that they ignored the Defendant’s right to a fair trial, and never did the required investigation of the cases they were prosecuting her for. (SEE: Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1, cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 1998) “… competent handling of a particular matter involves inquiry into analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.
     There was never anything fair about the case the District Attorney was building against the Defendant. As an officer of the court, the prosecutor has a heavy responsibility to the court and to the defendant to conduct a fair trial. (United States v. Escalante (9th Cir. 1980) 637 F.2d 1197, 1203.) “The prosecutor's job isn't just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules.” (United States v. Kojayan
(9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1315, 1323).     An attorney's professional responsibilities, whether prosecutor, or defense are set forth in, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 2668; People v. Pope(1979) 23 Cal.3d 412; as In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal 4th 924.
     No one can be punished for disobedience of a void order. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 759, 764, citing Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 405, 408-09; seeIn re Berry (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 137, 147; County of Ventura v. Tillett, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110.

The Court Has A Responsibility
To Correct a Void Judgment

        The statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, p. 569; Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648].) This rule holds as to all void judgments. In the other two cases cited, People v. Massengale and In re Sandel, the courts confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct void judgments.

     The Defendant did plead guilty after a year of incarceration, in solitary confinement, and a few weeks in Patton State Hospital, and, knowing she would not be adequately defended by her public defenders due “bad lawyering.” However, the Defendant had not committed any crime, and it was a legally impossible admission to be guilty of a crime she did not commit. “In this case we hold that since a trial court’s acceptance of a negotiated plea which patently includes a legally impossible admission it constitutes an act in excess of its jurisdiction.”  People v. Soriano, 4 Cal. App 4th 781—1992.       We cannot affirm a conviction and sentence imposed for a crime that does not exist…”  (People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 781,785 [ 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138])   
       “… where fundamental jurisdiction is lacking… it follows there is no crime, the court lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. This conclusion is compelled not only by the statutes and cases interpreting those statues, this conclusion comports with fundamental principles of justice. The notion that a person can be punished under the criminal law for committing an act that is not a crime is entirely outside our system of jurisprudence.” People v. Vasilyan 174 Cal. App. 4th 443 – Cal Court of Appeals, 2nd Dist. Div. 8, 2009.  See also, People v. Dlugas, one of the leading cases on legal impossibility, also known as People v. Jaffe Court of Appeals of New York
, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906)     The Defendant could not plead guilty to the already void judgments from the time of her unlawful seizure,
June 9, 2007, or to any cases filed piggy-back on those void judgment. All were void, and one cannot violate a void order.
All proceedings founded on a void judgment are themselves regarded as void. A void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place… it is not entitled to enforcement. 30A Am Jur Judgments 43, 44, 45.  Henderson v. Henderson, 232 NC 380, 100 SE 2d 227.
, no judgment could be filed against the Defendant, and all subsequent added judgments, including the sham, felony charges,  filed by the Riverside County District Attorney on this case are void, and, THEREFORE, on this point alone the Criminal Case against the Defendant needs to be validated as void, and dismissed as such, with an Award of Damages.
Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)


The Defendant is a Pro Per
     It is held that a pro-se pleading requires less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer. Puckett v. Cox 456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA). And, Justice Blackin in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)

     The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the

purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice." 
     “…a pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys”  SEE:  Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Haines v.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v.Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)           
     “A court faced with a motion to dismiss, a pro se complaint must read the complaint’s allegations expansively,” Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S.519, 520-21, S. Ct. 594, 596, 60 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1972) 
      “Court has a special obligation to construe pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally”
Polling v. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000
     “We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.”
Tannenbaum v.United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)

     The California Rules express a preference for resolution of every case on the merits, even if resolution requires excusing inadvertence by a pro se litigant that would otherwise result in a dismissal. The Judicial Counsel justifies this position based on the idea that "Judges are charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing referee... A lawsuit is not a game, where the party with the cleverest lawyer prevails regardless of the merits.” (John Greacen, Greacen Associates LLC, "Ethical Issues for Judges in Handling Cases with Self-Represented Litigants" <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Ethical/May_07_Ethical_Issues.ppt.>
     It suggests the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable and necessary to insure a fair trial" and says "There is only one reported case in the U.S. finding a judge's specific accommodations have gone too far"
     As a matter of law, because from the beginning The District Attorney’s Office, Judge Bjork, and then all judges, and defense attorneys, through “bad lawyering” and a lack of  due diligence, makes this a frivolous case and a void on the face judgment,  which has violated the Defendant’s right to a fair trial, caused her great harm, pain and suffering, and has left her in a state of Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome to this day, this case needs to be dismissed as void.
    All that is required to determine the original void case, on which the District Attorney did unlawfully and falsely prosecute the Defendant,  is to simply review the judgment roll record in
Trylson v Stephens INC057008 Riverside County Superior Court, Indio CA ), and Robbins v. Stephens, INC 040482 Riverside County Superior Court, Indio, CA. as is required to determine a void judgment.  People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., (2004) 33 Cal.4th at p.661).  It is that simple.

     This void criminal case against the Defendant, must be dismissed on the record, her record expunged, and an Award for Damages in the minimum amount of $100 @ day, (about $40,500). The court is also asked to award the Defendant punitive damages of $500,00 dollars, for a false and malicious prosecution that caused her much harm, from which she still suffers, and, any other damages as the court sees fit.

                                                                           Respectfully Submitted.

October ___, 2010                                         _______________________
                                                                            Sharon Dale Stephens